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Women have become an essential part of Western militaries. Particularly 
concerning the experience of NATO militaries in Afghanistan, there has been much 
public attention on the role of women in the military. While Western militaries are often 
studied as a whole with regards to military operations, there is variation in both how 
women are employed in the military and the experience they have as service members. 
This dissertation seeks to understand the cause of this variation by examining three 
critical cases: France, Norway and the United States. 
In this dissertation, I argue foundational beliefs about gender equality affect the 
institutional trajectory of military integration. Thus, variation in how gender equality is 
defined and operationalized across the Western world help explain the variation in 
women’s integration into militaries. The differences inherent in these beliefs can best be 
understood and operationalized through tracing the way in which women’s movements 
interacted with the government and society, and the differences in the claims made about 
women’s participation in public life. As an institution of the government, the military 
rarely makes policies about women’s service in a vacuum, but rather as a result of or 
response to broader equality law or shifts in attitudes about women’s roles in public life. 
While policies about women’s service set the stage for women’s integration, 
integration is a result of the interaction between claims about women’s military 
 iii 
participation and broader military culture and history. When the claims made about 
women’s service are compatible with the role and culture of the military, there is a high 
level of integration. When the claims about women’s service and military culture are in 
conflict, there is a low level of integration. In France, the claims about women’s 
participation and military culture have largely been in concert with one another, resulting 
in a high level of integration. In Norway, there have been periods in which they 
coincided, and periods in which they have been in tension, resulting in a moderate level 
of integration. In the United States, they have largely been in conflict with one another, 
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CHAPTER 1  
Shoulder to Shoulder yet Worlds Apart:  
The difference in Women’s Experiences in the Military 
 
 
 While women in the military have been instrumental for centuries, modern 
experiences have put the role of women in the military at the forefront of public 
consciousness. Women have been key to the tactical successes seen in Afghanistan since 
September 11, 2001. In particular, women have been an essential component to 
counterinsurgency and village stability operations, engaging parts of the population that 
traditional male infantrymen have been unable to reach. While the United States was an 
initial leader in the combat operations, other nations quickly took on prominent roles. The 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was truly a joint mission that relied on 
integrated strategic and tactical aims of all countries involved. As North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg exclaimed in a speech to the 
troops on December 14, 2014,  “for over a decade, the world’s largest coalition for peace 
and stability has stood shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan.”1 Indeed, the focus of the 
Secretary General’s remarks at the close of official combat operations in Afghanistan was 
 
1 Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the last North Atlantic Council with 
past and current non-NATO ISAF Contributing Nations, December 14, 2014.  Archived at NATO.int  
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on the joint nature of operations, how NATO and non-NATO International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) militaries worked together as a nearly seamless unit to eradicate 
Taliban and terrorist safe havens and promote local stability and rule of law. Though the 
overall success of combat operations has been subject to scrutiny and debate, there have 
been tactical successes, no matter how limited in their nature (See, for example, Lamb & 
Cinnamond, 2009; Chaudhuri & Farrell, 2011; Barno, 2007).  On the successes that were 
seen in Afghanistan, it was noted that “efforts at the tactical level would not be possible if 
gender roles and gender relations [were] not taken into account” (Lackenbauer & 
Langlais, 2013, p. 4).  Indeed, the importance of women for both localized tactical 
successes and overall implementation of strategic aims, was nearly universally noted by 
all levels of commanders in Afghanistan. NATO Deputy Secretary Rose Gottemoeller 
noted, “the ability to apply gender as a perspective and an analytical tool has proven to be 
vital to our missions and to our advising and training efforts to local security forces [in] 
Afghanistan.”2 Yet while ISAF’s actions in Afghanistan brought the universality of the 
need for a gendered focus in combat to light, it also highlighted some very important 
differences in women’s experiences in the military between participant countries.  
  
The Observable Difference 
 Given both the joint nature of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan and the near 
universal recognition for the importance of women, it would be easy to assume that 
 
2 Remarks at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, April 28, 2017. Archived 
at NATO.int  
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women in Western militaries, particularly those that participated in ISAF, can be studied 
as a homogenous group. Throughout Afghanistan, units were organized into Regional 
Commands (RCs), often led by officers from different countries. This created a 
battlespace in which general officers were frequently tasked with employing foreign 
troops on combat missions. Such activity assumes a great deal of interoperability between 
international forces. Processes such as uniform rules of engagement and clear chains of 
command helped ensure that ISAF forces could work together to achieve a common 
mission (US Army, 2012).  However, despite a convergence on most tactical aspects of 
military service in Afghanistan, there was no uniform policy on women in ISAF forces.   
This experience in Afghanistan highlights a puzzle: despite convergence of 
organizational and tactical aspects of their militaries, Western Democracies remain 
divergent on the integration of women in the military. Each individual nation maintains 
its own policies and practices with regards to what women are allowed to do, where they 
were allowed to be stationed, and the particulars around legal aspects of women working 
with infantry, or other ground-combat units.   
 This dissertation examines the cases of the United States, France and Norway as 
critical to understanding how despite having spent over a decade fighting “shoulder to 
shoulder,” women experienced very different levels of integration in the military. Not 
only were the tactical outputs of their participation different, but their experiences with 
the military and their path to service has been very different. I argue that these differences 
integration are a result of the interaction between claims made about women’s service in 
the country as a whole and military culture and tradition that unfolds over time. These 
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differences seen not only in combat operations in Afghanistan but also the domestic 
experiences of women. Understanding these differences cannot be done by looking at 
military conflicts alone. They are the consequences of a long and slow-moving process 
that has taken place against the backdrop of domestic fights for gender equality and 
military responses to a changing global order.  
The United States, Norway, and France are critical cases to understand these 
variations in the process and outcomes of integration. All three countries have been active 
proponents of increasing women’s presence and participation on the global stage, and 
have all been active in international military operations. Yet the paths to military 
participation women in each country took varied.  While much attention has been paid to 
the outcomes of utilizing women in the most recent wars, there are few studies on how 
women came to be integrated into their various roles. In this dissertation I look at the 
process of integration and find that it is an historical process that it has been, in large part, 
dictated by varying national beliefs about gender equality and their ability to resonate 
with military culture.  
 
Argument in Brief 
I argue foundational beliefs about gender equality affect the institutional 
trajectory of military integration.  Integration is a process that is driven by beliefs about 
the way in which equality should be practiced, and the resulting level of influence 
government has in shaping conditions for equality. The differences inherent in these 
beliefs can best be understood and operationalized through tracing the way in which the 
 5 
various women’s movements interacted with the government and society, and the 
differences in the claims made about women’s participation in public life.  As an 
institution of the government, the military rarely makes policies about women’s service 
in a vacuum, but rather as a result of or response to broader equality law or shifts in 
attitudes about women’s roles in public life.   
While policies about women’s service set the stage for women’s integration, 
integration is not set by policy along. It is a result of the interaction between claims about 
women’s military participation and broader military culture and history. The difference in 
claims is driven by differences in beliefs about equality. Military culture is driven by 
beliefs about the military’s place in the geopolitical order, its history of warfare, and its 
responsiveness to changing global politics. This can be operationalized in the degree to 
which the conduct of violence is emphasized as a source of authority for service 
members. Though the military is the legitimate institution of political violence, it has 
functional roles that exceed killing or physical destruction. Indeed, achieving the political 
aims of military action often rests on restraint in using force. The centrality of combat to 
the military identity varies across the Western world and between the countries examined 
in this dissertation. Additionally, military culture is manifested in the degree to which 
citizenship claims hinge on military service. This can be seen in the degree to which 
militaries embody the “schoolhouse for the nation” idea professed by Ronald Krebs 
(2006) in which militaries serve to make citizens by uniting diverse individuals into a 
common identity. Changes to global politics have made certain aspects of military culture 
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more desirable and conducive to women’s integration, and militaries have adopted to 
these changes in varying ways.   
When the claims made about women’s service are compatible with the role and 
culture of the military, there is a high level of integration. When the claims about 
women’s service and military culture are in conflict, there is a low level of integration. In 
France, the claims about women’s participation and military culture have largely been in 
concert with one another, resulting in a high level of integration. In Norway, there have 
been periods in which they coincided, and periods in which they have been in tension, 
resulting in a moderate level of integration. In the United States, they have largely been 
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In France, where there was a strong legacy of institutional equality, the women’s 
movement lobbied the state to ensure that provisions were made to account for and 
mitigate any differences between men and women that could potentially be detrimental to 
women’s advancements. The military was one of the first places for women to experience 
professional equality, as it was impacted by the public policies created to ensure 
structural equality between men and women.  The beliefs about the role of government in 
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promoting equality, namely that formal public policy has a role in not only promoting, 
but shaping public values, meant that women were able to promote further change once 
in the military. The military’s history of adaptability and response to changing global 
politics led to a military that valued restraints on the use of force and adoption of 
gendered policies in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency.  Such a culture is amenable to 
the claim’s made about the benefits of the unique characteristics that women bring to the 
military. The high level of women’s integration in France is a reflection of the fact that 
women, acting as women, have contributed not only to the adoption of new policies that 
better account for the differences women face, but have also had the ability to have an 
impact on both military tactics and strategies.     
In Norway, the women’s movement emerged from a society that was rooted in 
beliefs about citizenship equality, downplaying the differences between the genders and 
focusing instead on the import contributions made by all citizens. In the early 1970s, 
wide-sweeping policies were made to bring all citizens into the military.  A combination 
of the de-gendered nature of the claims made by the women’s movement, and focus on 
normalizing an inclusive citizenry resulted in policies and practices – from physical 
requirements to bunking accommodations – that view men and women as virtually 
identical. The military’s focus on making citizens and preserving the values of “true 
Norwegianness” coincided greatly with the second wave feminist argument about 
citizenship equality for women. However, as the military needed to respond to changes in 
geopolitics that necessitated gendered engagement with other cultures, the gender-neutral 
claims about women’s service began to conflict with military ideals, stalling further 
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progress on women’s integration. The result is a moderate level of integration in the 
Norwegian military.  While many of the cultural problems of “hyper masculinity” 
frequently associated with the military have not been present in Norway, some of the 
particular benefits from women’s service haven’t been quickly or easily realized either.  
While women in the Norwegian military were among the first to make strides in the 
infantry and senior leadership world-wide, the continued focus on de-gendered 
citizenship has meant that women have had moderate success in influencing military 
policies, tactics and strategy in a changing world.      
In the United States the women’s movement lacked a cohesive claim about 
women’s participation in public life and instead sought to empower individual women to 
prove their value in society. The United States also has a history that relies much less on 
state-led policies to legislate equality. Women’s participation in the military was either 
driven by tactical necessity or framed as individually empowering, a means by which 
women could prove their strength and grit. The combat focus of the United States 
military has left little space for claims about women’s service beyond national security. 
Women that have joined the military typically conform to the dominant male ideology, 
focusing on achieving individual success rather than changing the institution. As a result, 
laws around women’s participation in the military frequently had to play catch-up to what 
women were already doing. Little formal change – either in policy or culture – was made 
by women, resulting in a low level of integration in the United States Military.   
Understanding the process by which women have been integrated into the military 
has both scholarly and practical benefits.  From a scholarly perspective, it focuses on the 
 10 
military as an institution of democracy and part of the makeup of a country’s identity, 
rather than just a tool of violence. The exceptional nature of the violence that military is 
capable of frequently overshadows the other functional roles the military plays – such as 
promoting democratic norms and values, and preserving human rights.  However, 
viewing the military as part of the larger set of democratic institutions, we see that 
women’s integration into the military is not only a strategic or tactical innovation, but 
also a mechanism of social change. The military has a long history of being a tool of 
citizenship, both in giving previous out-groups claims to expanded sociopolitical rights 
and in indoctrinating new citizens into a political culture (Krebs, 2006). Indeed, 
institutions in democracies seek to be expansive and reflective of their population in 
order to build robustness and durability (Olsen, 2009). The military is often viewed as 
excepted from this due to its unique role in engaging in violence on behalf of its people 
(Goldstein, 2001). The need to do violence has often been used as an argument to keep 
people out. However, I argue that despite its exceptional capacity for violence, military 
is, in fact, an essential institution for expansion. Looking beyond the violent aspects of 
military functions is an important part in understanding this integration and the degree to 
which women have been able to leverage it.  
While present in nearly every democracy, variation exists in both the degree to 
which the societal role of the military is emphasized and the way that militaries have 
evolved with regards to changes in global politics. Carl von Clausewitz noted nearly 200 
years ago that war was the “continuation of politics by other means.” It is not violence for 
violence’s sake, but the specific and disciplined use, or threat of use, of violence to 
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achieve a particular political objective. In the 200 years since Clausewitz noted this, 
global politics has changed. So, too, has the conduct of war, and by extension the 
composition and role of the military in society. Understanding integration requires a more 
nuanced look at the different ways that militaries have been used in response to the 
changes in global politics.        
Viewing the military as a government institution, rather than just a tool of 
violence, allows better differentiation between integration, and inclusion. Much of the 
current focus on women’s participation is on the way in which women have been 
included. However, to truly understand the difference in women’s participation, we need 
to better understand integration. Integration is not merely bringing women into the 
military to fight, but a process of structural allowances, participation, and meaningful 
impact that allows women to leverage their unique contributions in order to better the 
military’s policies, tactics and strategies. Integration thus allows women to influence the 
military in a way that is reflective of the unique benefits that women bring to the public 
arena. France, Norway, and the United States despite all having made strides in including 
women in their militaries, have different level of integration. Understanding why these 
differences exist will help explain the observable variations in women’s experiences in 
the military, as well as their ability to affect tactical outcomes.    
From a practical standpoint, understanding the differences in levels of integration 
is of great interest to military leaders. As shown by the recent ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan and beyond in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) coalition forces are 
becoming standard practice for Western militaries in today’s national security arena.  
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Women are increasingly seen as necessary in these operations. It is thus very likely that 
military leaders will have female troops from other countries under their command.  
Understanding the differences in women’s integration in various militaries will help 
commanders to best employ women.   
Further, throughout the Western world, women in the military remain a topic of 
discussion and policy debate.  From 2000-2016, nearly every NATO member state and 
member of the partnership for peace has said that they have “enacted new policies” or 
“engaged in studies” aimed at increasing the number of women in the military or 
increasing retention rates of women in the military.3 A large majority of these studies 
include wide-sweeping reviews of other countries’ experiences with women in the 
military as a baseline to set new policies  (Berkshire Consultancy Ltd., 2009; Burrelli, 
2012; Cawkill, Rogers, Knight , & Spear, 2009; Trucano, Myers, Corbo, Hare, & Gaddes, 
2017).  However, rarely, if ever, are the programs and policies of other countries put in an 
historical or cultural context. While there are commonalities between NATO allies, there 
are historical and cultural differences that must be taken into account when making 
policies aimed at encouraging more participation by or greater retention of women.  By 
approaching integration as a process and situating it within its cultural and institutional 
historical context, I shed light on what parts of integration are generalizable and what 
parts are particular to a particular country’s cultural view of gender equality and military 
institutional history.       
 
 
3 NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives Annual Reports 2000-2016.  While not every country enacted 
new policies or commissioned studies every year, each did at least once.  
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Plan of the Dissertation  
 This dissertation consists of three parts. Part one (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) explains 
how the various beliefs about gender equality interact with military culture to explain 
variation in women’s integration. It shows how this study differs from previous attempts 
to understand women’s military participation by introducing a definition of integration 
that goes beyond the measures of inclusion typically used. In the remainder of this 
chapter I discuss my approach, case study selection, and briefly address alternative 
explanations for the puzzle of variation in gender integration. Chapter 2 introduces the 
various beliefs about gender equality and highlights how the women’s movements in 
France, Norway and the United States contributed to the claims made about women’s 
service. In particular I focus on the degree to which the claim had universal appeal and its 
strength in appealing to the various military culture. In Chapter 3 I differentiate between 
integration and inclusion by arguing that what is missing in the current studies of 
women’s military participation is an outcome-driven study of integration. I argue that a 
cornerstone to understanding the observable differences in these cases is in looking at 
historical evolution of the process of integration, rather than its individual aspects or 
particular moments of inclusion. I conclude Chapter 3 by discussing how claims about 
women’s participation and military roles and culture interact to drive the process of 
integration.  
 Part 2 (Chapters 4-6) consists of in-depth case studies of France, Norway, and the 
United States. A structured-focused comparison of each country first examines the role of 
the military in society, and then traces the way that the claims about women’s service 
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coincide and conflict with it. I look a three particular time periods that are reflective of 
major changes in global politics. The first is the 1970s – early 1990s. This period 
represents the early legislative impact of second wave feminism to the end of the Cold 
War. The second is the early 1990s – 2001. This period represents the end of the Cold 
War through the attacks of September 11, 2001. The third is 2001 – present. This period 
represents the post-9/11 world. Through tracing the process of integration in each 
country, I show how the differences in initial policy conditions and claims about service 
ultimately resulted in the observed different levels of integration.   
 In Chapter 4 I discuss women’s integration into the French military. In France, the 
women’s movement focused on institutional equality, highlighting that there were 
differences between men and women and that formal government apparatuses should 
mitigate that difference. The work of the women’s movement resulted in legislated 
equality for women in all public employment (to include the military) and focused on 
creating a formal support network to address those areas (primarily child care and 
parental issues) that disproportionally impact women’s ability to engage in public life.  
The military’s culture was conducive to women participating “as women,” and formals 
mechanisms allowed women to impact and change the military to make it more 
accommodating for women coming after them. Further, military doctrine reflected the 
unique contribution of women in both tactics and strategy.  
 In Chapter 5 I discuss women’s integration into the Norwegian military. The 
Norwegian women’s movement largely aligned with ideals of citizenship equality.  
Norwegian women downplayed their gender differences, focusing on the role that all 
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Norwegians played in promoting a stable and prosperous society.  As a result, policies 
were made that impacted “Norwegians” without differentiating gender.  Political and 
social structures were largely de-gendered, to include military service.  The military’s 
focus on making citizens, coupled with their emphasis on restraining the use of violence 
made them a pioneer in women’s integration. Since they began the process of integration, 
a modest, but steady, number of Norwegian women have consistently been in, and 
remained, in the military.  Yet while an initial leader in women’s participation, the gender 
neutrality of the policies has resulted in women’s “stalled” participation when faced with 
a changing global political order.  The experiences of the Norwegian military in 
Afghanistan has highlighted the need for increased women in the military, resulting in 
new policies being made to attract and train all-female special operations units and 
attempt to increase women’s integration. 
In Chapter 6 I discuss women’s integration into the United States military. For the 
United States, I show how the absence of a unified claim about women’s service and an 
historical distrust of government intervention for social equality, led the women’s 
movement to largely focus outside the formal government apparatus and encourage 
women to prove that they deserve equality. The degree to which men and women are (or 
are not) different has been the subject of a great deal of tension in the American women’s 
movement.  The military’s commitment to a combat-centric identity has further made it 
difficult for women to make strong claims about their participation broadly. Policies 
about women’s participation in the military have frequently been a response to what 
women were doing, or needed to do, in the conduct of war, and were often temporary. 
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Though the United States has a relatively high percentage of women in the military at any 
one point in time, due to a lack of supporting policies, very few women remain in the 
military to achieve enough seniority to effect change.  This has, in turn, impacted the way 
in which women have been used to face the challenges of the current security arena. 
Because of policies and a dearth of senior female combat leadership, women have been 
specially trained to augment all-male units. While individual women have been very 
successful in military careers, they have largely done so by proving their own personal 
worth, and conformed to, rather than pushed to change, the military.            
 Part 3 (Chapter 7) explores the implications of the differences of integration and 
examines how these differences may be leveraged.  As highlighted in the beginning of 
this chapter, these three countries, along with other NATO allies and coalition forces, rely 
on joint operations to meet today’s global security challenges.  Additionally, NATO 
countries frequently engage in joint training exercise and military educational exchange 
programs. However, despite increased exposure and the convergence of other tactical 
areas, the integration of women has remained culturally specific. Understanding how 
women have been integrated into different militaries is indeed helpful to joint operations, 
as it will help commanders to utilize the different strengths that have resulted from the 
various processes.  
 Additionally, understanding integration of women into the military as a process 
opens the door for many more research questions.  When we move beyond inclusion to 
integration, we are more richly able to explore the impact that women have on the 
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institution.  In part 3 I will introduce some of these potential questions and address their 
possibility to impact both scholarship and policy.  
 
Historical, Process Driven Approach to Understanding the Differences in 
Critical Cases  
Approach 
I argue that women’s integration into the military is a cultural process, driven by 
the interaction between claims made about women’s service and military identity and 
tradition. I take an historical-institutional approach to understand the different levels of 
integration seen in the France, Norway, and the United States.4 Integration is a process 
that takes place over a prolonged period of time, and is thus illustrative of the type of 
variable that Paul Pierson calls “cumulative and continual” (Pierson, 2003, p. 179). Such 
variables unfold over a prolonged period of time, and build upon themselves. Most 
studies looking at women’s participation in the military have focused on the impact of 
singular moments or policy decisions, treating the cumulative processes as fixed in a 
particular moment of time. While these studies tell us a great deal about those particular 
moments of inclusion, they do not capture the temporally dynamic process of integration.  
 
4 While Israel is a case worth of study for understanding women’s integration into the military it did not fit 
the most similar design of this dissertation for several reasons. First, Israel does not have the shared history 
with second wave feminist movements of the countries examined in this case. Second, Israel is involved in 
kinetic conflicts with its geographic neighbors, a reality that gives the military a different place in society 
than those countries who are primarily involved in operations abroad. However, while not included here, it 
is worth studying in the future to understand the role of culture in women’s integration.    
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Indeed, there are particular moments and events that are critical to integration, but these 
moments are only one part of a longer process of institutional evolution.  
Taking an historical institutionalist approach also allows for an examination of the 
constraints of institutional social change that are imbedded both within the institution 
itself and the society working to change it (Berry, Forthcoming). Using such an approach, 
I conceptualize integration as what James Mahoney terms a “self-reinforcing sequence,” 
in that it is “characterized by the formation and long-term reproduction of a given 
institutional pattern” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 510).  Integration is a temporally dynamic 
process that produces differing outcomes when applied to different countries.  The 
differences in beliefs about equality, and the resulting claims about women’s 
participation underpin the reproductive process. The process is constrained by beliefs 
about the role of the military and the military’s internal culture. Thus, even if seemingly 
identical laws and policies about women’s military service are passed in each country, the 
variation in culture and institutional evolution result in different levels of integration.     
Using differing beliefs about gender equality as the underlying mechanism for 
understanding military integration is unique.  Most studies of women’s inclusion in the 
military focus either on the gendered nature of the violence that the military is charged 
with conducting, and the paradox of women engaging in such violence, or the legal 
changes that allow for women’s participation in an historically male institution. They 
highlight how critical moments, such as total war or economic crisis, overcome this 
paradox, and allow society to better accept women participating in the typically male act 
of conducting war (See, for example: Carreiras, 2006; Goldstein, 2001; MacKenzie, 
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2015; Segal, 1995; Eulriet, 2012).  However, these studies do not capture the iterative 
nature of women’s service or the cumulative impact of social engagements that have led 
to variations in participation. They look at external shocks that see more women serving 
rather than internal learnings that shape the way that women service and the military as 
an institution interact with one another. Tracing the way in which that the claims made 
about women’s participation either coincided or conflicted with the role of the military in 
society and historical military culture thus gives insight into the slow moving yet 
dynamic process of integration.    
 
Case Study Selection 
The United States, Norway, and France are critical cases in understanding this 
difference. They  are similar in many ways, yet reflect differences in foundational beliefs 
about gender equality.  They thus represent a most similar research design and provide 
critical insight into how the nature of the interactions women’s groups had with political 
institutions and the kinds of claims they made about equality influenced the process of 
women’s integration into their militaries. All three countries are all wealthy and 
established democracies with both a democratic citizen-soldier tradition and formal 
civilian control of their militaries.  They are also all early members of NATO, active both 
in balancing the Soviet Union and in integrating former Soviet states.  They were all 
instrumental – and had active leadership roles – in ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan, with 
women winning numerous award for valor and conduct during combat. Culturally, they 
all had strong second-wave feminist movements in the 1960s-80s that actively lobbied for 
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expanded social, economic, and political rights for women. As of 2015, all three 
countries legally allow women to participate in all occupational specialties in the 
military. 
However, the underlying belief about gender equality is the key variable in 
explaining the difference in military integration. Despite all being liberal democracies 
that promote “equality,” both domestically and internationally, they do not conceptualize 
equality in the same way. France represents institutional equality, with a focus on a high 
level of difference between men and women, and an emphasis on the government 
enacting laws and policies that ensure that this difference does not results in equality. 
Norway embodies citizenship equality, emphasizing the similarity between all citizens 
with an emphasis on citizens receiving much from the government in return for 
substantial service. In the United States there has historically been an emphasis on 
individual achievement and a lack of social or cultural cohesion. As a result, there was 
little consensus on the nature of role of men and women in society, resulting in an 
absence of a uniform claim about women’s equality. These differences led to cohesive 
claims about women’s military participation in France and Norway, and individualized 
efforts on the part of women in the United States.  
The “women’s movement” of the United States and Western Europe frequently 
get lumped into a generic category, as they all focused on ensuring greater sociopolitical 
rights in established, liberal democracies (Rowbotham, 1996).  A closer examination of 
the movements, though, shows that while all possessed a macro-focus on “women’s 
rights,” the types of claims, and the specific actions taken by women’s groups in various 
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countries were constrained by foundational beliefs about what equality looks like. In 
teasing out the differences in these views, I take Judith Butler’s advice to not allow the 
“universal subject of women … to override or reduce the distinct articulations of gender 
asymmetry in different cultural contexts” (Butler, 2011, p. 48). These differences are 
frequently overlooked when comparing women in the military.  By taking them into 
account, I am able to tease out the critical difference in the path to and process of 
integration that have resulted in the observed variation in outcomes and experiences of 
women in the Norwegian, French and United States militaries. 
There are also differences in beliefs about the military’s role and culture. The 
militaries in each of the countries reflect different orientations with regards to their place 
in the world. These differences have resulted in variations in the sources of authority for 
leadership and legitimacy. The United States has long been seen as a “superpower,” 
emphasizing military might and conventional combat. As a result, the infantry has been 
seen as the primary source of authority. France and Norway have both largely enjoyed 
the United States’ security umbrella, and have thus placed their sources of authority in 
military aspects other than combat. Norway’s historical subjugation to Denmark and 
Sweden has resulted in a military that is focused on the differential aspects of Norwegian 
culture that set it apart. The military is largely seen as the protector of Norwegian values 
and the maker of “true” Norwegian citizens. France’s military culture is shaped by its 
colonial legacy and current relationship to its former colonies. It is largely adaptable to 
the changing international political arena and rewards innovation in both tactics and 
strategies.  
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Taken together over time, the interaction between the claims made about 
women’s military participation and military culture, result in differences in the levels of 
women’s integration into the military. From the way women are talked about by their 
peers and senior leaders, to policies on coed bunking facilities, to provisions for child 
care and parental leave, despite years of fighting side by side, women have very different 
experiences with military service.  These differences are reflective of differences in the 
integration process as experienced by women in the United States, France, and Norway. 
There have been differences in the way in which women have been able to impact the 
military as an institution, both in terms of policies and strategy.  Taken in total, these 
represent differences in levels of integration in the countries considered.  














Table 1.2: Overview of Case Selection 
 United States Norway  France 
Similarities  -  Liberal 
democracy 
- Civilian control of 
military 
- Early NATO 
member  
- Military strategy 
includes promoting 
democratic values  
- History of 
women’s 
participation in the 
military  
- Participation in 
operations in 
Afghanistan 
- Active women’s 
movement  
-  Liberal 
democracy 
- Civilian control of 
military 
- Early NATO 
member  
- Military strategy 
includes promoting 
democratic values  
- History of 
women’s 
participation in the 
military  
- Participation in 
operations in 
Afghanistan 
- Active women’s 
movement 
-  Liberal 
democracy 
- Civilian control 
of military 
- Early NATO 
member  
- Military strategy 
includes 
promoting 
democratic values  
- History of 
women’s 
participation in the 
military  
- Participation in 
operations in 
Afghanistan 















 There are currently three primary lines of arguments used to explain women’s 
increased participation in the military: to support the war effort, competition for 
employment, and reflection of societal views about women. While these arguments have 
historical validity and are foundation for the study of women in the military, the fall short 




Supporting the War Effort 
The need for women to support a national war effort is the most common and 
universally used explanation for women’s increased role in the military.  Indeed, it has 
been used both as justification by policy makers (the “Free a Man to Fight” logic) and as 
an explanatory tool by academics (Enloe, 1980; Eitelberg, 1988; Higonnet, 1987) to 
explain why it becomes both legally and socially acceptable for women to increasingly 
engage in military service. As Segal (1995) explains, as the threat to national security 
goes up and states need bigger militaries to confront this rising threat, women are seen as 
necessary in order to meet the needs of the growing size of the military.  The exceptional 
nature of war-time means that states will take “seemingly exceptional” measures, 
including recruiting and expanding the role of women, in order to meet their security 
needs (Goldstein, 2001).  This approach uses participation in war and the size of 
militaries as the primary independent variables.   
This approach fails to explain the current variation in levels of integration. The 
United States, Norway and France have been engaging in most of the same international 
conflicts since the end of the Cold War, yet experience different levels of integration. 
Additionally, it cannot explain why all Western militaries are focusing on measures to 
increase the presence of women in their ranks, despite drawing down the size of their 
militaries. For this logic to hold, given the comparatively rapid rise of women in Western 
militaries, we would expect to see an increase in the number of wars being fought by 
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Western militaries and a growth in the size of militaries.  However, neither of conditions 
are met in the post-Cold War era.  
 
Figure 1.1: States Experiencing Warfare  
 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace, systemicpeace.org  
 
Figure 1.2: Total Force Numbers for Select NATO Forces 1990-2014 
 
Source: World Bank Data  
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As Figure 1.1 shows, war has been generally on the decline.  NATO and Western 
militaries, in particular, have decreased their number of military interventions as well 
(Kisangani & Pickering, 2008).  Additionally, as shown in Figure 1.2, the size of 
militaries has been trending downward or holding steady.  Further, most NATO nations 
have participated in the same conflicts since the end of the Cold War,5 making war an 
inadequate explanation for the variation in women’s integration.    
 
Competition for Employment   
As militaries have professionalized, economics increasingly plays a role in the 
personnel composition of the armed forces.  When men no longer have to serve in the 
military, they are more likely to choose jobs that are less dangerous, more stable, and 
offer better pay in the private sector.  As a result, states must increasingly turn to women 
to fill the ranks of the military (Stanley & Segal, 1988; Segal, 1995).  This logic is 
primarily related to the legal provisions of women’s participation, offering evidence as to 
why states open positions to women that seemingly contradict social norms (Eulriet, 
2012).  If this approach were true, we would expect to see low male unemployment (as 
men have secure private sector jobs) when seeing an increase of women in professional 
militaries. As Mady Segal asserts “high [male] unemployment rates are associated with a 
ready supply of men for the armed forces, and relatively low opportunities for women” 




women in the military contracted (Stanley & Segal, 1988). Therefore, given the stark rise 
in women’s military participation since the end of the Cold War, we would expect to see 
very low male unemployment.  Figure 1.3 shows the trend lines of male unemployment 
in select NATO countries.  While unemployment was falling in the 1990s, it rises sharply 
beginning around 2000.  It is in the early 2000s that most NATO countries saw their most 
dramatic increase in women in the military, making explanation via economics less 
likely.  
 
Figure 1.3: Male Unemployment Rates of Select NATO Countries  
   
Source: World Bank Data  
 
Reflection of Societal Views on Women  
A final argument explaining women’s integration rests on the fact that 
professional militaries become more representative of the societies they protect.  
Therefore, as society’s values and attitudes about social norms (whether race or gender) 
change, the military should reflect that change (Abrahamsson, 1972; Allen, 2000; Armor 


























































































































traditional roles, it becomes more acceptable for women to engage in a profession of 
violence (Carreiras, 2006).   
If this logic were to hold true in explaining the observable differences in Western 
militaries, we would expect to see states in which women we more present in the public 
workforce have more opportunities and higher levels of women’s integration in the 
military.6    
 
Figure 1.4: Women’s Workforce Participation  
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the public workforce participation of women in select NATO 
countries.  Used as an operationalization of attitudes and values about women’s public 
participation, it is moderately useful in explaining the various levels of women’s 
integration in militaries.  In the case of the countries with the highest women’s 
 
6 Operationalization from: Carreiras, Helena. Gender and the military: Women in the armed forces of 
western democracies. Routledge, 2006.And further explained in Alexander, Amy C., and Christian Welzel. 
"Empowering women: four theories tested on four different aspects of gender equality." Annual meeting of 
































































































































participation (represented by Norway and Canada), it is a plausible explanation for their 
high degree of military integration.  However, the other countries are more problematic.  
For example, despite their relatively high rates of workforce integration, the United States 
and United Kingdom have a relatively low level of overall military integration.  
Similarly, this approach cannot explain countries such as France and Belgium’s relatively 
low workforce participation yet high level of military integration.    
 
A Note about Women in the Military and Levels of Integration  
 This dissertation focuses on the different levels of integration of women in the 
French, Norwegian, and United States’ militaries as a way of understanding the observed 
differences of women’s experiences in Western militaries. While I operationalize 
integration, and place a value of “low,” “moderate,” or “high” on the three countries, this 
is a comparative value, not a values judgement on who a country has engaged with 
gender integration. As highlighted on the NATO committee on Gender Perspectives’ 
annual reports, women in the military remains a contentious and unsettled topic in nearly 
every country. Both government and military leaders continue to grapple with both policy 
provisions and culture issues around the topic.  My intent in labeling the levels of 
integration is not to highlight a “right” or “wrong” way, but to create a viable means for 
comparison.      
 It is also important to note that individual women in all three militaries still 
believe that there is much work to be done to improve both the experience of women and 
the overall effectiveness of the military.  This reality highlights the need to look at 
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integration rather than just inclusion. Indeed, in all three countries, women are legally 
allowed to participate in any occupational specialty, and their numbers are growing. The 
fact that despite this, women still feel as though their potential is not fully realized shows 
that there is still work to be done. My hope in highlighting the cultural and historic 
institutional constraints placed on the process of integration is that it will ultimately be 
able to help determine those spaces for opening more opportunities for women to be more 
fully integrated and utilized in their nations’ militaries.      
   
  
 31 
CHAPTER 2  
Beliefs, Laws, and Action:  
Views about equality and claims to women’s public participation 
 
 Military participation is one way in which women participate in public life. 
Though there is a commonality among women’s movements that women should have a 
greater participation in public life there is not a unified reason as to why. These claims are 
largely rooted in foundational cultural beliefs about gender equality. The variations in 
these claims are one of the driving forces in understanding the variations in the process of 
integration. Further, the way that claims interact with role of the military in public life 
and military culture creates either permissive or restrictive condition for the process of 
integration. In order to better understand the differences in claims made about women’s 
military service, I turn to the second wave feminist women’s movements in France, 
Norway and the United States as a way to understand the foundational differences in 
beliefs about gender equality. Though women’s movements were active on specific 
issues in the early part of the 20th Century, particularly workers’ and voting rights, the 
second wave feminist movement expanded the focus of women’s issues to engage with 
the totality of women’s position in society. Second wave feminism moved beyond 
specific legal demands (such as voting rights) to discussions of how to change large scale 
social, political and economic attitudes and opportunities for women ((Katzenstein & 
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Mueller, 1987). While the women’s movement rarely engaged directly with the military, 
the language used concerning women’s equality and the way in which women’s 
movements interacted with the government laid the groundwork for the claims made 
about women’s military service. 
It is important to look beyond individual women’s organizations and to view the 
women’s movement in a given country as a “broad political force” that weaves 
throughout a country’s many ideologies, identities, and moments of history (Katzenstein, 
1987) in order to better understand how the women’s movements impacted women’s 
integration into the military. I thus focus on the underlying beliefs about equality and the 
role of women in public life that transcended specific groups and result in unified claims 
about women’s service.  
 The impact of these underlying beliefs on women’s military integration fall into 
two primary categories. First is the way that underlying beliefs about equality influenced 
the type of claims made about women’s participation and roles in the military. Women in 
Norway, France, and the United States, as well as officials in the militaries in which they 
served, made claims about why women should (or shouldn’t) serve in the military. These 
claims are largely influenced by the beliefs about women’s equality espoused by the 
movements in the various countries. The language of the women’s movement permeated 
into social dialogue about women’s participation such that even groups not directly 
targeted by the movement adopted their language of equality.  
 The second area in which women’s movements had an impact on military 
integration is in creating initial structural enabling conditions. Legal provisions for 
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military service not only include what women are allowed to do in the military, but also 
enabling provisions, such as child care and maternity leave, that ensure the familial and 
social expectations placed on an individual because of one’s gender are not a limiting 
factor to service. In all three countries, women’s movements were largely responsible for 
lobbying for, and often drafting, the legislation that led to such policies. The variations in 
parental leave and childcare policies seen in the three countries are reflective of the 
variations in the underlying beliefs held by the women’s movements.  
 In this chapter, I discuss the three broad categories of belief about equality7  that 
differentiate the women’s movements in France, Norway, and the United States: 
institutional equality, citizenship equality, and individual equality. The differences in 
these categories will be traced through two factors: women’s self-identification compared 
to men, and beliefs about the government’s role in ensuring gender equality.  
I begin this chapter by discussing some of the key differences in foundational 
beliefs about equality. I then go into more detail about how each country’s women’s 
movements defined and professed their self-identification in relation to men and their 
interaction with the government.  Throughout the chapter I highlight how these 
differences resulted in different types of legislation concerning the key structural 
enabling conditions of child care and parental leave. I conclude this chapter highlighting 
 
7 These are based on the work of Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller who focuses on 
the difference between institutional and citizenship ideas of equality.  Combining their work with that of 
Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith and Dieter Rucht I added the idea of individual equality to better 
capture those movements that primarily worked outside the state to promote gender equality in the private 
or social sectors.  
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how these differences resulted in differences in both the strength and type of claims that 
helped inform and constrain the process of women’s integration into the military.    
 
Beliefs About Equality  
Studies of feminism and women’s movements have a prominent focus on second 
wave feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The era of second wave feminism was 
one of global change and idea diffusion (Klein, 1987). Additionally, feminist journals and 
magazines were published in many countries across the West during this era, allowing for 
both the sharing of ideas and access to primary source materials. While the diffusion of 
ideas did result in some commonalities between countries, a closer examination 
highlights that there were variations in the way in which women’s movements talked 
about equality. National cultural and political history and traditions contribute to these 
variations that can be seen in the different self-identifications and beliefs about the role 
that government plays in ensuring gender equality. We can see these differences through 
outcomes in terms of both policy achievement and social claims about women’s role in 
public life throughout the Western world (Katzenstein & Mueller, 1987; Banaszak, 
Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003).  
While the Western world is frequently thought to be blanketly “liberal” with 
regards to social and political equality, there is quite a bit of variation in how that 
equality is understood, practiced, and manifested (Hindess, 1993).  Equality is broadly 
talked about throughout the West, particularly as a foundation for democracy. However, 
it is not practiced or conceptualized in a uniform manner. Understanding that political 
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culture, institutions, and historical experience all contribute to shaping socio-cultural 
ideas of equality, the following three broad categories of gender equality help our 
understanding of variations in women’s military integration.  
 




Characterized by Example Countries  
Institutional 
Equality 
- Gendered focus on differences 
between men and women  
- Government seen as responsible 
to ensure that differences don’t 
result in one gender being 
preferenced over the other  
- Women fill public roles that 
men can’t  
- Unified claims around the 





- De-gendered downplay of 
difference between men and 
women 
- Government provides large 
amount of equal social 
provisions for all citizens  
- Women viewed as citizens with 
the same obligations to the state 
as men 
- Unified claims around de-





- Individual ability, not gender, is 
the basis for equality  
- Government may be pressured 
to provide equality of 
opportunity, but no focus on 
equality of outcomes 
- Limited obligations of citizens 
of either gender to state 
- No universal claim about 
women’s public participation  





Because the military is both beholden to public policy decisions and reliant on 
citizens to make up its ranks, the underlying beliefs about equality held by the women’s 
movements and their interaction with the government shaped the way that women’s 
integration took place. Further, because the militaries of the United States, France, and 
Norway all rely on women volunteering to serve, the claims made about women’s role in 
public life influenced the choices that women made to join and remain in the military.  
Below, I briefly discuss the three different categories of beliefs about gender equality.   
 
Institutional Equality   
 Institutional equality is characterized by a high level of difference in women’s 
self-identification from men and a high level of government involvement to promote and 
ensure equality. Gender differences are not muted, but emphasized as necessary, and 
diverse characteristics that complement one another are highlighted. These differences 
are seen as necessary and it is incumbent on society to both protect and promote them. 
Institutional equality is frequently accompanied by a strong strain of intellectualism, 
focusing on the sources of inequality experienced by out-groups and the requirements to 
ensure social, political, and economic equality between them (Lovenduski, Women and 
European Politics, 1986). The focus of such intellectualism is often to guarantee that 
differences – whether innate or socially constructed – do not become “synonymous with 
oppression,” (Duchen, French Connections, 1987) but are properly leveraged to promote 
a diverse, yet equal, society. In this vein, the role of the government is to ensure that 
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differences do not put one group at a disadvantage to another in the formal or public 
sector. Public policy must provide the resources to mitigate any potentially adverse 
externalities resulting from differences and ensure a truly opportunity for equality.   
Women’s movements based on institutional equality tend to lobby the 
government for policies that make up for both the biological and socially constructed 
differences between the genders. Rather than downplaying femininity or attempting to 
dismantle gendered structures of power, the feminine is highlighted as a necessary 
complement to the masculine that has typically dominated society. Both must act together 
to ensure a well-functioning sociopolitical order. Formal institutions, from education to 
parliament to the military, are targeted in order to ensure that gender imbalances are not 
perpetuated and to ensure that public policy does not preference men. Universal child 
care, women’s health care, and parental leave are examples of policies for which such 
women’s groups lobby, as they help to mitigate some of the differences between men and 
women that have traditionally hindered women’s ability to achieve full equality in public 
life. In return, women participate in the public as women, often engaging with formal 
institutions in such a way that they adopt more feminine characteristics or are made 
aware of more feminine approaches to their work.   
France typifies institutional equality. French feminists highlighted the unique 
characteristics of women, and demanded institutional change to ensure that women would 
not be disadvantaged because of their differences. The government was lobbied to break 
the hold of the “institutions of the patriarchy”8 (Duchen, 1987). The words of Simone 
 
8 Term originally coined by Collette Guillaumin writing in Questions Feministes in 1979. 
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Veil, a French politician, exemplify this approach, noting that “a democratic system must 
ensure equal participation of all its citizens” (Quoted in Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 
2003, p. 74). An example of this can be seen in how child care was framed as a necessary 
provision for women’s participation in society. French feminists attacked the “unbearable 
conditions imposed on mothers” (Gallimard, 1973) and thus insisted that public policies, 
such as crèche care, were necessary to ensure that motherhood did not inhibit women’s 
ability to engage in public life on equal footing with men. Childcare remained a 
“woman’s issue,” and the differences between men and women were not muted, but 
highlighted as an essential part of a diverse public citizenry.      
 
Citizenship Equality 
 Citizenship equality centers around the idea that individuals – regardless of 
gender, race, religion, or ethnicity – are seen as citizens first, and any other particular 
identity groups second. From a gender perspective, citizenship equality is characterized 
by a low level of difference in women’s self-identification from men and a high level of 
government involvement to promote and ensure equality. Differences between 
individuals or identity groups are downplayed, and instead the similarities of both 
obligations and benefits of citizenship are emphasized. Often seen in social welfare 
states, citizenship equality is usually accompanied by generous benefit provision from 
state institutions given equally to all identity groups (Borchorst & Siim, 2008). Because 
of the high levels of benefit provision from the government, increased social, political 
and economic rights are often bargained for in return for service to the country or the 
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public good. Equality in benefit provision by the government to all groups can be seen as 
an instrument of social integration, as benefit provisions help ease the transition of a 
previous out-group into the social order (Banting, 1995). For example, immigrants who 
become citizens are given nearly the same benefits as those with birthright citizenship. 
Such universal provision works to create a more homogenous society and associated with 
“equality of the highest standards, rather than minimum need” (Epsing-Andersen, 1990, 
p. 27).  To ensure equality for all citizens, governments frequently provide such benefits 
as education, employment, healthcare, and parental benefits at the same level for 
everyone, regardless of their belonging to any particular identity group or gender.      
Norway is an example of a country rooted in citizenship equality. Even when 
lobbying for those issues or benefits traditionally seen as “women’s rights,” such as 
childcare, education, and parental leave, women’s movements did not frame them 
explicitly beneficial for women, but as a positive benefit for all of society. To combat the 
historical patriarchal nature of the state,9 Norwegian women focused on sociopolitical 
homogeny.  As women organized and lobbied for increased medical, social, economic, 
and political rights, they did so by stressing their sameness to their male counterparts as 
citizens, and willingly engaged in the same obligations, from increased taxes to universal 
military conscription. Women argued to be treated as citizens – and therefore afforded all 
the social welfare guarantees of their male counterparts – in order to expand the labor 
pool and defense market, something that would benefit all Norwegians, not only women 
(Hernes H. M., 1988).  This is highlighted in the case of universal childcare. Rather than 
 
9 For a discussion on the debate around the patriarchal nature of welfare states see O’Connor, 1993  
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being framed as necessary for women to have equal opportunity, Norwegian women 
argued that “working citizens” should be sociopolitical norm (Leira, 1992). State-
provided childcare would thus free more citizens to work, resulting in net benefits for 
society. Childcare thus became de-gendered, and seen not as the responsibility of women, 
but of “parents.” 
 
Individual Equality  
 Individual equality holds that it is each individual’s responsibility to overcome 
any perceived disadvantages or hardships and prove themselves based on merit. 
Individual equality is characterized by a lack of a unified belief about the difference in 
women’s self-identification from men and a low level of government involvement to 
promote and ensure equality. Government plays a minor role in ensuring equality, 
ensuring only that there are no formal structural restrictions on individuals achieving the 
same level of social, political, or economic success. The overarching focus of those 
rooted in individual equality is on empowerment of individuals and removing formal 
barriers to success without guaranteeing any particular outcome. Structural, institutional, 
or social mechanisms of inequality are greatly downplayed. With regards to gender, there 
is little consensus as to the differences between genders, whether those differences are 
biologically or socially constructed. As a result, rather than focus on group characteristics 
or differences, individual choice and ability is emphasized (Brenner, 1996). Unlike either 
institutional or citizenship equality, very little is expected from government, and, in 
return, there are lower expectations of public service for those groups that adhere to 
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individual inequality. Instead, it is up to the individual to choose the path that is best for 
them. Public policy is an “insufficient means of producing social change … [as] it denies 
autonomy, and forces a one-size fits all solution to a complex problem” (Costain, 1992, 
pp. 8-10). Proponents of individual equality thus seek to use the experiences and abilities 
of individuals that have been successful as proof of equal opportunity, highlighting 
success without assistance from formal government policies or structures.    
For women’s movements in individual equality, feminism, and the resulting 
identity vis a vis men, is seen as an individual choice. If there are perceived gendered 
differences that result in inequalities, it is up to the individual to compensate for them. 
The United States exemplifies individual equality. While women fought for increased 
recognition and rights, they appealed to individuals much more than the government. 
Harriot Stulman, a women’s activist and member of Students for Democratic Society, 
noted in 1967 that “women will always be invisible in [government] power … so we 
bypass the government” (Quoted in Evans, 1979, p. 167). Indeed, the tactics of the 
women’s movements reflected the historic belief in the United States that the government 
should not interfere with personal matters, to include gender relations (Evans, 1979; 
Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003; Costain, 1992). The absence of a national child care 
system is an example of how individual equality plays out in practice. Though groups 
such as the National Organization of Women (NOW) lobbied for federally-funded child 
care centers, the political opposition was strong,10 so groups did not devote resources to 
formal political lobbying (Mink, 1998). Rather, women’s groups encouraged individual 
 
10 See, for example, President Nixon’s veto of the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971  
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women to form child-care co-ops to “encourage community involvement in empowering 
women and direct social change” (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003, p. 1). It was 
believed that seeing examples of success in individuals would better direct change than 
government-led programs.  
 As noted above, women’s self-identification in relationship to men, and beliefs 
about the government’s role in promoting and ensuring equality are prominent 
differences between the various beliefs about equality. Taken together they result in 
different claims about women’s roles in public life. Table 2.2 highlights the differences 
for the countries included in this dissertation.  
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 Below I trace how this self-identification and beliefs about women’s equality 
combine in each country to result in claims about women’s’ role in public life. I then 
identify how the variation in these claims help us better understand the variation 
women’s military service.   
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France: Different Can be Equal 
Self-Identification: Strong emphasis on the difference   
French Feminism, and the women’s movements that it spurred, strongly adheres 
to the belief that there is a difference between men and women. While there was 
disagreement among organizations during the second wave feminist era as to whether the 
difference is part of the inherent natural differences between men and women or a result 
of social and political expereinces,11 there was agreement that they were fundamentally 
different. Both the intellectual roots of the women’s movements, and the experience of 
women during World War II were instrumental in emphaiszing this difference and 
contributing to solidifying it in the French consciousness.  
The intellectual roots of French feminism provide a strong body of work that 
focus on the difference between men and women. The source of that difference, as well 
as how it should be addressed, is the subject of a great deal of French feminist writing.  
The idea of the difference between men and women was so important to intellectual 
feminists that an entire issue of Questions Feministes12 in 1979 was dedicated to debating 
both the source and nature of difference in an attempt to find unity among feminist 
movements. The hope was that by engaging in dialogue about the source of the 
difference, women’s organizations could discover that they had more in common than 
 
11 The two major French women’s organizations, Psyche et Po and Mouvement de Liberation des Femmes 
(MLF), highlight this divide. While Psyche et Po focused primarily on the natural origins of the difference 
between men and women, MLF emphasized sociopolitical and economic roots of the masculine/feminine 
divide. Disagreements about the roots of the difference resulted in a great deal of discord among the 
women’s movements.    
    
12 A French feminist journal that ran from 1977-1980. It was originally founded by Simone de Beauvoir.  
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previously thought, and work together to advance a common cause. Collette Guilliam, a 
prominent French feminist intellectual, asserts in the introduction to the volume “as 
[women] we must address the heterogenous nature of our difference.  By heterogenous I 
mean that it covers both anatomical and physiological features and also social-psycho 
phenomen” (Guillaumin, 1979).   
The focus on the heterogenity of differnce, like many of the intellectual roots of 
French feminism, can be traced to Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. An example of 
the dual nature of difference can be seen in de Beauvoir grappling with the relationship 
between the act of sex and marriage:   
…It is still a difficult problem for [women] to reconcile their 
conjugal life with sexual satisfaction. A marriage generally 
does not mean physical love, it would seem reasonable to 
clearly differentiate one from the other. A man can 
admittedly make an excellent husband and still be 
inconstant: his sexual caprices do not in fact keep him from 
carrying out the enterprise of a friendly communal life with 
his wife… One might allow that it could be the same for the 
wife; she often wishes to share in her husband’s existence, 
create a home with him for their children, and still 
experience another embrace… But for women, the love act 
is still considered a service a wife must perform, the possible 
result of which makes her shakeled to her husband. (De 
Beauvoir, 1949, pp. 596-597) 
 
In this passage, we see de Beauvoir highlight how biological differences, namely the fact 
that women are the child bearers, are exploited through the socially constructed 
expectations in the institution of marriage. Throughout this seminal work, she highlights 
how both social institutions and formal laws take advantage of women’s biology and 
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therefore lessen their worth, chastising the French government for creating “a system 
based on women’s dependence” (De Beauvoir, 1949, p. 721). 
 Illuminating how laws and policies created an environment where women were 
considered second class citizens, often based on their biological differences, was a 
primary focus of the intellectual pursuits of French feminists. Indeed, they did not 
theorize for merely the sake of creating new ideas, but with a focus to change the policies 
that had allowed the government to continue to reproduce the patriarchy.  The desire to 
work to change the system is characterized by the introduction to the first issue of 
Questions Feministes: “Questions Feministes is a theoretical discourse that attempts to 
explain the causes and mechanisms, the why and the how of women’s oppression in 
general, or of one of its specific aspects; it welcomes any discourse that tries to draw 
political conclusions, which suggest a strategy or tactics for the feminist movement.”       
The writings contained in Questions Feministes served to enlighten and embolden 
women in a way that would result in lasting change. Intellectual feminism existed to 
“analyze and demystify the patriarchy and to project a reconstruction of a society where 
relations of domination are eliminated” (Duchen, 1986, p. 83).  
The focus on women’s difference was not only seen in intellectuals. Women in 
France became acutely aware of the differences between men and women during the 
Resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II. The women of the Resistance 
provided a practical model to highlight the benefits of leveraging the difference between 
men and women for the good of the country. With their role in liberating France, women 
of the Resistance and the Women’s Corps proved that national defense was not only a 
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man’s job. The influence of the Resistance women on claims made about the benefit of 
the difference between men and women on future generations is seen in the trial of 
Marguerite Gonnet. Ms. Gonnet, a mother of 9, was a successful fighter in France’s 
resistance. However, due to the formal restrictions that were still in place regarding 
women’s participation in combat and possession of firearms, she was put on trial in 1942. 
Upon being asked why she broke the law and “picked up a gun,” she responded, “quite 
simply, Colonel, because the men had abandoned their weapons” (Transcript of the trial 
in Douzou, 1995). Throughout the trial the message remained clear: women picked up 
arms because the men, charged with the defense of the country, had failed.   
 Throughout the Resistance, women were able to largely do what men were not. 
From bombing Nazi barracks to leading raids on Nazi strongholds, women proved 
essential to the liberation of France (Weitz, 1995; Diamond, 2005). It is worth noting that 
women, by in large, acted in line with social gender norms when carrying out combat 
actions. They adapted to cultural norms about women’s role in society, often seducing 
officers to get information or access to intimate spaces. Rather than engaging in overt 
offensives, the women of the Resistance used their femininity to move through occupied 
France with little suspicion and launch covert attacks. The success of female members of 
the Resistance resulted in women experiencing both validation and a form of freedom 
previously unknown. As Jean Paul Sartre wrote in the Atlantic, “Never were we freer 
than under the German occupation … for they forced us all to be Frenchmen in the ways 
in which we knew how” (Sartre, 1944, p. 43). This freedom, for women to live as equals 
to their male counterparts while maintaining their femininity, and have their differences 
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celebrated as necessary for victory, would serve as a foundation for the claims made 
about women’s public service throughout the Fifth Republic.  
 Recalling their roles in particular combat operations, partisans13 noted that their 
success was largely due to the fact that they were able to leverage their differences and 
move through occupied France in a way that their male counterparts were not. Reflecting 
on her assassination of a Vichy military officer, “Claude”14 spoke of wearing her best 
dress and a hat with an ostrich feather to woo him at Maxime’s, a fine dining 
establishment where German and Vichy military officers would dine. After a flirtatious 
evening, she escorted him out a rear door, leading the officer to believe that their evening 
was “off to a grandiose finish” (Interview in Schwartz, 1998). Outside, she led the officer 
into the backseat a cab driven by a member of the Resistance, and met his advances with 
a shot from a revolver to the head. She exited the cab, and walked through the streets, 
passing the Gestapo checkpoints without suspicion while her comrade disposed of the 
body. Similarly, Fanny Dutet and Betty Jegouzo15 recall carrying weapons in shopping 
bags undetected into Nazi barracks and safe houses to conduct raids and assassinations.   
 Gender norms made women particularly adept at urban guerrilla warfare, as they 
were able to move through urban settings seemingly undetected and strike when Nazi or 
Vichy soldiers were unaware. Due to their tactical success, women were promoted into 
command positions in organized Resistance fighting units. Women in command were 
 
13 Term female members of the Resistance used to self-identify 
 
14 Due to the sensitive nature of her work as an assassin, this particular woman has refused to be recorded 
in interviews or write an official memoir.  However, he story is recounted exactly the same way in 
Schwartz, Diamond, Weitz, and reported in The Atlantic.   
 
15 All interviews transcribed in Schwartz 1998 
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primarily stationed in Lyon and Limoges, areas where urban guerrilla warfare was the 
most common tactic to defeat Nazi occupation (Baudoin, 1962). The groups commanded 
by women would frequently conduct raids of city halls where occupying forces were 
holding meetings or the living quarters of the Nazi soldiers. As a result, women found 
themselves frequently fighting house-to-house in urban combat. Urban units also played 
to the benefits of having mixed gender units. Male and female officers in the resistance 
would frequently live together, posing as a couple, in order to infiltrate affluent Nazi or 
Vichy neighborhoods.     
 Both the intellectual conceptualization about the differences between the genders 
and the practical experiences of women being successful “as women” during the 
Resistance are the foundation of many of the claims about women’s role in public life, to 
include their military service. Throughout the 20th and into the 21st Centuries, women 
would continue to emphasize the importance of their difference to meet the changing 
nation security arena.  
 
Role of the Government: Take Responsibility and Provide for the Differences  
The French women’s movements emphasized the differences between men and 
women, and many French feminists focused on the government as one of the primary 
drivers of inequality that resulted from those differences. Indeed, the government was 
often seen as being responsible for creating the conditions that created or intensified 
women’s inequality. French feminists often referred to “structures of patriarchy” created 
by the government as the root of social, political, and economic inequality:  
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We believe that [inequality] is socially constructed, that it is 
one of the pillars of patriarchy, that it is not a ‘moral’ norm 
but a political strategy which makes it possible to keep a 
system going, to perpetuate it, hide its contradictions, mask 
the oppressors and above all divide us. (Icamiaba, 1981) 
 
The women’s group Psyche et Po catalyzed around this idea by asserting in their charter, 
“We are not in the margins; we’re here to explode the structure that says we are 
marginal” (Pysche et Po, 1978). The focus of French women’s movement on trying to 
change formal structures through government actions is reflective of a history of 
previously marginalized groups lobbying the French government for policy changes to 
address inequality (Lovenduski, 1986; Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003; Hill & Hupe, 
2002; Hall, 1986). Despite different flavors of policy prescriptions held by the French 
right and left, government intervention in “labor market policy, social protection policy, 
and issues [related to] structural inconstancies” has remained constant (Levy, 2005, p. 
107).  
The women’s movement took great care to properly engage with government 
policy. Edith Lhuillier, a prominent voice in the feminist movement, asserted in a Parti 
Socialiste (PS) meeting that the “if [feminists] are going to play the institutional game, 
and are obligated to play it properly” (Transcript of the meeting in Duchen, 1986, p. 116). 
To this end, feminists partnered with politicians (particularily in PS), to pursue policy 
changes that helped revise the structures of inequality and ensure that women had truly 
the same access to political, social and economic opportunities as men, without having to 
compromise on the unique characteristics that made them women. In the words of 
political activists, the overarching theme of engagement with government was for a 
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woman’s “right to be different biologically … but to squash any resulting political 
difference” (Guillaumin, 1979). Among the most radical factions of French feminists 
there was a distrust of male politicians, and a move to only support female legislators. 
Such activists believed that “it was up to women to formulate women’s politics” 
(Duchen, 1987).  
 It is important to note that French feminists did not see the government’s role as 
changing societies’ views about the gender norms, nor did they focus on convincing men 
to do traditional “women’s work.” Rather, they believed that the government was 
resonsible for ensuring that the differences between the genders did not result in 
inequalities. When they used the clause in Constitution of 1946 that asserted that all 
French citizens were equal before the law to strengthen their claims to increased social, 
political, and economic access, they did not substitute equality with “sameness.” In 
seeking liberation and equality, French feminists rejected the idea that they had to be 
“just like men,” and instead focused on the important differences between the genders 
and the unique role for women in society (Jardine, 1979). In order to guarantee equality, 
they focused on public policies that made up for any differences could disadvantage 
women.   
 The focus on the government’s role in mitigating any negative outcomes from 
gender differences cut across political ideology.  For example, conservative politician 
Simone Veil stated, “I believe that men and women are rich in their differences and that 
they are complementary.  It is, moreover, in the name of these differences and of all that 
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women can offer that it is necessary to demand equality in politics.”16  The ability of the 
French women’s movement to appeal to both radicals and conservatives would help 
solidify it as a cross-cutting force throughout the latter half of the 20th Century and the 
beginning of the 21st and shape the claims that would be made about women’s role in 
public life.     
 Laws around child care highlight the beliefs in the government’s role in ensuring 
that women’s differences are not a disadvantage. The lobby for universal child care was 
rooted in The Constitution of the Fifth Republic’s legal guarantee for the “right to work” 
for all French citizens. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, women were committed to 
guaranteeing that they actually had equality in the workplace. Women quickly realized 
that guaranteeing work could not be done without overcoming many other structural 
hurdles women faced with regards to gender-based workplace discrimination (Mazus, 
1995, p. 49). In order to ensure workplace equality, reforms and laws would have to be 
made that extended beyond employment. For example, child care, health care, and 
maternity leave were part of ensuring equal opportunity at work that would result in equal 
pay. Without them, women would not be competitive with their male colleagues.  
 The most wide-sweeping government response to women’s equality was the 1972 
Law of Equal Pay between Men and Women.17 While the law was foundational in 
ensuring gender equality, it is the interpretations and follow-ons to the law that are the 
 
16 Speech to Parliament recorded in Le Monde, June 6-7 1993 
 
17 Loi No. 72-1143 du 22 Decembre 1972 relative a l’egalite de remuneration entre les hommes et les 
femmes  
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most illustrative of the government ensuring conditions are met for equality. In a 1972 
report to the Counseil Economique et Social, Yves Chaigneau writes  
It would be illusionary to think that a legislative text could 
by itself automatically solve completely the problem of 
salary equality within the firm… in terms of other 
contributing factors in disparities [between men and women 
workers], they will disappear only with the formulation of 
much broader and better adapted policies on women’s equal 
right in all areas, especially in the employment, training and 
social promotion.  The success of such policies depends on 
the modification of resources available and values around 
womanhood when it involves the professional future of 
young girls and women. (Chaigneau, 1972) 
 
To that end, a series of structural reforms that further enhanced equal opportunities for 
women were passed. As a result of the work of the Comite d’Etudes et de Liaison des 
Problemes du Travail Feminin (CETF) and the writings of several prominent feminist 
intellectuals the in early 1973 Prime Minister Pierre Messmer issued formal clarification 
on the 1972 Equal Pay Law. In a decree dated March 27, 1973, PM Messmer asserted 
that simply offering equal pay was not enough, and that “conditions for equality” must be 
set by all employers, public and private.18   
 The conditions to which PM Messmer alluded would be codified in a series of 
laws and edicts issued throughout 1975. For example, protections were codified for 
pregnant women that both forbade employers from using pregnancy as grounds for 
refusing to hire or terminating employment, and guarded women against having to reveal 
pregnancy to their employers. Employers were also banned from firing women during 
 
18 Decret no. 73-360 27 Mars 1973 
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medically advised maternity leave periods, and mandated that employers either pay 
women during this period or face penalty fines.19   
 The importance of meeting women’s unique needs was further emphasized in a 
series of decrees issued in March of 1984. While childcare and maternity leave were 
codified in response to interpretations of the 1972 Equality Law, the decrees of 1984 
emphasized the importance of structural reforms to the principles of the Equality Law. 
The decree strengthened the child care system, requiring increased education for care 
providers and expanding access for rural women. It also affirmed the equal “importance 
of the roles of men and women in all stages of life … [and] that a woman’s life stage 
should not inhibit her from economic equality.”20 The recognition both that womanhood 
was valuable in society and that women may need support at various life stages would 
prove essential for claims about women’s role in public life.  
 
Claim’s About Public Life: Don’t Send a Man to do a Woman’s Job 
 The claims about women’s role in public life were a result of the focus on the 
differences between men and women coupled with an emphasis on women fulfilling a 
unique role in French public life. The focus on the contributions that only women can 
make are seen in several aspects of public participation. In elected office, women are 
often “othered,” and subjected to discrimination based on their gender. French politics 
was no different, and when women first entered elected office they were often “teased 
 
19 Loi 72-625 11 Juillet 1975 
 
20 Journal Officiel de la Republique Francais, 20 Mars 1984 Article 12-16 
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about being different” or forced to serve only on committees related to family and social 
services (Sineau, 1988). However, rather than downplaying their difference, or 
attempting to assimilate into the previously all-male Parliament, women “aspired to 
change the acceptable ways of doing politics” (Jenson & Sineau, 1994, p. 247). In 
particular, women claimed that they were essential to changing the language of politics 
and creating new norms and practices that would ensure equality for all citizens. As 
Simone Veil, a former Minister of Health, Member of Parliament, and President of the 
European Parliament stated, “I believe that men and women are rich in their differences 
and that they are complementary.  It is, moreover, in the name of these differences and of 
all that women can offer that it is necessary to demand change in politics.”21   
 In the political arena, claims focused on the benefits brought about as a result of 
the difference between men and women were successful in both increasing the number of 
women in French politics and changing the character of the political process. Despite a 
slow start to representation, in the past two decades, the number of women in the 
National Assembly has increased from around 6% to nearly 40%.22 More important than 
the increase in number of women has been the changes in the way women candidates 
present themselves publicly, and the impact that elected and appointed officials have had 
on the political process. In 2000 the Parite law was passed, requiring that parties run 
equal candidates of both gender in national election. Additionally, parties must address an 
equal number of “women’s issues” to those issues traditionally considered part of the 
 
21 Speech to Parliament recorded in Le Monde, June 6-7 1993 
 
22 Source: World Bank Data 
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political arena (defense, infrastructure, etc) on their official party platforms. While 
individual women in politics still assert that cultural norms of sexism are present in the 
political office,23 the reframing of women and women’s issues as a central part of the 
political identity has invigorated and elevated the discourse around women’s public life 
(Defossez, 2017). Such claims were ideologically independent and nearly universal. On 
both the right and the left, these claims have been used to successfully elevate both 
female candidates and women’s issues.  
 Claims about women’s economic participation are similarly rooted in beliefs 
about the benefits of the difference between men and women. Traditionally, the claims 
around the benefits of women’s workforce participation were used to lobby for increased 
protections and benefits from employers. However, as the economy has shifted from 
manual labor to a more service-based workforce, women have been able to more 
effectively leverage their claims of difference to make inroads in the economy (Unit D2 
“Gender Equality”, 2013). The claims have resulted in a proliferation of women in the 
quickly-growing biotech and emerging technology market. France has one of the highest 
percentage of female managers in the service sector in Europe.24 Under women’s 
leadership, tech firms have led the way in economic growth, due in large part to 
innovative work environments that have adopted to differential family situations and 
retained employees in ways that the traditional economic sector has not (Feinstein, 2017).   
 
23 In 2016, MPs and Ministers staged a protest outside the Parliament demanding that formal action be 
taken against the everyday practices of sexism that ranged from harassing language to groping. Several 
ministers were removed from office as a result.  
 
24 Source: OECD Data. The countries that have higher percentages (Ireland, Sweden) have laws mandating 
gender-equality of boards. 
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 While the claims about French women’s participation in politics and the economy 
resulted in increased participation by women, more notable is the impact that women 
were able to have. Women not only joined politics and the workforce, but changed the 
character and dialogue. Indeed, the focus of French women’s claims is not so much that 
“we deserve to be included” as “we can make unique contributions.” These claims were 
echoed by women in the French military, and top military leaders working to expand 
opportunities for women.       
 
Norway: A Nation of Citizens  
Self-Identification: De-gendering Norms for a Norwegian Identity   
 The gender-neutral beliefs of Norway’s second-wave women’s movement have 
roots in the struggle for Norwegian independence, drawing on Norway’s strong 
egalitarian history as a means of differentiating itself from Denmark and Sweden. This 
history can be seen in the late 19th Century, when Norwegian women appealed to their 
economic contributions as citizens, focusing on the fact that they were active and 
engaged citizens as a means of claiming more political rights. In the years leading up to 
the 1905 referendum for independence from Sweden, focused on their economic 
contributions to make the argument that that they too were citizens and deserved the same 
benefits as their male counterparts. The way in which women in Norway characterized 
their claims for enfranchisement were the foundation of de-gendered nature of the 
Norwegian feminists in the second wave.  
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 Though women could not vote in the referendum for independence from Sweden, 
they were active public advocates for the vote. The degree of Norwegian advocacy was a 
result of the demographic difference between Norwegian and women in Western Europe. 
Compared to much of Western Europe, Norwegian women were more likely to remain 
unmarried or marry later in life, pursuing careers before domestic lives (Blom, 1980). 
Participation in the workplace gave them credibility for their interactions and advocacy in 
the public sphere. Additionally, compared to other women in Western Europe, they had 
more “leisure time” to devote to political advocacy, as they had less expectations of 
housework and childcare obligations (Hernes, 1987).  
Women’s history of lobbying and interest-group organization made them 
successful political activists for equality throughout the 20th Century. As the number of 
women in the workforce grew, they began to demand more political involvement to 
secure better working conditions, forming Norsk Kvinnesaksforening (Norwegian 
Feminist Society) to formally lobby the government for increased rights and protections. 
Norsk Kvinnesaksforening worked to create legislation to benefit all workers and ensure 
that equality prevailed throughout the workforce. Political equality was included in this 
quest for workplace equality. Given the gender-neutral nature of Norway’s constitution25 
women made a claim for enfranchisement on the basis of their economic contributions to 
the country.26  They emphasized their sameness with men due to their public economic 
 
25 The 1814 Constitution refers only to “Norwegian Citizens.” Unlike many European constitutions of the 
19th Century, there is was no reference to “man” or “mankind” that could have been interpreted as 
excluding women from citizenship.  
 
26 Nearly 45% of women in Norway worked outside the home by 1905 and their contribution to the 
country’s GDP increased yearly. (Source: van der Ros, 1994)  
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contributions in order to appeal for increased sociopolitical benefits and protections (Van 
der Ros, 1994). However, as long as Norway was legally under Swedish control, it would 
unlikely that women would gain increased political rights. Women’s suffrage advocates 
thus had to appeal to their male counterparts to gain independence from Sweden,27 in 
order to secure their own rights.  
 The way in which women appealed to men to convince them to vote for 
independence and thus women’s suffrage, was consistent with the Norwegian cultural 
history of egalitarianism. As an independent country during the Middle ages, “aristocracy 
or bourgeoisies in the European context was completely nonexistent” in Norway 
(Norwegian National Commission, 1989). Formal class divisions were first imposed 
when Norway was under Danish control in the 17th Century and then further entrenched 
during subjugation to Sweden in the 19th. An assertion of independence was thus also a 
call for a rejection of all things foreign, and a return to the foundational Norwegian 
principles of egalitarianism. Women capitalized on the historically Norwegian nature of 
egalitarianism to argue for independence. Regarding the importance of the referendum 
for Norwegian independence to women, Martha Thynas, standing in for her husband as a 
Labor party representative asserted:  
Given the option to vote, no Norwegian women would 
answer “no” to the question which will be posed on the 13th 
[The date set for the referendum]. Yet alas, this is not a 
plebiscite of the whole people but only of Norwegian men. 
It undermines the value that women bring to Norwegian 
society, in culture, economics, and status. We women feel 
that we, too, belong to the people and wish to be regarded as 
part of Norway, and cannot be so until we are free from 
 
27 For much of the time that Norway was under Swedish dominion Sweden was a monarchy. Suffrage only 
existed for Swedish citizens in local elections.  
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[Sweden’s] influence. (As quoted in Social-Demokraten, 10 
August 1905)  
 
The referendum was successful, with less than 100 people voting against it. Norway now 
operated under gender-neutral Constitution of 1814, and women were grander suffrage.28 
The appeal to the sameness between men and women continued after 
independence, and is echoed in the way in which women made claims for legislation on 
“women’s issues” during the second wave feminist movement. In the first half of the 20th 
Century, women in the Sorting focused on offloading such things as child care and 
domestic work from individual women to public society through welfare state reform 
(Epsing-Andersen, 1990; Hernes, 1987). Concurrently, they sought to elevate the 
financial status of single or stay-at-home mothers by reframing mothering as “work” 
rather than a women’s burden, and providing stipends, health care, and pensions for 
mothers (Sainsbury, 1999).  By 1915, policies on public childcare and motherhood 
salaries were in place. This framing of women’s issues as work was unique among social 
welfare states. Women being compensated for providing a public good moved social 
policies away from been interpreted as “protective” of women or “paternalistic,” and 
towards inclusive egalitarianism. 
 The women’s movements focus on men and women as identical was a vital part 
of the ideal Norwegian society. Writing in the Journal of the Norwegian Women’s 
Movement, Bjornstjerne Bjornson asserted, “a modern woman is a woman … who 
 
28 While women were given legal suffrage as part of the referendum on independence, the practice was 
phased in between 1905-1913. Initially only women that paid taxes (i.e. were working citizens) were 
allowed to vote. However by 1913, all citizens, regardless of income, were enfranchised.  
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understand that the fate of her children is mainly decided by society, and that her work is 
pointless, maybe even in vain, if that society sees her as different” (Transaltion in Blom I. 
, 2004, p. 125). Such an assertion downplays gender differences, even when related to 
parenthood. Raising children, something that for many women’s movements was seen as 
the crucial difference between men and women, was seen as being in vain if men and 
women were to be perceived differently from one another.  
 Because of the way in which child care, early childhood education, and healthcare 
opportunities, were framed, as well as the introduction of compensated parental leave, 
women were able to navigate the public arena more easily knowing that they could 
openly discuss issues of childcare and health without repercussion. Norway became a 
state that “[did] not force harder choices on women than on men … women could 
continue to have children, yet there were also other roads to self-realization open to them 
… women did not have to choose futures that demanded greater sacrifices from them 
than were expected of men” (Hernes, 1987, p. 15).  
 The similarity between men and women was codified with the Equal Status Act 
(ESA) of 1978. While policies to ensure workplace equality had begun to be 
implemented in the early 20th Century, in the second half of the 20th Century women 
wanted to ensure that gender was not grounds for social discrimination either. The ESA 
ensure that men and women were not only treated the same but given the same amount of 
attention and exposure in society. For example, the ESA “mandates that books, audio and 
video tapes, and other materials used in educational institutions promote the ideas of 
gender equality” (Kelber, 1994, p. 75). In practice, this meant that everything from math 
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problems to the literature assigned in school represent an egalitarian society and actively 
promote the equal status of men and women. 
 Egalitarian gender neutrality, a framework initially used by Norwegian leaders to 
differentiate Norwegian culture from that of the Swedes and Danes, became an important 
identifier of the women’s movement. Women were able to leverage the memories of the 
past to appeal for increased rights in the present. The result was a deliberate effort to de-
gender typical “women’s” issues and universalize citizenship.  
 
Role of the Government: Offload the private to make it part of public life  
 As part of the historical commitment to egalitarianism, the Norwegian 
government was proactive in introducing legislation that muted the difference between 
the genders in the years following independence from Sweden. The gender-neutral 
language of the constitution, coupled with a cultural dedication to social equality, resulted 
in the welfare of all citizens being greatly improved after independence. Throughout the 
early part of the 20th Century, the Norwegian government was actively engaged in 
creating a redistributive welfare state that preferenced worker’s rights. Between 1905-
1909, a series of labor laws were passed that limited work hours, regulated workers 
conditions, and supported the family life of workers. Childcare allowances were 
integrated into the national welfare scheme, as were social security payments for families 
that required one parent to leave the workforce for a period to care for a family member. 
These provisions were enacted to promote the “independence, value, and continued 
contribution of all Norwegian citizens” (Unidentified member of the Sorting quoted in 
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Flora 1986, 125). The Nordic Women’s Rights association was at the forefront of 
revisions to labor policies, arguing that a universal eight-hour work day would ensure that 
all citizens could adequately contribute to the economic well-being of the country while 
also ensuring that essential domestic tasks did not go unfulfilled (Paletschek, 2005). 
Explicit in their argument was that women had a place in the public workforce, and men 
had a place in domestic roles. Such policies not only directly benefited workers, but 
shifted social norms. Not only did it become acceptable (and even encouraged) for 
women to be in the public workforce, but men were expected to be part of domestic life. 
Such government policies worked to change social attitudes about acceptable behavior 
and gender roles.    
Women also benefitted from both a legislative and executive branch that was on 
the forefront of policies aimed at redistributive egalitarianism. As political scientist and 
Labor Party politician Helga Hernes (1988) describes, the government was committed to 
being an active participant in the quest for equity, not just equality, for all of its citizens. 
The commitment to economic parity resulted in less of a disparity in professional 
valuation than is seen in other Western countries. Whereas traditional “women’s” work, 
such as nursing, elementary education, and child care, often have relatively low salaries, 
Norway has very little gendered gap in income disparity.29  
Like other aspects of Norwegian legislation, the ESA focused on shaping attitudes 
more than on delivering actual provisions. It was largely a symbolic measure on the part 
 
29 World Economic Forum has deemed Norway the second most equal country with regards to economic 
opportunity and access with more than 85% of all economic gender gaps closed. This compares to a 59% 
average for the United States and Europe.   
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of the Sorting to recognize the importance of egalitarianism among Norwegian citizens. 
As Beatrice Halsaa, political scientist and member of the Equal Status Council, remarked,  
On the one hand, the Act is intended to ensure substantial 
equality of treatment in all areas of life. On the other hand, 
the law is intended to influence attitudes about sex roles, 
committing the authorities to work actively for equal status 
through instruments that may not specifically be outlined in 
policy (Halsaa, 1989, p. 25).  
 
The instruments that Dr. Halsaa was referring to were found in the community. Indeed, if 
equal status was actually to be achieved, it would be through changes in beliefs that and 
behavior so that equality was practiced in the way that the legislation intended.  
 Child care was similarly implemented to both provide a social necessity and shape 
attitudes and values towards gender neutral egalitarianism. Norway’s policies encouraged 
a dual-earner socioeconomic model whereby both the mother and father were 
incentivized to work and be engaged in childrearing (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Korpi, 
2000). In 1975, the federal government created a shared local-federally funded child care 
scheme that ensured that all working citizens would have access to childcare as they 
needed it to engage in Norway’s economic public life (Havnes & Mogstad, 2009). In 
1978 the Sorting introduced gender-neutral leave, with each parent getting 18 weeks of 
paid leave upon the birth of a child. Parental leave was extended to 12 months in 1993 
and to 13 months in 2002. Further, as part of the 1993 act, a portion of leave was 
explicitly designated for fathers that was non-transferable to mothers (Duvander, 
Lappegård, & Andersson, 2010). The implications of the so-called “daddy quota” was 
that nearly 70% of Norwegian fathers take the full portion of parental leave after the birth 
of a first child and over 80% after the birth of a second (Lappegård, 2008).  
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 Norway’s childcare system was the result both of a social welfare state that 
valued a productive and egalitarian workforce and a women’s movement that emphasized 
the importance of social equality. Indeed, the emphasis on the “daddy quota” is a “break” 
with traditional feminist policies. While historically women’s movements had worked for 
policies that made women equal to men, the Norwegian women focused on 
simultaneously brining men into equality with women (Brandth & Kvande, 2009). The 
shape of government policies echoed this, with egalitarian policies that helped to flatten 
society and shape social attitudes towards a rejection of traditional gender roles and a 
focus on the obligations of citizenship.  
 
Claims about Public Life: Recipients and Participants in the Welfare State  
 Women’s claims to public participation are based on citizenship rights and 
obligations. Rather than emphasize the unique role that women play in society, they 
emphasize that women are part of the broader society. Women have been careful to 
emphasize that they desire to improve equality in general rather than specifically improve 
women’s historically subordinate position (Van der Ros, 1994). Women’s claims to 
equality were reinforced by Norway’s early experience with women’s formal political 
representation (Blom I. , Women's politics and women in politics in Norway since the 
end of the nineteenth century, 1987). By 1983, over 37% of elected officials were women 
and in 1986 the Labour Party government was headed female Prime Minister who 
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appointed 40% female cabinet ministers.30 Especially when compared to the rest of the 
developed Western democracies, women occupied a large place in public office.  
 While women continued to increase in prominence in public life, they rarely used 
their positions to attempt to change the process or structures of government. Women 
campaigned and were elected on their contributions to society (Skjeie & Forde, 1989). 
The tradition of “moral representation” in Norwegian politics, a focus on policies that 
emphasize the good of the collective over individual identity groups (Gilbert, 1995), 
helped women assimilate into political life and gain popularity for their gender-neutral 
practices.  
 In the economic sphere, women similarly claimed that equality was grounded in 
their role as citizens. Women’s increased labor force participation has largely been a 
result of wide-spread campaigns about social obligation coupled with a service-heavy 
economy. Due to Norway’s resource wealth, it boasts a disproportionality high level of 
service-sector jobs. Also, it transitioned quickly to a service economy while other 
countries were focused on manufacturing and agricultural labor (Johnsen, 2012). Physical 
ability has thus not been a prominent factor of economic participation, removing one of 
the traditional barriers for women entering the workforce. Because the primary economic 
drivers are not very gendered, women have been able to enjoy nearly equal footing to 
men in competition for employment, and by the 1970s had nearly identical workforce 
participation to men (76% vs 80%).31 
 
30 Source: World Bank Data 
 
31 Source: OECD Data 
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 Both the political system and the service-heavy economic foundation of the 
country have reinforced women’s claims for equality based on their sameness. This 
undercurrent of equity is prominent on the right and the left. Even among groups and 
individuals that espoused more traditional gender norms, they did so in such a way that 
emphasized that motherhood and domestic work was work. Such groups also advocated 
for increased domestic participation by men. Women were unified around the belief that 
there was little difference between men and women. Further, the nearly gender-neutral 
social benefit provisions have a created a dialogue around equal obligation for Norwegian 
women. As I will show in Chapter 5, both the history of gender-neutral political and 
economic participation and the benefit provision are leveraged to make claims about the 
need for women in the Norwegian Armed Services.  
 
United States: Individuals and Empowerment  
Self-Identification: The Same or Different?  
 Compared to Norway and France, feminism in the United States has a much more 
recent history. While there was a consolidated and organized women’s suffrage 
movement in the 1910s, after the passage of the 19th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (1920), the women became less organized, and as a group less politically 
active until the 1960s. When women did organize and emerge as a political group, they 
were not homogenous, but “diverse and dis-unified … mirroring the complexity of 
American society” (Costain, 1992, p. 26). Much like the diversity of politics in the United 
States as a whole, the women’s movement lacked a cohesive or unifying identity. Such 
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discord is common in contentious social policy issues in the United States, with issues 
rising to prominence only to be dropped when a new ideological identity comes into 
favor (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). One of the biggest sources of discord and disunity 
among women’s groups in the United States was the identity of women compared to 
men. The roots of this disagreement are seen in the aftermath of the ratification of the 19th 
Amendment, with disagreements as to whether women should have the same legal rights 
and responsibilities as men, or whether biological and/or social differences warranted 
laws specifically tailored to meet their needs (Lemons, 1973). A fissure developed among 
the women that had fought for the right to vote, between those that believed that true 
equality would only be achieved when women were seen as the same as men, and those 
that believed that women could be different and also equal.  
 Women on both side of the argument emphasized that their view would be the 
best for individual women. Proponents the belief that men and women should be subject 
to the same rights and responsibilities asserted that as long as men and women were 
treated differently, women would not be able to live up to their potential. Women 
adhering to this belief called upon women to recognize their identity and value beyond 
the socially mandated roles of wife and mother in order to find their humanity. Betty 
Friedan, writing in 1963’s Feminine Mystique, asserts “In a sense that goes beyond any 
woman's life, I think this is a crisis of women growing up—a turning point from an 
immaturity that has been called femininity to full human identity” (Friedan, 2010, p. 
136). Friedan’s argument hinges on the belief that traditionally prescribed gender roles 
are constructed to keep women subservient and beholden to a “feminine mystique” that is 
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created by men to keep women out of the public arena. If women are to recognize their 
potential, they must focus their effort on ensuring that women are treated the same as 
men. Women that adhered to a belief in the sameness of men and women appealed to the 
growing discontent of housewives in the United States in the post-World War II era. 
After the war, women left factories and service jobs to reassume their domestic identity 
now that the male labor force had returned. In the decades that followed the War, there 
was a further emphasis on growing the American population. As one woman that left her 
job to raise a family asserted in response to why she supported formal equal rights:  
It makes me mad – makes me feel like a child – when I have 
to ask my husband for money. My mother was always 
dependent on my father and so fearful of life. She is lost now 
without him. It frightens me, the thought of being dependent 
like my mother, even though I have a happy marriage. … It 
improves your sense of self-worth when you don’t depend 
on your husband for everything good in life, when you can 
get it for yourself. I don’t want [my daughter] to have the 
fears that paralyzed my mother and that I’ve always had to 
fight. I want her to have real options. (Tong, 2013) 
 
To overcome the fear and humiliation associated decreased social status of wives and 
mothers, women argued for equal treatment with regards to economic opportunities that 
would allow women to be untethered from their husbands.  
 The emphasis on the sameness between men and women most closely aligned 
with liberal feminist beliefs. The basic tenets of the liberal women’s movement adhered 
to women’s legal equality with a focus on personal liberty and individual rights (Banks, 
1981; Ferree, 1987).  Equality in access to education, political rights, economic rights and 
property ownership were framed as promises guaranteed by the Declaration of 
Independence’s focus on each individual American’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit 
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of happiness. Liberal feminists based their claims on the belief that women’s capacity to 
freely compete and participate without prejudice or favor would benefit the most 
individual citizens (Brenner, 1996). There was little discussion about whether any 
accommodations were needed to ensure equality for women as the focus was more on 
equality in access and opportunity than in result.     
  Not all women activists in the United States’ second wave movement argued that 
women should be treated the same as men. There was a strong faction of women that 
promoted differential treatment from men. Though arguing for different policies and 
social norms, these women appealed to the logic that it was in the best interest of 
individual women and their ability to live up to their potential. Though an ideological 
fissure existed, the appeal to individuality was the same.  
Women that stressed the difference between men and women focused on the 
mother-child bond or the uniqueness of pregnancy as both a medical and psychological 
condition as the roots of this difference. They viewed these as differences to be 
celebrated, and advocated for a strong understanding of these differences in order to 
ensure women were prepared if they chose to enter public life (Chesler, 1988). They 
argued that men and women had different roles in society and that they had to approach 
public life differently. Further, they asserted that if the difference between men and 
women was not emphasized, that women be forced to adopt “male-defined abstract 
standards … and attempt to assimilate into male norms” (Brenner, 1996, p. 46). If forced 
to do so, women would not be able to realize their potential in society.  
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The emphasis on the unique character of women came from both the left and right 
of the political spectrum. On the left, Zillah R. Eisenstein (1978) critiqued the assertion 
that men and women should be viewed as the same in society as privileged in that ignores 
the compounded impact that race and class have on women’s inequality. She argues that 
womanhood is incompatible with a “mutually reinforcing dialectical relationship between 
capitalist class structure and hierarchical sexual structuring,” and that a socialist model 
that incorporates and represents the differences was necessary if women were to 
experience equality in public life (Eisenstein, 1978).  
A backlash to the idea that women were to be viewed as the same as men also 
emerged from conservatives. Phyllis Schlafly (1977) attacked the “women’s liberation” 
movement as being focused on the sameness of men and women “at the expense of 
women, babies, and society itself.” To be successful, she asserted, women must 
“understand the differences between men and women,” and rather than fight for political 
economic equity, leverage their difference to “motivate, inspire, encourage, teach, 
restrain, and reward men” (Schlafly, 1977).  While not exhaustive, Eisenstein and 
Schlafly’s critiques of the liberal feminists’ emphasis on sameness highlight the extent of 
the disunity experienced in the United States women’s movement. Women were neither 
unified by political ideology nor belief about the role of women in society.   
 The lack of agreement around the self-identity of the women’s movement in the 
United States was further heighted by the often-contentious relationship between the 
women’s movement and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. On the one hand, 
injustices faced by the African American community and the lack of political and 
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economic opportunities for women shared a common enemy: the white patriarchy.  
Individual white women became active and instrumental in the Civil Rights movement, 
both by challenging the segregation of Southern churches and the prohibition against 
interracial matrimonial relationships. As Lilian Smith, a prominent white anti-segregation 
activist and author argued “southing was wrong with a world that tells you that love is 
good and people are important and then forces you to deny love and humiliate people” 
(Smith, 1994, p. 28). Much of the language of de-segregation was also used by feminists. 
Women attacked the system that viewed them as different. Whether they were formal 
prohibitions against women’s participation in economic systems, or informal expectations 
on women’s role in society, women had largely become second class citizens. Some 
women, such as Lilian Smith, saw civil rights as going hand in hand with women’s rights. 
The work in the civil rights movement gave some women both the credibility to speak on 
public issues and the tools to organize and lobby for social change.  
 However, women’s involvement in the Civil Rights movement also highlighted 
many of the problems brought about by the intersection of class, race and gender that was 
present in the United States. It became increasingly evident that “white women” 
feminism was not universal for all women in the United States. The case of white 
women’s involvement in student protests highlights some of the discontent among the 
women’s movement. Throughout the 1960s, young black women increasingly joined the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a student-led group that engaged 
in direct-action protests against segregation throughout the South. Though initially 
welcoming of white members, black women in the SNCC became increasingly suspicious 
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of white women. While members of the SNCC were being harassed, arrested, and often 
physically harmed by the police, white women were able to “return to a white refuge” 
that benefited and protected them (Belfrange, 1965, p. 80). Particularly under scrutiny 
from the SNCC and civil rights leaders were liberal feminists. The lack of 
intersectionality practiced by liberal feminists and the underlying assumptions that all 
people were equal was deemed the province of rich white women.   
 The contention over the identity of women further manifested in debates and 
beliefs about higher education. For those that emphasized men and women being the 
same, college was seen as an essential step in a women’s development because it was 
often the first time in a woman’s life that she was held to academic and intellectual 
standards that did not have any regard for sex or gender (Evans, Personal Politics: The 
Roost of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left, 1979). 
College campuses were seen as essential places for women to understand their humanity, 
not just the expectations that society has for them. Those that emphasized the differences 
between men and women, and focused on women’s unique role asserted that college was 
a time for women to better learn how to “inspire in her home a vision of the meaning of 
life and freedom … help her husband find values that will give purpose to his specialized 
daily chores … [and] teach her children the uniqueness of each individual human being” 
(Adlai Stevenson quoted in Friedan, 2010, p 53). This disunity in the role of hinger 
education further hindered women from having a unified claim about their role in public 
lives. College and university campuses were essential places for activism and the homes 
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of many prominent women’s rights groups. However, despite often being co-located with 
one another, women’s groups did not always have unity of effort. 
Even when high-level women seemingly came together in the 1960s to advance 
the causes of women’s rights, there remained disagreement about women’s self-identity. 
In the report provided to President Kennedy, the President’s Commission on the Status of 
Women opened with saying that “one of the greatest freedoms … is the freedom to 
choose among different life patterns” (President's Commission on the Status of Women, 
1963). The emphasis on the ability to choose one’s “life pattern” set the stage for a report 
that walked a fine line between advocating for women in the workforce and women in the 
home. The overarching theme of the report was that women should be free to pursue 
whatever course in life was best for them. It did not make a cohesive claim about what 
women should do in the public life, just that they should be free to pursue the options that 
best suited them. The report also fell short of making any specific policy 
recommendations with regards to the traditional women’s issues such as child care of 
parental leave. Rather, it emphasized the need to support female individualism.   
 The lack of a cohesive understanding about the self-identification of women and 
their role in public life resulted in an unharmonious and contentious practice of feminism 
in the United States. Due to this, there was an emphasis on individual choice and 
responsibility. Often, both the structural and cultural roots of women’s inequality were 
left unaddressed. The only agreement was that individual women should be successful 
within the system in the way they wanted.    
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Role of Government: Limited Intervention to allow for Individual Responsibility  
 The United States’ political model is characterized by limited government 
intervention into the lives of its citizens. There is an historic belief in the ability of liberal 
markets to create a beneficial equilibrium and a distrust of government intervention to 
promote socioeconomic equality (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Efforts at adopting parts 
of a welfare-state model of equality assurance, especially with regards to employment, 
have failed because of the interferences of “status groups and echelons in private 
industry” (Epsing-Andersen, 1990, p. 97). The only government action or intervention 
that is celebrated is removing the barriers to competition. In the absence of government 
intervention, there has been a focus on individual empowerment to obtain the tools 
necessary to achieve equality.  
 Despite the historical hands-off approach of the United State government’s 
involvement with social issues, there was a concerted effort to lobby for women’s 
formalized legislative equality. By the early-1970s a group of politically astute and elite 
women coalesced with the goal of changing the political landscape in a way that would 
be favorable to women (Ferree & Hess, 1994). The growth of the National Organization 
of Women (NOW) into a formidable lobbying force emboldened feminists to pursue the 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).32 The ERA would prove to be a litmus test both for 
beliefs in the role of women in society and the role of government in intervening in 
matters of social and economic equality.  
 
32 During the 1970s NOW’s lobbying budget grew from $160,000 to $500,000. Source; National NOW 
Times, October 1982.  
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 When the ERA was introduced in Congress in 1971, it enjoyed great bipartisan 
support and by 1972 easily passed both the House of Representatives (354 yeas, 24 nays, 
and 51 abstaining) and the Senate (84 yeas, 8 nays and 7 abstaining), thanks in large part 
to the lobbying efforts of NOW. The text of the ERA was simple and direct: 
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date 
of ratification 
Despite the legislative support, the ERA ultimately failed to be ratified by the states. Its 
failure illustrates both the disagreement that existed (and continues to exist) in the United 
States’ women’s movement and the wariness of Americans towards government 
intervention in social policy. As Senator Lloyd of Utah noted, most Americans supported 
equal rights for men and women, but not in a way that “gave the appearance that the 
government was changing social roles” (Berry, 1988, p. 100).  
 While NOW had influence with enough key politicians to garner support for the 
ERA in congress, divisions among women still resonated among the general population. 
In an effort to block its ratification after passage, the ERA was painted as government 
overreach attempting to erode values and social roles. The primary ideological challenge 
against the ERA was mounted by self-described “traditionalists” who argued that 
ratification of the ERA would result in a “substantive change in women’s roles … and a 
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government-mandated change to the social order” (Mansbridge, 2015, p. 20). Phyllis 
Schlafly’s Eagle Form drew parallels to the government-mandated desegregation of 
public restrooms as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to argue that passage of the 
ERA would “impact the privacy and safety of women and girls by forcibly removing 
gender designations for bathrooms, locker rooms, jails and hospital rooms.”33 Concerns 
over unisex bathrooms and forced mixing of the sexes were used to emphasize the extent 
to which the government would intervene into the everyday lives of Americans if the 
ERA were to be ratified.  
Government overreach was used as a primary argument against the ERA because, 
even among traditionalists, there was general support for a women’s choice to enter the 
workforce and an overall positive attitude about women in politics and higher education 
(Donnelly, 2013). The contention came around the government’s role in promoting social 
change, or potentially forcing individuals to adopt a particular way of engaging in the 
public sphere.  
 Ultimately, the traditionalists were able to mount enough of a campaign against 
the ERA that in 1982 it failed to gain enough state approval for ratification. The failure 
was largely a result of the traditionalists’ ability to drum up fear about what the 
government possibly could do to dictate women’s roles, rather than the reality of 
women’s experiences (Ferree & Hess, 1994).34 The United States is unique among 
 
33 The Phyllis Schlafly Report Archives. Available at www.eagleforum.org  
 
34 President Nixon’s veto of the Comprehensive Childcare Act, after its passage through both houses of 




developed democracies in that it does not have a national gender equity policy. In the 
absence of such, women’s activists have reverted to a model of individual liberalism, 
stressing the importance of women making their own personal and professional decisions 
(Ferree, 1987; Brenner, 1996).  
 Women activists in the United States have done this through two primary strains 
of action. First is the backing of individual female political candidates. Facing defeat of 
the ERA and a conservative executive administration voted-in in 1980, progressive 
women’s organizations reasoned that getting women elected to public office was the only 
way to keep women’s equality in the public discourse (Costain, 1992). NOW initiated an 
“elect women” campaign both to substantively ensure women were in seats of power and 
to symbolically elevate the discourse on women’s rights. Second is the targeting of 
private industry and celebrating the accomplishments of women’s success in the private 
sector. Indeed, while the federal government failed to ratify the ERA, the private sector 
has emerged as a place of equality. Women in business mentorship programs, and 
women’s conferences began to emerge.35 
 The strides made by female politicians and women in the private sector reflects 
the values of individual equality, and also the often problematic fissures in the United 
States’ women’s movement. While individual women have been successful in both 
politics and the private sector, they are overwhelmingly women from privileged 
backgrounds with access to privately-funded childcare and medical care (Gordon & 
Chase-Lansdale, 2001). Indeed, though the government does not restrict women’s 
 
35 For examples, see Women in the World, the Catalyst Conference, Forbes Women’s Summit, and INC 
Women’s Summit  
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participation in any aspect of social, political, or economic life, it does not enable it 
either. Legacies of oppression due to race, social class, or religion have gone 
unaddressed. And while there is an emphasis on the choice of individuals to participate, 
the responsibility to overcome structural inequalities is also left up to them.  
 
Claims about Public Life: Ask what you can do, and do it.   
 In the United States, there is not a universal ideal claim about women’s public 
participation. Rater, there is a focus on equal opportunity and equal status under the law. 
Both the de-centralization of political power of the federal government and the historical 
commitment to the primacy of the liberal markets has made the United States focused on 
the role and impact of individuals. The success of individual women has been held up as 
proof that women have equal rights and opportunities (Nelson & Carver, 1994).  
 However, the success of individual women has not translated into a more general 
improvement for women. While the United States has a high, and increasingly growing 
number of female CEOs and members of boards of directors, it simultaneously ranks 
below other developed democracies in terms of the average wage gap and other gender 
equality indices (World Economic Forum , 2016). The success of these individuals has 
not translated into an overall increase in the quality of life or opportunities for women.    
 Additionally, though women have increased in political representation, there has 
continued to be a failure of women’s issues to be broadly advanced among the national 
legislatures. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, women that ran “as women,” or 
campaigned on a platform centered on “women’s issues” deviated from it once in office 
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(Plutzer & Zipp, 1996). Once in office, women tended to put the interests of their race or 
social class above that of their gender in making decisions as to how to vote or what bills 
to introduce (Vega & Firestone, 1995). In the absence of claims that were able to advance 
the condition of women broadly, women’s movements turned their attention to the 
success and empowerment of individual women.  
 
Claims and Integration  
 In this chapter, I highlighted how different starting points in beliefs about equality 
informed claims about women’s service in public life. These claims provide valuable 
insight into understanding the variation of women’s integration into the military. Both the 
strength and universal appeal of the claims, as well as their ability to coincide with 
military culture help to better explain the environment in which integration was taking 
place. In most of the studies of gender integration, laws and policies about women’s are 
the starting point. Introducing claims about women’s role in public life starts the inquiry 
a step earlier.  
 Understanding how claims drive the integration process is especially important 
given recent scholarship on the important link between the security of women and the 
security of states. As evidenced through the work of Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-
Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett (2012), the way that women are treated in 
society is a key predictor to overall security, stability and prosperity. Including women in 
security forces has been a method used to safeguard against potential abuses of women 
(Simić, 2010). However, laws and policies for inclusion are not sufficient to capture the 
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full benefits from women’s participation. The way in which these laws are implemented 
and the process by which women come to participate in public life matters for a 
successful capture of these benefits (Ruppel, 2008; Budgeon, 2001; Razavi, 2016). 
Indeed, the differences in the pathway matters. 
In chapter 3 I highlight how these differing beliefs allow for a rich study of the 
variation in gender integration. In doing so, we are able to view military policies as a 
result of broader sociopolitical beliefs and examine the roots of their differences.  
 Additionally, the strength of the claim matters. In both France and Norway, 
women’s claims about their role in public life had near universal appeal. They also 
worked to increase the status of women more broadly, through the implementation of 
national level policies aimed at gender equality. Conversely, in the United States, the lack 
of a universal claim meant that the success of some women did not necessarily translate 
into improved status or opportunity for all. In chapters 4-6 I will show how these claims 
interact with military culture to provide either conducive or restrictive environments for 
women’s integration.   
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CHAPTER 3  
From Inclusion to Integration:  
Talking about the military and women in it 
 
The differences in beliefs about gender equality discussed in chapter 2 are 
exemplified by how women were used in the military. The United States had to contend 
with restrictive laws about what women were allowed to do in combat environments. In 
combat, women were used in temporary positions to meet mission needs. For example, 
Female Engagement Teams (FET) teams augmented infantry units engaged in village 
stability operations (VSO). These teams, attached to infantry units to engage with women 
in villages, followed very close legal guidance to ensure they were in alignment with the 
so-called “combat exclusion” policy that was in place when the United States invaded 
Afghanistan in 2001 (Lemmon, 2015). Women received differential initial training from 
their male counterparts and were kept in separate quarters aside from the time spent 
conducting missions. While FET teams were essential for success that the United States 
military had in VSOs, the women that participated in them were never fully viewed as 
part of the infantry units to which they were attached.  
Norway’s employment of women in is exemplified by the appointment of Colonel 
Ingrid Gjerde, a decorated infantry officer, as commander of all Norwegian forces in 
Afghanistan. While her gender was touted by the international community, the 
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Norwegian military greatly downplayed it, focusing instead on her proven leadership 
ability and combat proficiency (Matlary & Petersson, 2013). Her service is reflective of 
the sameness of service experienced by men and women in Norwegian society.  
simultaneous development and security, using purposely designed mixed-gendered 
infantry teams to gain the trust of the local population while engaging with the enemy.36  
The French military employed tactics and strategies that were consistent with the 
belief that men and women were different, yet of equal value. Women were often 
specifically chosen to conduct certain missions, and identified as essential for the 
realization of long-term strategic plans. When the French were given control of the Tagab 
Valley, an area that the Soviets couldn’t pacify in the 1980s and in which the British had 
suffered their greatest losses in the previous months, they developed a strategy of 
simultaneous development and security, using purposely designed mixed-gendered 
infantry teams to gain the trust of the local population while engaging with the enemy.37 
Such tactical innovation is indicative of the way in which the French have employed 
gender integration and the resulting high level of integration that they experience.  
 These differential ways in which women were employed resulted in differential 
outcomes in Afghanistan and has been the subject of much military study.  The director 
of the military studies department at Army Command and General Staff College notes 
that the “women in Afghanistan, to include FET teams, and the work of our NATO allies 
 
36 Unclassified after action report  
 
37 Unclassified after action report  
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is one of the most popular topics of study for our students.”38  For example, Lieutenant 
Colonel Tyra Harding found that FET teams attached to United States’ infantry units 
were essential to successfully moving from the “hold” to the “build” phase of the clear-
hold-build counterinsurgency triad.39  However, getting “buy in” from infantry 
commanders was exceedingly difficult.  Especially when compared to coalition allies, 
United States’ platoon and company level commanders frequently “left the women 
behind” on missions because they were “not part of standard infantry tactics or training” 
(Harding, 2012, p. 18).  In her final paper for the Naval Postgraduate School, Stephanie 
Erwin compared Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, highlighting the 
differences of women’s roles in the militaries of the various countries that had control of 
the different RCs. In her analysis, she found that degree of women’s participation in the 
military impacted not only combat outcomes, but the ability of ISAF forces to engage 
with the local population and create indigenous governments (Erwin, 2012).  She 
highlights Faryab Province, under Norwegian control, as being an effective example of 
women-led provincial rebuilding.40   
 
38 Several of the papers, both at Command and General Staff, as well as the War College and Post-Graduate 
schools rely on classified personnel or event data, and remain within the military’s system.  Therefore, a 
full count of the number of papers is not available. Dr. Valentine, director of military history for DoD 
schools, estimates that “20-30%” of students engage with the effectiveness of women in the military to 
some extent (May 2017 interview).   
 
39 For an overview of the Counterinsurgency doctrine see Army manual MCWP 3-33.5 
“Counterinsurgency” December 2006  
 
40 At the time of her publication, Faryab Province was considered a success story.  However, in 2016 the 
Taliban returned and now control the province.  
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In addition to different use in and impact on combat operations, women have had 
different experiences in the domestic context of military service. This difference is 
highlighted through recent notable events.  On March 4, 2017, Thomas Brennan, a former 
United States Marine and journalist, reported for The War Horse that a website, “Marines 
United,” with over 30,000 current and former members of the United States military as 
subscribers, had uploaded thousands of pictures of scantily clad or nude female service 
members. Some of the photos were taken unwillingly, while others were shared in a 
“revenge porn” manner, but all contained descriptions of rape, violence, and lewd sexual 
activities that visitors to the site wanted to engage in with those women.  Members of the 
military, veterans, politicians, and citizens of the United States were outraged.  Senator 
Gillibrand’s comments echoed the sentiments of many when she asked, “how can a 
country that sends so many women to war, women who are willing to die for this country, 
produce Marines and Soldiers who are willing to do this.”41  Indeed, the United States has 
one of the highest percentages of women in their militaries, yet still has what service 
members have dubbed a “cultural problem” (Ackerman, 2015) that hinders women’s 
ability to both be seen as equals and influence change among the ranks.  
In 2016, Jegertroppen, or Hunter Troop, an all-female elite special forces unit, 
completed training in Norway, as part of a pilot to test whether women had the ability to 
endure the country’s hardest military training and harshest environmental conditions 
without assistance from their male peers (Braw, 2016). The women-only makeup of the 
Troop was a departure for the Norwegian military, historically emphasizing gender 
 
41 Senate Hearing Transcripts March 14, 2017.   
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neutrality. Three years earlier, universal conscription was passed, and gender-neutral 
bunking and berthing was adopted after a long-running study found that gender-neutral 
standards dramatically reduced (to less than 8 reports/year) instances of sexual 
harassment or assault (Fasting, 2011).  Yet despite these advancements, officials in 
Norway continue to pursue measures as to how to increase both the number of women in 
the military and number of women who make a career out of service. As Frank Steder, 
special researcher on women in the services for the Norwegian Defense Research 
Institute stated, “Norway should continually be a pioneer for gender equality in all 
aspects, we’re not doing enough to engage women, to encourage them, to keep them as 
valuable members of our armed forces.”42     
 Newly elected French President Macron, in a March 2017 interview with 
Reuters43 asserted that France was facing “turbulent times” with an increase in home-
grown radicalization and the targeting of French Citizens abroad.  To combat this, he 
called for the recruitment of 60,000 more French women into the military, citing women 
as “proven to fight radicalization in a way that men cannot.”  His statement was met with 
over 80% approval rating from the French public, and French Defense ministers began to 
deliberate on how to appeal to female recruits to meet the needs of their country.44 
Using both the impact that women have tactically and their experience in the 
military to understand women’s integration is unique in studying women in the military. 
 
42 Interview conducted July 23, 2017.  
 
43 Reuters, March 17, 2017.  
 
44 Remarks at NATO High Profile Event at University of San Diego by French representative, April 2017 
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In this chapter I discuss the evolution of the study of women in the military and introduce 
my theory of how claims about women’s participation in public life contributes to gender 
integration. I highlight how there have been great strides made in understanding the 
autonomy of women to choose to participate in the military despite the permeation of 
masculinity throughout Western military culture. However, I also point out the 
deficiencies in much of our understanding of women’s military participation, noting that 
the focus tends to be on either the legal or numerical inclusion of women, and the 
military is still essentialized as solely focused on violence and killing. I then go on to 
discuss the importance of the military’s other roles, and discuss how military culture and 
the response to changing global politics have influenced what roles are the most 
emphasized. I operationalize integration through the impact that women have on various 
aspects of the military, and introduce the components of integration. I explain how 
integration is a result of the interaction between legal provisions and functional 
participation, spurred and constrained by the interaction between claims about women’s 
service and military culture. I end by briefly highlighting the differences in women’s 
impact on the military observed in France, Norway and the United States and how they 
are reflective of high, moderate, and low levels of integration respectively.   
 
The Evolution of the Study of Women in the Military    
Historically, the scholarship on women’s inclusion in the military has treated it as 
a one-way process. Women join the military. The military changes women, or forces 
them to conform to their historical masculine culture. Most of the variation studied 
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centers on the differences in number of women in the military or laws about women’s 
participation. These is little examination as to what impact women have on the military or 
the relationship between military service and broader public life. I argue that to 
understand integration, we must examine impact.  While the current scholarship has been 
instrumental in elevating the importance of women in the study of war and the military, it 
falls short in explaining the more nuanced variations we see in women’s integration into 
Western militaries. This failure stems largely from both the segmented operationalization 
– focusing either on number or laws – of women’s participation and the essentialization 
of the military. An emphasis on laws over-simplifies many facets of military service, 
especially as militaries have professionalized. As a result, the emphasis has been on 
inclusion, bringing women into the military, rather than integration, incorporating women 
in such a way that they are able to have a beneficial impact on military tactics and 
strategies. The existing studies have set the stage in highlighting both that there is 
variation in women’s participation and that this difference matters. Yet do not fully 
explain the current variation or how women have been able to impact the military.  
Studies of women’s participation in the military have grown out of the broader 
literature on women in war. A consequence of the growth of feminist discourse in 
political science and international relations in the late twentieth century has been a move 
to understand women “outside the homogenous bonds of motherhood and reproduction” 
(Ferguson, 1988).  Understanding women’s role in war, to include their participation in 
the military, is one such area that has expanded. Particularly in the women, peace, and 
security (WPS) arena, the literature has been moving beyond assuming that women are 
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essentially pacific in nature, and towards understanding the totality of women’s 
participation during war and conflict.    
The recent emphasis on the importance of gendering security studies in WPS 
scholarship represents an important evolution in the study of women in the military. 
Broadly, there has been an accelerated interest on the role that gender plays in security 
and stability. Gender equality and inclusion has been found to be directly related to a 
state’s peace and stability (Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli, & Emmett, 2012). Further, 
gender equality generally in governance generally promotes more peaceful and lasting 
outcomes to potential inter- and intra-state conflicts (Caprioli, 2005; Castillejo, 2009). 
Through the work of scholars such as Valerie Hudson and Mary Caprioli, we have 
empirical evidence that the role of women in society matters. Their work has created a 
cornerstone for academic and political activists to work for more inclusive governments 
in order to promote security, stability, and prosperity. However, despite the increased 
attention on women’s inclusion in formal politics, women’s participation in the military 
has largely remained an outlier.  
Early arguments about women as they related to the military were primarily 
focused on the importance how women were affected by war or military actions (Enloe 
1980, 1983, 1990; Elshtain 1981; Cohn 1987).  Historically, military studies have been 
both male-focused and dominated by male scholars. By asking a simple question, “where 
are the women?,” (Enloe, 2014) a new movement in scholarship and public conscious 
was born. International relations and war studies were on longer solely the providence of 
men. This early feminist scholarship was radical in that it asserted that women mattered, 
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and a women’s perspective to conflict was as valid as the traditional male counterpart 
(Tickner, 1992). These works laid the groundwork for a focus by both policy makers and 
scholars on bringing women into policy conversations and studies, and considering 
diverse views of both conflict and security.   
These pioneering studies of women in war recognized that women had always 
been present on the battlefield, and brought that presence into the security dialogue. Such 
studies challenged both which actors we attended to during war and conflict and which 
outcomes were of interest. By putting camp followers, comfort women, and mothers on 
the same plane as soldiers, military action became not just a man’s world, but a social 
enterprise. However, while these studies emphasized the importance of women, they 
viewed women as largely passive.  While the women’s perspective is deemed important, 
war (and the military broadly) was operationalized something that happened to women.  
In the introduction to the Women & War Reader, Jennifer Turpin asserts “war has 
profound and unique effects on women” (Turpin, 1998, p. 3).  This view places women 
outside the institution, unable to shape or change it. The choices women do have are only 
in reaction to or a byproduct of war’s conduct.  
The literature has evolved from viewing women as passive and reactive to war 
into viewing them as autonomous actors who make choices as to how they interact with 
war and institutions of violence. Studies now acknowledge that women may also have a 
roll in war’s conduct (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007), and often focus on the number of women 
that participate in war or are included in the military. Those looking at the number of 
women in the military largely focus on understanding why women are allowed in an 
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institution that has been historically characterized as the providence of men (Goldstein, 
2001; Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002; Higonnet, 1987; Hacker, 1981; Herbert M. S., 1998). 
They often emphasize the construction of masculinities and femininities, and how the 
conduct of war either reinforces or conflicts with social gender constructions.  Though 
they recognize women’s autonomy, they typically still treat women as objects of war or 
the military.  They often are concerned with what the impact of fighting is on women, or 
how the feminine identity may be at odds with military service.  As Melissa Herbert 
(1998) finds, though women have a choice to enter into the military, they do so knowing 
that they will become more masculine. The underlying assumption is that if women want 
to be included in the military, they must conform to the traditionally masculine norms 
and rules associated with it. As Sjoberg notes, even as militaries have included women 
and emphasized the importance of their participation, there has been a “preservation of 
the discursive structures of gender subordination” for women (Sjoberg L. , 2007, p. 84). 
Even when given autonomy over their participation, the relationship between the military 
and women has largely been viewed as one way, with the focus on how women are 
changed or subjugated by the military, rather than how they may impact it.      
Some, however, also focus on the social implications of women’s military 
participation, including attempts to understand why a society chooses to send women to 
fight. Goldstein (2001) emphasizes that war is an exceptional phenomenon, and societies 
must respond in exceptional ways. Such a logic helps to justify women’s participation in 
an historically masculine enterprise, while maintaining generalized gendered beliefs 
about the roles of men and women in sociopolitical life. There are also more practical 
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approaches to understanding women’s participation in war. Such approaches focus on 
needs of war fighting, emphasizing the manpower needs of the military to successfully 
defend a nation. As Segal (1995) explains, as the threat to national security goes up and 
states need bigger militaries to confront this rising threat. When men are unable to fill the 
ranks, women are seen as necessary in order to meet the needs of the growing size of the 
military. National security has traditional held an exceptional place in the national 
consciousness (Goldstein, 2001), and as such provides the leverage for countering 
traditional gender roles by recruiting more women for the armed services.   
Social expectations are also used to highlight unnecessary gendered constraints 
that have been placed on women. Often, the military’s role in conducting violence is used 
as an excuse to keep women out of war, or at least certain military occupations. For 
example, in her exploration of the United States military, Megan MacKenzie (2015) 
focuses on the social (mis)conceptions of what violence is and who is capable of doing it.  
She shows how overly essentialized gender ideals created a legacy of exclusion for 
women in the United States military. She argues that women’s history of proving 
themselves to be capable of the conduct of war is a necessary step in the military 
becoming more legally inclusive. Her work is useful in explaining how women are able 
to change social beliefs by their actions. It highlights how war as an enabling condition 
for women to do exceptional things that challenge the existing social order. However, as I 
will show in the case studies, some of the most prolific change for women came during 
peacetime and was led not by women in the military but by civilian women or 
government leaders.  
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 In addition to the focus on how many women participate in the military, there is 
also a body of work that focuses almost primarily on the legal aspects of women’s 
military service.  These studies focus on what women are allowed to do in the military, 
and how women’s roles have formally expanded over time. Mady Segal (1995), often 
considered the pioneer of women’s military sociology, contributed greatly in 
conceptualizing Western militaries, NATO forces in particular, as differential and 
discrete units of analysis. Her work focuses primarily on the legal aspect of inclusion, 
arguing that what women are allowed to do in the military is a product of the military’s 
prominence overcoming social norms about women’s role in society and state 
institutions. She hinges her argument on the experiences and priorities of Western nations 
during the Cold War, focusing on how different priorities led to different opportunities 
for women among NATO countries. Her work contributed greatly to understanding that 
there is, in fact, variable experiences and outcomes between NATO countries. However, 
the effectiveness of her argument diminishes in the post-Cold War era as NATO 
members have increasingly converged on military priorities.      
Segal also focuses on the legal ramifications of the professionalization of 
militaries. As militaries have professionalized, economics increasingly plays a role in the 
personnel composition of the armed forces. When men no longer have to serve in the 
military, they are more likely to choose jobs that are less dangerous, more stable, and 
offer better pay in the private sector. As a result, states must increasingly turn to women 
to fill the ranks of the military. Segal asserts “high [male] unemployment rates are 
associated with a ready supply of men for the armed forces, and relatively low 
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opportunities for women” (Segal, 1995, p. 767). Women’s inclusion in the military is 
thus typically associated with low male unemployment. Conversely, there is a surplus of 
male labor, women tend to lose military opportunities.  Explicitly, it was found that when 
male unemployment rose in the early 1980s, opportunities for women in the military 
contracted (Stanley & Segal, 1988). However, while this patteren held for the first decade 
after most Western militaries professionalized, it has proved more problematic in recent 
years. In the 2000s, when Western military saw expansions in both the number of women 
participating in the military and in laws accommodating them, much of Europe and the 
United States was experiencing an economic recession and high male unemployment. 
Economics alone cannot explain women’s integration.  
In more recent years, there have been efforts to expand on Segal’s work and 
account for changing global politics in the post-Cold War era. For example, Helena 
Carreiras (2006) emphasizes the changing nature of the conduct of violence, noting that 
both improvements in military technology and growth in the personnel requirements for 
combat support,45 coupled with changes in geopolitics have played a substantial role in 
states’ willingness to formally include women in their militaries. As militaries are less 
reliant on combat foot soldiers, they are more likely to include women. Including women 
in support positions does not challenge gendered norms as much as including women in 
combat roles. Additionally, Carreiras provides evidence for the idea that as states 
professionalize their militaries, they will need to expand opportunities for women in 
order to have a large enough talent pool to fill the ranks, hinging her argument on women 
 
45 Logistics, supply, intelligence, transport aviation and medical specialties 
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being more willing to participate in support roles than their male counterparts. While very 
applicable to the post-Cold War era, her argument hinges on inclusion rather than 
integration. Irene Euirlet (2012) furthers Carreiras’ arguments about military inclusion by 
emphasizing the role of political culture. She argues that the stickiness of cultural norms 
create political systems that are either permissive or restrictive to increasing formal 
allowance for women’s participation in the military. I draw much from both Eurlet and 
Carreiras’ work to explain variations in demand and allowance for women’s participation 
in the military. However, their work does not explain why women are able to have 
variable impact on the military and treat women as largely passive with regards to 
military service. They focus on women being allowed into the military, but not on how 
they can potentially impact military operations. The military is still the primary actor, 
with women being impacted and often changed by their service.  
 Beyond the scholarly literature, focusing on either the number of women or the 
laws about women’s service has impacted the way that governments have approached 
understanding women in the military. There have been many studies undertaken by 
Western governments on women’s military participation. Most of these focus primarily 
on the number of women in the military (Steder, 2014; National Defense and the 
Canadian Armed Forces, 2014; NATO, 2016). Much attention, especially since the 
adoption of UN Resolution 1325 has been on increasing the number or share of women in 
the military.  Whether 10% or 50%46 many governments have set a target percentage for 
 
46 Targets set by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the wake of the Marines United Scandal and the 
Minister of Defense of Norway after the successful training of the Hunter Troop respectively.  
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“success” with regards to women’s inclusion in the military.  However, focusing on the 
number of women results in little variation between Western democracies.  Most NATO 
countries have between 9-11% female service members47 (NATO, 2010-2016).  
Additionally, this percentage has been increasing since the end of the Cold War. 
According to the 2015 NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, women 
represent 11% of all operational48 NATO forces, up from 3.7% in 1998 (NATO, 2016). 
 
Figure 3.1: Women in NATO Forces  
 
Source: NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives49  
  
The focus on numbers as the operationalization for women’s service is an 
efficient way to compare militaries. However, it provides limited, and often misleading 
information as to the quality of women’s participation. Hungary, for example, has the 
highest percentage of women in the military of all NATO forces at 20.2%.  Relying on 
 
47 Notable outliers are Italy that did not open any military positions to women until 2000 and Denmark, that 
has a unique hybrid civilian-service member military rank structure.  
 
48 NATO’s reporting requirements focus on troops that are deployable, which excludes some service 
specialties (such as medical) that are not regularly deployed.    
 
49 The decline from 1999-2001 is largely related to the assentation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland into the alliance.  These countries did not make policies permitting women into the military until 
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numbers alone, one would expect that the military is more egalitarian, and even attractive 
to women. However, there are no female senior officers or senior staff noncommissioned 
officers, and only 6% of Hungary’s operational50 forces are women.  The vast majority of 
Hungary’s service women are of junior rank and in non-deployable service roles that 
have little impact on either the military as an institution or its conduct of missions. 
Despite being most inclusive of women, Hungary is one only two countries51 that do not 
consider gender as a factor when planning military operations (NATO, 2016). Though 
women are included in the military, they have not had the opportunity to make a 
meaningful impact, therefore are not well integrated. Indeed, numbers are a useful proxy, 
as they can neatly be discussed and measured as a way to operationalize women’s 
presence or inclusion.  However, they fall short in measuring the quality of women in the 
military or explaining variations in the outcomes resulting from women’s service.    
 In addition to largely being constrained by a focus either on the numbers or legal 
allowance for women’s participation, several studies also suffer from an over-
simplification in the way they view the military. These studies largely assume that the 
military is a masculine institution that is focused almost exclusively on the violent 
conduct of war. The focus on the violent outputs of the military allows for a construction 
of women and femininity as the “other,” a foil to military life (Goldstein, 2001, pp. 304-
305). Such an emphasis has resulted in discord among feminist scholars. Because military 
service and the conduct of war is largely viewed as masculine by design, women are 
 
50 Defined as forces that can be deployed in support of military operations 
 
51 Luxemburg is the only other country that does not formally consider gender in their operational planning  
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often emphasized in their roles opposing the conduct of war or militarism more broadly. 
As Cynthia Cockburn writes in the introduction to her book on anti-war activism, a 
feminist take on war is one that emphasizes that “women are less inclined to support war 
… and need to tools to mobilize against it” (Cockburn, 2007, p. 1). Judith Hicks Steinem, 
conversely, argues that women should reject the gendered norms of war and join the 
military on the same terms as men in order to prove their equality (Stiehm, 1982). Where 
there has been debate about the form that women’s participation during war takes, the 
focus remains on the military’s output of violence, and sees the relationship between the 
military and women as one-way. Whether opposing it or participating in it, women are 
reactive to the military and changed by it.  
 However, as I will discuss in more detail below, women have had, and continue to 
have an impact on the military. Indeed, to understand women’s integration, and the 
resulting variations in tactical and strategic outcomes, I argue that we must look beyond 
the numbers of women participating in the military or the laws passed about their 
participation to the impact that women have had on the military. This includes both 
internal military policies and tactics and strategies of war. To do this, we much 
understand that the military-woman relationship is not only one-way, and examine the 
impact (or lack thereof) that women have had on the military.  
The first step in creating the framework for understanding women’s impact on the 
military is to recognize that the military does more than just engage in state sanctioned 
violence. It plays a vital role in promoting a country’s social and political values both at 
home and abroad. The role of the military has shifted over time as well. As global politics 
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have shifted, so, too, has military conduct. Particularly in the past decade, militaries in 
Western countries have been less focused on killing and more focused on creating 
beneficial conditions for democracy. As Colonel (Retired) Mike Shup, commanding 
officer or Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 1 in the First Battle of Fallujah noted, “I 
could have recruited anyone to kill Iraqis, what I needed was Marines who upheld the 
moral values of equality … to model to the Iraqi people that democracy was something 
worth fighting for … and they needed to model it to the American people when they get 
home, too.”52  On the ground, commanders recognize the need to look beyond the 
conduct of violence to understand military success and respond to global changes. In the 
next section, I discuss the functional roles of the military beyond conducting violence and 
how they have evolved, and highlight why they are important in understanding women’s 
integration.  
 
The Military: Beyond Killing People and Breaking Things 
The idea that the military is an exceptional institution because of its capacity for 
violence is prevalent throughout both policy debates and scholarship on expansion of 
military service to women. “The military is not a social experiment,” is a common cry of 
politicians and activists striving to maintain a masculine status quo. This assertion is 
typically followed up with some derivation of the military’s purpose being “to kill people 
and break things,” emphasizing sanctioned acts of violence over the political role of the 
military both at home and abroad. The prominence of the military in public life can 
 
52 Interview September 14, 2017 
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accentuate the traditional masculine character of the military. As Uta Klein asserts, the 
more active a military in society, more obvious the gendered “division of labor” is.  
Beyond any other function a military serves, violence “is essential in its formulation of 
the masculine identity” (Klein, 1998, p. 149). However, when we look beyond the 
outputs of violence, we are able to more fully understand the differences in military 
cultures and ultimately women’s integration into them. Indeed, while all militaries 
conduct violence, they all also serve other important functional roles. The degree to 
which militaries emphasize these various roles differs and has evolved with changes in 
global politics. This difference is part of understanding the differences in women’s 
integration.  
Moving beyond a focus on the military as solely defined by the outputs of 
violence is more than recognizing that there are jobs in the military that may not directly 
involve killing or destruction. However, in understanding women’s inclusion in the 
military, the presence of non-combat jobs has been of particular interest. From 
intelligence, to communications, to cooking, to supply and logistics, to administrative 
roles, Western militaries have large support apparatus.  Nearly 80% of military jobs are 
not part of the “ground combat”53 specialties  (Carreiras, 2006; NATO, 2016). A main 
thread of argument for keeping ground combat positions closed to women has been that 
there are so many other opportunities for service that don’t involve ground combat that 
women are not actually limited in making military service a career. Helena Carreiras 
(2006) and Mady Segal (1995) both highlight how the large support population of 
 
53 Defined as infantry (both ground and mechanized), artillery, and tanks.  
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modern Western militaries have provided extensive opportunities for women, as they are 
able to participate without disrupting too many gendered ideals on acceptable 
professional behavior. However, while opening opportunities to women, this focus on 
non-infantry jobs perpetuates the primacy of violence and combat as the area of 
importance in the military, and continues the gendered essentialization of both women 
and the military. All support elements exist to enable the infantryman to conduct 
violence, and therefore success in a masculinized combat role remains the continued 
focus of military culture.  
However, recent arguments suggest that the focus of the military is on more than 
just the infantry, and that military effectiveness includes actions that cannot be measured 
in body counts or physical destruction. Particularly as global politics has moved away 
from the bi-polar standoff of the Cold War towards economic and political globalization 
and interdependence of the 21st Century, state politics has become less zero-sum and 
more focused on consensus building (Lipschutz, 2012). As Risa Brooks notes, military 
effectiveness is not just about the capacity to kill, but the ability to achieve specific and 
strategic policy outcomes while continuing to adapt to changes in both domestic priorities 
and the international security arena (Brooks, 2007, pp. 9-11).  Even during the Cold War, 
countries had strategic aims that involved more than killing. Beginning in the post-World 
War II era, Western states have largely focused less on conquering and more on 
promoting and preserving democratic values and beneficial political arrangements. This 
can be clearly seen in the case of the United Kingdom. Once a military focused on 
physical conquest, the post-imperial military named as its top priority “promoting the 
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United Kingdom’s wider security interests through maintenance of international peace 
and stability” (Dandeker, 2000, p. 33).  In his assessment of this new priority, Charles 
Dandeker (2000) finds that the idea of the “soldier statesman” has become as important 
as the soldier-conqueror to ensure that the strategic purpose of the military is maintained. 
In a security context where national strategic interests are more than national physical 
survival or territorial expansion, soldiers must be more constrained in their use of force 
and ensure that any violence that is expressed serves political ends.  
The emphasis on the ability of western militaries to be more than an instrument of 
brute force and violence has become central to their function in the 21st Century. Though 
western military power during the Cold War was measured largely in terms of physical 
capacity and ability to effectively balance against the Soviet threat, changes in the post-
Cold War order have shifted the military’s purpose. James Rosenau refers to the 
transition Western militaries underwent at the end of the Cold War as one in which armed 
force was no longer the assumed outcome of military action (Rosenau, 1998).  
Particularly for Western militaries, military power and effectiveness was measured in its 
capacity to prevent violence, rather than enact it. Since the end of the Cold War, nearly 
88%54 of NATO’s missions where infantry troops have been sent were non-combatant in 
nature (peacekeeping, crisis response, natural disaster, training exercises, etc). General 
Rupert Smith (2007) similarly notes, “the reality of contemporary conflict, and the new 
paradigm, is that information – not firepower – is the currency on which war is 
conducted.”   
 
54 Data compiled from NATO.int  
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While militaries still have the capacity for overwhelming combat force, the focus 
on international peace and stability and democratic values has taken center stage as the 
purpose of military action. The security of Western democracies frequently rests on 
“building relationships on a global scale,” and, as Rosa Brooks notes, the “military is the 
only institution with the manpower to do it” (Brooks, 2016, p. 144). It is also in the best 
interests of political leaders in Western democracies to promote democratic values 
without bloodshed, as democratic selectorates preference systemic peace over increased 
expansionism (Bausch, 2015). Indeed, to serve in this role, the military must constrain 
force for much of its operational time. The concern with constraining force and modeling 
democratic norms among militaries from developed democracies is correlated with 
positive institutional outcomes in those developing democracies with whom they interact. 
Modeling a purpose beyond the use of violence has positioned the military as an essential 
tool of diplomacy in the post-Cold War era (Meernik, 1996).  Even in terms of 
conventional military force, norms around the use of military force have converged 
towards restraint. While militaries have built large weapon stockpiles and invested 
heavily in technology that increases lethality, their purposes tend to be more strategic 
than practical, as a coercive tool of last resort (Farrell, 2007).    
Modern peacekeeping operations highlight how the fundamental functions of the 
military go beyond just the conduct of violence. Stability throughout the world is in the 
political, economic, and security interest of West. However, many states, especially those 
emerging from conflict, lack the internal capability to provide for both the domestic and 
international security necessary to build robust and resilient political and economic 
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institutions. Foreign powers thus step in to fill the security void, freeing domestic forces 
to focus on internal capacity building. Foreign powers are faced with a two-pronged 
dilemma; to be strong enough to enforce peace, while maintaining a light enough 
footprint to not be seen as an occupying or imperial force (Edelstein, 2009). It is not just 
violence, but the ability to tie its use to concrete policy objectives that define modern 
effectiveness.  Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis emphasize this in their 
examination of “failures” of peacekeeping. They described failures as resulting from a 
“troubling divorce” between political strategy and operations in the field (Doyle & 
Sambanis, 2006, p. 185).  
If we look beyond the physical conduct of violence, we see that the military is 
engaged in a verity of tasks – from construction to intelligence gathering to education – 
that are not merely needed to enable violence, but central to the political mission of the 
armed forces. Top generals from every NATO country involved in the operations in 
Afghanistan have noted some derivation of the idea that we can’t kill our way out of the 
war. The conduct of violence is thus not the sole focus of military force, nor are non-
violent activities merely enabling violence. To achieve strategic political aims, militaries 
must be equipped to engage in a range of activities. The more complex an international 
security dilemma, the less likely that violence, alone, will solve it. In a comprehensive 
review of 20th Century counterinsurgency campaigns, Kalev Sepp found that operations 
led by “military goals, rather than civil politics [were] overwhelming disasters” (Sepp, 
2005, p. 11).  Effective militaries are not just good at fighting, but beholden to political 
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control and reflective of the values of the society they represent and protect (Kestnbaum, 
2012).  
A historical institutionalist approach helps us understand that the functional role 
of the military can change.  Understanding how military culture and their role in society 
changed in response to global political changes is essential for more completely 
understanding the process of integration. I trace the process of integration through three 
eras of global political change. First is the early 1970s – early 1990s. This era is the first 
in which women made large legal strides in public life. Additionally, it is a time of 
transition from “hot” proxy wars in the Cold War to an increased emphasis on 
peacekeeping and development in post-Colonial Africa and South Asia. The second is 
1992 (end of the Cold War) – 2001. In the post-Cold War era, the lines between war and 
peace have been blurred, with no clear enemy or delineated battlefields. There was both 
an increase in peacekeeping as well as an increase in non-state violence. The third is 2001 
– present. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, much of the 
Western world’s security sectors have been focused on the Global War on Terror. The 
nebulous nature of this conflict has resulted in a permeation of the role in the military 
throughout society (Brooks, 2016). Additionally, it has often furthered the military’s role 
in promoting values. Rather than “killing people and breaking things”, the military is now 
expected to constrain the use of violence to only those times that it is politically 
necessary. This is essential to winning on today’s battlefield. Hard-power and violence 
have become less useful for meeting the threats Western militaries faced in the post-Cold 
War (Nye Jr, 2008).  
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Not all societies have adopted the belief that the role of the military is greater than 
conducting violence to the same degree though. Beliefs about the military’s role in 
society, and the emphasis placed on conventional military tactics varies between Western 
militaries, especially since the end of the Cold War. As Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff 
(2002) find, the divergence in the changes – both in doctrine and prominence in society – 
to Western militaries in the post-Cold War global security arena is a result of a 
combination of cultural inputs and public policy constraints. Domestic experiences with 
war, the history of imperialism, the size and strength of the military budget, and beliefs 
about social welfare and values have influenced military doctrine and policies.  Risa 
Brooks (2007) further emphasizes that sociopolitical and cultural beliefs influence both 
the definition of military effectiveness and the means by which militaries achieve it. For 
example, France’s colonial legacy has resulted in a military that is very responsive to 
changing international politics, while Norway’s history of subjugation to its Scandinavian 
neighbors has resulted in a military that is more entrenched in citizenship ideals. The size 
and strength of the United States military has resulted in an enduring focus on combat 
and conventional military strength, even in the face of changing political demands. 
Tracing these differences in experiences, beliefs, and policy constraints is important for 
fully understanding differences in integration. As I will show, the critical differences in 
cultural beliefs about equality have impacted the way in which militaries have adopted to 
new security challenges, and specifically affected attitudes toward women. This, in turn, 
has created permissive or restrictive environments for women’s integration.  
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The way in which the military has responded to changes in global politics is an 
output of differences in military culture.  A particular military may be more responsive to 
some political changes than to others. For example, in the years immediately following 
World War II, the United States’ military was used as a means of making citizenship 
claims, with an emphasis placed on the military as a “schoolhouse for the nation” (Krebs, 
2006). Military service was used to strengthen the Civil Rights’ movements. However, by 
the latter part of the 20th Century and the introduction of the all-volunteer force, the 
United States’ military had returned its focus outwards, with an emphasis on 
conventional military tactics and force projection. The Norwegian military has 
historically been focused on making Norwegian citizens, and highlighting those aspects 
of culture that are distinctly Norwegian (Friis, 2000). The historical focus has been on 
appealing to the values of equality and egalitarianism, and socializing young people into 
the national sociopolitical culture. However, the demands of the international 
environment, especially in the wake of operations in Afghanistan, have resulted in a more 
externally focused military that must try to respond to the changing security landscape. In 
France, the military has had strong conventional foci in various periods of its history 
(Siegl, 2008), while also being dedicated to positive values engagement during military 
conflicts (Bore, 2006) that have translated into its responses to the current environment.  
The way in which militaries respond to changes in global politics is a result of a 
larger military culture. Military culture can be best seen in the sources of authority55 for 
 
55 Sources of Authority is a term used by Dobbin, 1994 to help explain variation in industrial policies 
between the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. He argues that the variations in authority over 
economic policy (markets, firms, or central government) created differential outcomes despite similar 
available policy options. Variations of sources of authority were reflective of a deeper sociopolitical and 
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reward or promotion within a given military. Despite the changes in global politics and 
the resulting nature of warfare, the ways in which service members gained credibility and 
access to leadership positions has been relatively unchanging. These variations in sources 
of authority represent some of the more deeply rooted aspects of military culture.  
To understand the sources of authority in the military I look to the background of 
and requirement for promotion to leadership ranks and the way that members of the 
military can earn accolades and awards.  In the United States, the source of authority lies 
in the combat arms. Of the four-star generals that have been the most senior leaders of the 
Army and Marine Corps, only one has come from a non-ground combat occupational 
specialty. Combat service is seen as a requirement for military leadership. Additionally, 
over 90% of the valor-awards since Vietnam have been awarded to members of ground-
combat specialties. In France, the source of authority lies with furthering political norms. 
There is a high concentration of intelligence officers in the general officer rank, 
highlighting the emphasis on a values-based constrained use of force, and the importance 
of information gathering and decimation. Norway places its source of authority in 
citizenship ideals. Leadership promotions are based off of upholding the tenets of 
“Norwegianness” and performance in skillsets based on classical Norwegian identity. 
These variations in sources of identity are reflective of the deeper military cultural 
identity that drives changes in orientation. Understanding the variations in these cultures 
and identity is important for understanding the variations in integration. Over time, the 
 
institutional culture. The source of authority guided both how the policy was enacted and the character of 
the resulting economic and industrial development. In much the same way, I argue that there are variations 
in the sources of authority in the military that are reflective of the deeper military culture.  
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cultures are more or less responsive to the claims that women make about their service, 
influencing women’s ability to influence military policies, tactics and strategy. It is 
against the background of military culture that the process of integration takes place.  
 
The Process of Integration: Women’s Ability to Impact the Military   
Studies of women’s participation in the military that focus on numbers or law, do 
not fully capture the variation seen in women’s integration in the militaries of the France, 
Norway, and the United States. These approaches focus on women’s inclusion, viewing 
the military as the primary actor and women as a subject to being allowed to participate. 
While they offer great insight into the drivers of legal change or moments of time that 
result in increased participation, they do not engage with the relationship between the 
women and the military or explain the observed variation seen in both tactical outcomes 
and the experiences of women in the military. To understand this, a more robust and 
comprehensive measure of integration, with a focus on the interactive effect between 
women and the military, specifically the impact that women are able to have on the 
military, is needed.  
Women’s participation in the military is not the only area where scholarship has 
revealed a tension between inclusion and integration. Work on women’s participation in 
parliamentary politics has been met with similar challenges. Early work on women’s 
elected representation focused heavily on the number of women in parliaments, often 
emphasizing quotas or electoral systems that best helped bring women into the elected 
body (Caul, 1999; Caul, 2001; Squires, 1996). However, while this work revealed the 
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importance of having women in parliaments, there was criticism and questions raised as 
to the character and quality of the women elected, and if women had any meaningful 
impact on politics or the political process. A common criticism to women’s inclusion in 
politics was that women were essentially coopted by male party members, forced to toe 
party lines, negating any benefit of women’s presence in government (Tinker, 2004).  To 
address this criticism there was a subsequent move to assess the actual impact of 
women’s participation in legislatures, measuring the policy outcomes and debates that 
women brought to the table by virtue of their unique social experiences (Ballington & 
Karam, 2005; Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli, & Emmett, 2012). The driving scholarly 
questions moved beyond “how many women” are in parliament to “what is the value 
added by women’s participation in governance?” The study of women in the military is 
due for a similar shift in focus, away from how many, and towards what impact they have 
on policies, tactics and strategies.  
To do this, I focus on the impact that women have on the military as the 
dependent variable. To measure impact, it is best to view integration as a complex set of 
legal, cultural, and practical factors (Vojdik, 2005) that interact to ultimately determine 
the degree to which women have been able to change military policies, tactics and 
strategy. More than numbers or laws, change in policy, tactics or strategies is indicative 
of integration taking place. As March and Olsen (1989) find, institutions in democracies 
change as they integrate individuals with different preferences. Christopher Anderson 
(2009) similarly discusses the change in institutions that result from participation by 
previous outgroups by emphasizing that institutional policies, practices and norms are 
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“changed – whether strengthened or weakened – by new [participants’] priorities or 
preferences” (Anderson, 2009, p. 317). We should therefore expect to see the military 
change as a result of women’s increased participation if integration has taken place. To 
understand how the change in the military occurs (or what inhibits its occurrence), it is 
best to conceptualize integration as a process that has unfolded overtime.  
 Understanding the integration of women into the military as a process rests on 
two important assumptions.  First is the idea that institutions in democracies see change – 
especially change that expands their participatory base – as both beneficial and desirable.  
Democratic organizations must be both enduring enough to withstanding potentially 
whimsical changes in popular sentiment, and nimble enough to improve with changing 
sociopolitical beliefs (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1981). Identifying and responding to 
beneficial moments of change is essential for a well-functioning democratic institution 
(Olsen, 2009). Regarding the military there is evidence that militaries that are reflective 
of their citizenry population are more effective and efficient at both their overall military 
objectives and at acting as part of the total state political apparatus (Burk, 2002; Cottey, 
Edmunds, & Forster, 2002). It can therefore be argued to be in their best interest to 
continue to expand military participation to be more reflective of society. Additionally, 
there are strong arguments to be made linking military participation to social and civic 
rights and duties of previously excluded or newly enfranchised groups (Burk, 2001; 
Krebs, 2006).  Indeed, if the military is conceptualized as an institution that can take on 
different roles and cultures (rather than solely a tool to commit violence for the state), we 
can see how expansion of opportunities to women – who comprise 50% of the population 
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and have an increasing state in the political, civic, and economic life of the state – can be 
beneficial.  
The second major assumption is that the requirements for participation remain 
constant when the participatory based is expanded. Whether expanding voting rights 
(Dalton & Grey, 2003) or military participation (Cohn, 2000), opponents of an increased 
institutional reach frequently point to the possibility that the institution will have to 
weaken its core competencies in order to account for the newly included group. Because 
of the unique nature of the military in society, and the gendered nature of the conduct of 
violence (Goldstein, 2001), this line of argument is particularly loud with regards to 
women’s integration in the military. However, there is no evidence that democratic 
institutions, including the military, have lessened or reduced standards or capabilities 
when expanding to include previous out-groups (MacKenzie, 2015). While the military, 
as an institution, may change requirements in order to meet changing security threats or 
changing global politics, thay have not been lessened to accommodate newly integrated 
groups, including women.56 Requirements for military service can be seen as a potential 
constraint on women’s choice to participate.  However, they are constraints that impact 
all potential recruits, and thus are operationalized as an inherent part of the institution.  
By conceptualizing of integration as a relational process we are able to identify 
and measure individual components (such as legal provisions and numbers of 
participation), while also capturing the ways in which women have actually changed the 
military. It takes the often segmented measures present in most of the literature on 
 
56 See NATO country reports 2000-2016 for a list of training requirements.   
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women in the military and interacts them. By taking an historical institutional approach to 
studying the process of integration, I will show that the interaction between military 
history and culture, and women’s claims about service create unique dynamics that help 
to explain the variation in tactical outcomes we see in the cases of Norway, France and 
the United States. The foundational beliefs about equality discussed in Chapter 2 greatly 
influence women’s decisions about both whether and how to join (and remain) in the 
military, and, in turn, their ability to influence military policies, process, and tactics. The 
degree to which these claims coincide or clash with military culture creates either a 
permissive or restrictive environment for the process of integration.  
 





Figure 3.2 highlights the process of integration. Integration takes place bounded 
by the interaction between claims about women’s service and military culture and 
tradition. Within these bounds legal provisions and functional participation interact to 
allow for women to have an impact on the military. This, in turn, creates new legal 
provisions and allows for new functional participation in military service. When claims 
about women’s service and military culture are in agreement with one another, a 
permissive environment is created for integration and the interaction of legal structure 
and functional participation results in women having the ability to change military 
policies, tactics and strategies. When claims and military culture are in conflict women 
are less likely to affect change on the military. The interaction between claims about 
service and views on the military role and culture help explain variation in women’s 
integration. Because of this variation, even when laws about women’s service are the 
same, or there are the same number of women in the military, we see differences in levels 
of integration.  
 
Operationalizing & Measuring Women’s Integration in Western Militaries  
 To operationalize the process of integration it is important to operationalize its 
components. Referring back to Figure 3.2, we see that legal provisions and functional 
participation interact to result in changes to the military’s policies, tactics and strategies. 
Legal or structural provisions are necessary open military service to women. They are the 
initial enabling conditions that allow women to be a part of the military structure. 
Functional participation addresses not only how many women are in the military, but 
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what women are doing in critical occupational specialties. It also addresses women’s 
staying power in the military and focuses on women’s access to influential senior 
positions. These components interact to ultimately result in women’s ability to impact the 
military. I will next discuss the measures of each of these components.  
 
Legal 
Though not the sole factor, de jure provisions for women’s inclusion in the 
military are an essential building block for integration. They formally open space in the 
military for women to participate. The legal component, however, extends beyond just 
what women are allowed to do, and also encompasses formal support structures that 
promote or enable equality and egalitarianism between the genders with regards to 
military service. In order to fully encompass the totality of the legal aspects of women’s 
integration we must take into account three legal factors. The first is what women are (or 
are not) legally allowed to do in the military. While I argue that this is not the sole basis 
of integration, I do agree with Irene Eulriet that the law is the foundation of women’s 
participation in Western militaries, especially in the post-Cold War era (Eulriet, 2012). 
Throughout the history of women’s participation in Western militaries, there have been 
restrictions placed on their service, particularity with regards to participation in direct 
combat roles and service aboard ships with limited berthing spaces.  The expansion of 
what women are legally permitted to do, therefore, does represent a first and necessary 
step in the process of integration.   
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Simply allowing women the possibility to serve in combat roles, though, does not 
account for integration. Even when there is legal equality in occupational specialties that 
are open, there are structural factors that hinder the de facto equality of women. The 
second and third legal factors are related to creating a structural environment that 
mitigates any differences resulting from one’s gender that may disproportionally hinder 
one’s possibility for operational success or promotion. Access to childcare and adequate 
female-specific medical care was cited as one of the top concerns of service members 
when asked what may hinder their career possibilities. In several instances, women were 
unable to find childcare outside traditional working hours, despite the fact that military 
operations take place 24 hours a day (DACOWITS 2016). Parenting is a condition that 
overwhelming affects women. Nearly 30% of all service women across NATO forces are 
single mothers (NATO 2016). For both biological and cultural reasons, motherhood is 
often used as a reason that women should not participate in the military (Goldstein, 2001; 
Van Creveld, 2001). Legally mitigating the differential in childcare requirements creates 
an environment where gender equality can be more fully practiced, and women actually 
able to integrate (rather than just be included) in the military. Access to childcare, or the 
lack thereof, is thus either an enabling or constraining force to women’s service and 
composes the second legal factor of integration.   
Similarly, parental leave and pregnancy policies impacts women’s ability to 
integrate. The physical aspects of motherhood do impact women’s ability to engage in 
many military activities. From not being able to be on ships or shoot firearms, to limited 
physical capability, pregnant women cannot participate in all aspects of military life. 
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Policies around assigning pregnant women to non-physical jobs, and allowing for 
adequate physical recovery time enable women to stay in the military and balance 
motherhood with their professional duties.   
Sexual assault and/or harassment is another explanatory factor linked to women’s 
propensity to serve in the military (Cawkill, Rogers, Knight & Spear, 2009). 
Institutionalized sexism manifested through both harassment and assault has been found 
to be a structural barrier to women’s participation in Western militaries from both a 
cultural perspective and lost training time (Fitzgerald, 1999; Morral, Gore & Schell, 
2016; LeardMann, et al., 2013). As the traditional domain of men, introducing women 
into the military has the potential to bring out “toxic, even dangerous” aspects of 
traditional views on masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). While there is debate 
around the interplay between culture and laws, legal conditions and processes are 
measurable and offer a point of comparison between countries.  To this end, 
incorporating laws around sexual harassment and assault, as well as the degree to which 
reports of such are investigated and prosecuted, provide necessary insight into to 
structural conditions to create actual equality between men and women, and comprises 

















- Occupational fields closed to women  
- Geographical restrictions on women’s service  
- Quotas/limitations on number of women able to 
serve in a given unit 
Childcare  - Provisions for childcare during all operational 
hours  
- Provisions for childcare during deployment  
- Equality in maternity / paternity leave  
Sexual Harassment - Laws on harassment / assault (military and 
national)  
- Ratio of allegations to investigations  
- Allegations / 10,000 military members  
- Ratio female/male victims  
- Ratio of trial / prosecutions  
 
Functional Participation  
In addition to considering the legal factors of integration, the nature of women’s 
participation and the roles they hold in the military is necessary to understand integration. 
Beyond just looking at what women are allowed to do, it is important to measure what 
women are actually doing and their ability to access promotions and leadership roles. 
Legal expansion to include women in the military does not guarantee that they will 
choose to participate. As seen with the case of voter enfranchisement, we cannot assume 
that expanding access to rights will result in more participation (Alex-Assensoh, 2005). 
While laws may be more inclusive, and create conditions for participation, without the 
choice to participate, the previous outgroup will never actually integrate. Additionally, all 
participation is not equal. As Carole Pateman asserted, “participation,” must be viewed as 
a “continuum of engagement” that encompasses various forms, qualities, and intensities 
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of involvement (Pateman, 1970, pp. 67-70). This variation is the functional quality of 
participation – how many women are doing what in the military.  
Functional participation composed of three factors.  First is the number of women 
in the military as a percentage of the total force. While not the complete picture, it gives a 
comparative baseline between countries. Understanding how many women participate is 
necessary for understanding the potential breakdown of labor. When there are relatively 
few women in the military (below 5%), women tend to be concentrated in a few 
occupational specialties that are reflective of traditional gender roles. While there is not a 
clear understanding as to why, the 5% threshold is correlated with women engaging in a 
verity of occupational specialties (Segal, 1995; Carreiras, 2006). Capturing the overall 
percentage of women is thus part of understanding what women may be doing.   
 The second component of functional participation is a breakdown of what 
occupational specialties and roles women are actually doing in the military. To evaluate 
this, I use the NATO standard of grouping military occupational specialties: 
administration/support, medical, support aviation, combat aviation, supply/logistics, 
ground combat, submarine, surface navy (shipborn), and intelligence. Breaking down 
participation into the actual occupational specialties is important for two primary reasons.  
First, it shows the degree to which women have permeated throughout the military.  
Indeed, there is evidence that numbers matter, and success in newly opened occupational 
specialties is dependent on women reaching a certain threshold of participation (Cawkill, 
Rogers, Knight & Spear, 2009).  Second, it allows insight into the supply side of military 
participation.  In Western militaries, military service is voluntary, to include a choice of 
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occupational specialties.57 Women must therefore choose to participate in occupational 
specialties that have previously been closed to them. This is a critical piece of the 
iterative process of integration. If women are not choosing to participate, despite de jure 
provisions that allow their service, full integration will not take place.    
The roles that women have in the military, particularly those that result in 
leadership and authority are also an important part of functional participation. For women 
to have an impact on the military in a meaningful way – both that makes it stronger and 
more conducive to future women’s participation – they must achieve a certain level of 
seniority and be in leadership positions. We must therefore look beyond the numbers of 
women who join, or what they are doing, and also examine the rate at which they stay in 
the organization and their access to leadership roles.  
 Looking at evidence from women’s participation in politics, gender-differentiated 
effects become more prominent when women reach a certain seniority of political office 
(Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Melander, 2005). It may logically follow that as women reach 
more seniority in the military, they may impact both strategy and tactics in a way their 
male counterparts do not.  To capture seniority, I look at the percentage of women that 
hold the rank of non-commissioned officer or field grade officer.  Though countries vary 
in their initial operational commitment, individuals cannot obtain these ranks during their 
initial enlistment term.  Additionally, these are the ranks at which individuals exert 
leadership authority over others. For the NATO countries, these ranks are achieved 
 
57 Though the needs of the military will ultimately win out, in the countries considered, recruits are able to 
express preference as to their desired occupation specialties. Currently, infantry occupations and special 
operations are still completely voluntary for women.   
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somewhere between 10-12 years of service.58 Additionally, I consider the retention rate 
of women compared to men.  A positive value means that that a greater percentage of 
women as compared to men stayed on to their next term of enlistment. A negative value 
means that a greater percentage of women than men who were eligible for separation due 
to the end of contract left the military.   
 In addition to seniority I also look at the number of operational commands and 
key positions that are held by women. Being in command gives one direct influence over 
more junior service members. This exposure to leadership is essential to make the 
military a more permissive environment and ultimately enact lasting structural change 
that will easy women’s ability to join in the future. Further, receiving command 
demonstrates the most senior military leadership’s confidence in women’s tactical 
competency. Women receiving command billets also signals that they have been 
normalized (and therefore integrated) into what is often conceptualized as a gendered 
organization.   
 Finally, functional participation includes a measure of women involved in 
overseas operations. The military has twin purposes overseas – a functional enactment of 
violence as an extension of policy aims and a societal reflection and upholding of core 
values (Feaver, 1996; Nielsen, 2012). The number of women involved in overseas 
operations is a reflection of both the faith in women’s ability to engage in functional 
combat operations and the centrality of gender equality to national priorities.   
 
 
58 Organizational requirements of NATO countries available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/68147.htm#civilian  
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Table 3.2: Functional Participation Components of Integration Index 
Component Definition 
Level of Participation - Women’s Participation as percentage of total force 
Types of Participation - Women’s Participation by occupational specialty  
- Women’s Participation by rank  
- Women’s Leadership positions  
- Retention Rate of women  
Overseas 
Participation 
- Women’s Participation in overseas missions  
- Breakdown of combat vs peacekeeping vs training 
missions 
     
The Impact Women have on the Military as a Result of Integration: Changes in 
Policies, Tactics and Strategy  
 Ultimately, the result of the process of integration is that women have an impact 
on the military. This impact varies in the cases of the France, Norway, and the United 
States. The variation can largely be seen in the degree to which the military recognizes 
the benefit of women as women, and has allowed space for them to impact and shape 
strategic policy outcomes while continuing to adapt to changes in both domestic priorities 
and the international politics (Brooks, 2007, pp. 9-11). If we look especially in the post-
Cold War era, women have been essential in both leveraging the currency of information 
and achieving strategic policy outcomes for which the military was deemed the 
appropriate tool. Further, the militaries of the France, Norway, and the United States have 
all emphasized women’s rights and gender relations as a strategic priority, particularly in 
their operations in Afghanistan. However, the degree to which strategic priorities beyond 
conventional force has been adopted varies.   
 Understanding the degree to which women have had an impact on the military as 
an institution can thus be seen in two ways.  First is the policies that have made it easier 
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for women to join and remain in the military. Though men are capable of enacting 
women-friendly policies, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps remarked, “I had no 
idea that child care was even an issue we should be concerned with; however it turns out 
it makes us better warfighters. Maybe we need more female senior leaders to make us 
aware of these things.”59  Women can be influential in easing the structural constraints 
that have limited their participation.   
Second is in the adoption of strategies and tactics that play to women’s unique 
strengths that also enhance the capabilities of the organization as a whole. Women have 
proven beneficial in advancing national security priorities and policy objectives, 
especially in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency missions. Including women in the 
military does not necessarily result in them being used in any different way than service 
members have been used traditionally. Historically, women have felt the need to adopt 
masculine characteristics and adhere to the “male way of fighting” (Herbert M. S., 1998) 
to be included in the military. Integration, conversely, results in the institution of the 
military being changed by women.  Therefore, in more integrated militaries we see the 
adoption of tactics and strategies that harness women’s unique abilities to better achieve 
their strategic goals.    
Table 3.3: Impact on the Military  
 United States Norway France 
Structural 
Provisions 
Left up to the 
individual 
Applied to all 
citizens equally  
Refinement to 
maternity policies 
and childcare  
Tactics/Strategies Conventional Force  After Afghanistan 
realize the value of 





59 Remarks to DACOWITS, June 2017  
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Table 3.3 highlights the differences in the impact that women have had on the militaries 
of the United States, Norway, and France.  
Broadly speaking, women have had very little impact on the military in the United 
States, despite their relatively high level of participation. Laws around their participation 
have been slow to change, and enabling structures still are largely left up to the 
individual. The lack of structural support for child care and motherhood contributes to the 
negative retention rate. While the United States has a relatively high number of women at 
any given point in time, the majority of them are junior enlisted or junior officers who 
leave after their enlistment contract is up, citing family as the primary reason 
(DACOWITS, 2016). Further, those women who do stay in the military tend to remain 
single or not have children. As retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Fran Wilson 
stated, “being a woman in the [United States] military is all about survival. You don’t 
make waves, and you sure as hell don’t offer up any ideas that may you’re your male 
peers think that you want things ‘easier’ for other women.”60  As evidenced by her 
remarks, despite the success of individual women, there was little space for meaningful 
change that would either ease or encourage women’s continued participation in the 
military.  
Discussions around women’s participation in the United States military typically 
hinge on whether or not they will be able to meet the male standards. For example, most 
of the contention surrounding FET teams was on the ability of women to meet the same 
 
60 Interview May 2017 
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physical standards as men, and engage in the “masculine” enterprise of close-quarters 
combat. Though FET teams were created specifically for gendered reasons, women were 
encouraged to adhere to male standards and patterns of behavior in order to “fit in” to the 
infantry units to which they were attached (Lemmon, 2015). Attempts to masculinize 
women in FET teams is at least partially responsible for the hurdles for fully 
implementing counterinsurgency strategies the United States faced in Afghanistan. After 
what was seen as a “failed experiment” by many of the current administration’s 
advisors,61 the United States continues to focus on conventional warfare, as evidenced by 
President Trump’s recent assertion that the purpose of military action in Afghanistan is 
“killing terrorists, not nation building.”62  
In Norway, the ability of women to change the organization has been limited, but 
is present. Concerning laws and enabling structures, Norway’s government has enacted 
wide-sweeping laws and policies on parental leave and childcare that pertain to all 
citizens.  These policies minimize gender differences. For example, parental leave is 
equal between parents, and fathers are expected to be as present in children’s lives as 
mothers. Indeed, the so-called “daddy quota” mandates that fathers take the first 16 
weeks of a child’s life away from work (Hernes, Scandinavian Citizenship, 1988; 
Borchorst & Siim, 2008). The need for more specific policies directly aimed at military 
women has been largely seen as unnecessary. Culturally, there is an expectation that 
 
61 Discussion on Afghanistan with members of Trump’s national security team who wish to remain 
anonymous, May 2017 
 
62 Speech on Afghanistan, August 21, 2017  
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government and parents will work together to ensure a proper work-life balance for all its 
citizens.    
The adoption of universal conscription further muted the differences between men 
and women. A 2011 report on the potential impacts of universal conscription highlighted 
how expanding to conscription to women would make women and men feel “more 
Norwegian” knowing that all fellow citizens were subject to the same benefits and 
responsibilities (Sand & Fasting, 2011). While historically men and women have been 
viewed as equal in all ways in the military,63 experiences in Afghanistan resulted in the 
creation of the “Hunter Troop,” an all-female special operations unit.  Its creation was a 
response to the lessons learned in Afghanistan as to the value of having women for 
specific tactical and strategic outcomes. The unit has not yet been tactically employed, 
yet its creation highlights the beginning of a women-led, meaningful change to military 
strategy.  
The French military is experiencing the highest level of women’s integration. 
Since 1972, there have been more than a dozen policy changes aimed at revising the 
maternity and childcare policies in the military, to include a 1984 order that deemed 
childcare a national security priority. These laws have been aimed at both attracting 
women and retaining them in service. Valerie Andre, the first female general in the 
French military, writes in her memoir that it was her duty and responsibility to make it 
easier for the women who came after her, and ensure that they never had to make the 
 
63 In an event sponsored by CSIS, Col Gjerde continued to emphasize the “sameness” of service in the 
military, downplaying any role that her gender had on her success. Transcript available at: 
https://www.csis.org/events/women-combat-arms-conversation-colonel-ingrid-gjerde 
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same choices concerning family or military that she did (André, 1954). Even early on, 
there was a recognition of responsibility to ensuring that the institution made up for any 
potential differences between the genders in order to create true equal opportunity.  
Women have also been targeted for recruitment for the specific talents that they 
bring, and integrated into infantry units purposefully for peacekeeping and 
counterinsurgency operations. The focus on female-specific military talents have their 
history in the role that French women played in the Resistance to Nazi-occupied France 
and the role of women in counterinsurgencies in Indochina and Algeria (Weitz, 1995; 
Hubin, 2012). Indeed, the role and success of women in these early wars has set the stage 
for women to have a powerful voice when it comes to military tactics and strategies.    
 In the following chapters I highlight the historical process that have shaped 
integration in France, Norway and the United States.  
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 Women have, and continue to have, a measurable impact on military tactics and 
strategy. Claims rooted in institutional equality are compatible with a culture of 
responsiveness to changes in global politics and a focus on innovative and human-
centered tactics. Today, France’s military is at another pivotal moment of change, as it is 
working to address the emerging threat of domestic terrorism and radicalization. The 
current responses in calls for cultural training and engagement are in line with the 
historical process of integration that women experienced.  
 The impact that women have had on the French military can be seen in their 
operations in Afghanistan. The French military made technological and tactical changes 
to harness women’s contributions to combat operations. Technologically, the French 
redesigned their body armor and combat gear to fit women. Though they had been 
working in peacekeeping operations, women had not been frequently engaged in 
offensive combat. Therefore, there was not combat-specific body armor tailored to 
women’s proportions. Combat-specific vehicles were also not designed for women’s 
smaller frames. In evaluating the reason for combat deaths in 2008, ill-fitting equipment 
was found at least partially to blame. Women were not able to maneuver easily, or 
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upload/offload from vehicles effectively. Properly fitting personal protection equipment 
and retrofitted vehicles allowed women to move more freely and effectively in combat 
situations.  As a result, by 2009, the French COIN forces had eliminated over half the 
Taliban forces in the Kapisa Province (Le Nen 2010). 
 The success in Kapisa rested on a tactical doctrine that de-emphasized purely 
kinetic operations and incorporated community engagement and capacity building. When 
Colonel Chanson took control of the region, he emphasized that “spatial discrimination, 
rather than large scale attrition, leading to a careful control of a few selected areas 
through persistent presence in the villages,” would be the key to ensuring that the Taliban 
would not return to gain control of the region (as quoted in Taillat, 2010). Rather than 
focusing on capturing main supply routes by force, or conducting house to house raids 
aimed at killing Taliban operatives, they focused on key village influencers, and used 
persuasion and coersion to fortify against Taliban recitivism. France withdrew from 
Kapsia in 2012, turning it over to Afghan security forces. Kapsia and the Tagrib Valley is 
currently a contentious region, yet has not fallen to the Taliban.  
 While there has been debate about the overall effectiveness of ISAF operations in 
Afghanistant, the Kapsia Vally is a succes story, in large part due to the actions of the 
women in the French forces stationed in the Vally. The high level of intergration of 
women into the French military was largely responsible for the French military’s success. 
The process by which the French military came to be integrated in important to 
understanding their recent actions in Afghanistan.  
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France: High Level of Integration  
The claims rooted in institutional equality and the policies resultant from the 
women of the women’s movement contribute to the high level of integration of women 
into the military in France.  This can be seen both in the way in which policies 
concerning women’s participation and the structural enabling conditions have been 
refined as well as the degree to which the unique talents of women have been used to 
strengthen military action. Laws have been continually refined to better accommodate 
women’s needs, both easing their ability to join the military and increasing retention. 
Additionally, France has revised strategic and tactical practices that emphasize to adapt to 
changes in global politics that highlight the importance of gender and the values of 
equality. For example, the 2013 Defense White Paper put an emphasis on human 
intelligence as the foundation of defense policy, and the military’s role in preserving and 
promoting values of equality and justice in both the near and far abroad (Ministry of 
Defense 2013). Evidenced by the work in Afghanistan, and the peacekeeping operations 
in Bosnia, women were an essential part in both gathering actionable intelligence, but 
more importantly promoting values through their lived experiences.  The focus of the 
strategy outlined in the White Paper is on the military’s role in preventing conflict before 
it starts. This is seen in President Macron’s call for female service members to fill roles in 
intelligence, peacekeeping and crises mitigation.   
The laws related to equal pay and work discussed in Chapter 2 were foundational 
in setting the stage to begin the process of integration. While laws related to women’s 
equality were necessary for France’s high level of integration, alone they were not 
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sufficient. The permissive environment created by the positive interaction of claims about 
women’s service and military culture has allowed women to influence the military 
through their participation and access to key positions of influence. This influence comes 
both in terms of military-specific policies, and tactical and strategic decisions. Table 4.1 
shows the current measures of women’s integration. 
Table 4.1: Current Measures of Women’s Integration into the French Military  
Measure Value  
Legal - No Restrictions on Occupational Specialties open to 
Women  
- No Restrictions on services on ships or in combat 
zones  
- No quotas (either positive or negative)  
- Creche Care – national childcare program  
- Guaranteed provisions for child care for night work 
- Pre/Post partum leave (16 weeks)  
- 156 weeks shared leave for mother/father in cases of 
dual military families  
- Themis Cell created a “prevention kit” for sexual 
assault   




- 15.5% of military force  
- 5.5% in ground combat force  
- 7% in international operational forces  
- + 6.3% retention rate  
- 2% of flag officers  
- 9% of senior officers  
- 51% of Noncommissioned Officers 
Institutional Impact - Spreading the values of equality and security 
worldwide is a national security priority   
- Counterinsurgency and nation building activities 
- Personnel policies refined to attract more women 
 
While the individual components each represent a relatively high level of 
women’s inclusion in the military, it is the process of their interaction that helps to better 
understand the high level of integration experienced by the French Military. The legal 
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and functional components interact in a way that is supported by institutional equality’s 
focus on the government’s role in ensuring that differences are not detrimental. This can 
be seen in the legal provisions for women’s service extending beyond allowance for 
women’s participation to include targeted maternity and child care policies that make it 
easier for women to both enter and remain in the military. The refinements to benefit 
policies largely came from women having influence on decision makers. Additionally, 
while France has an objectively high percentage of women in its military (15.5% 
compared to a 2016 NATO average of 11%), what women do and their numbers in 
leadership positions is more important when determining their level of integration. 
Though still objectively low, at 5.5%, France has one of the highest percentage of women 
in ground combat units. The presence of women in the specialty considered the “main 
effort” of military operations, reinforces the unique role that women have in the military. 
Traditionally, in order to participate in combat operations women had to adopt male 
characteristics, and were treated more as a soldier than a woman (Herbert 1998). 
However, the historical experiences of the military, coupled with the strategic 
commitment to values transferal has resulted in women in the French military being able 
to retain some of their uniquely feminine characteristics even while serving in combat 
roles (Boulegue 1991).   
Women’s ability to be both women and soldiers is reflected in a positive retention 
rate (women are more than 6% more likely to stay in the military than their male 
counterparts), and is also seen in their presence in leadership roles. Notably, staff 
noncommissioned officers (SNCO) are majority female. SNCOs are primarily 
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responsible for personnel management and the day to day lives of soldiers. The continue 
refinement to policies that impact women are reflective of women being in leadership 
positions that emphasize the wellbeing of soldiers.   
As noted in Chapter 3, integration is more than either just the laws that allow 
women to participate in the military or their degree of participation at any given point in 
time. Rather, it is a temporally dynamic process of institutional change and participation 
that interact to fundamentally change the institution. In this chapter I will show that 
France did not achieve a high level of integration due to one policy change. Rather, they 
engaged in multiple iterations of change that resulted from women being able to position 
themselves in leadership roles such that they could influence claims about women’s 
service and the conditions under which they serve. Because of policy change that made 
military service more attractive, and a culture that valued women for their unique 
characteristics, women remained in the military and gained influential leadership 
positions.  I begin this chapter by discussing the role of the French military and its 
culture. I focus on its culture of adaptation through self-examination and how its history 
has resulted in an emphasis on values and equality in response to changes in the 
international arena.  I further show how the structural results of the work done by the 
women’s movement set the stage for women’s military integration, and the claims made 
about women’s service in response to a changing international security situation echoed 
the claims made about women’s equality. I then trace the process of women’s integration 
through the three eras of global political change. In the first, the basis for integration is 
set through initial equality laws that allowed women into the regular armed forces. In the 
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second, military policy was refined to better account for the experiences that women were 
having in the military, and French military doctrine shifted from conventional combat to 
values based intervention and norm defusing. In the third, French forces professionalized 
and the military continued to refine its identity around values. In the fourth, I show how 
current proposed changes are reflective of the past process of integration.    
  
French Military Culture  
The French military history of adaptation through self-examination (de Durand 
2011, Hubin 2012).  As Olivier Schmitt (2017) argues, the modern-day French military 
has looked to their own history of colonial warfare – both its successes and failure – to 
both strategically and tactically adapt to present circumstances. Historically, there has 
been a tension over the role of the military in everyday French life. On the right, there has 
been an historical argument for professional militaries as an essential function of 
reproducing citizenship norms. For example, in discussing the importance of the military 
to society, former Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle commented that military service was 
the “right by which proper young men were initiated into becoming French citizens” 
(Sorin, 2003). This assertion was predicated on this history of the warrior class that were 
the keepers of French society and had particular appeal to the upper class. Prior to World 
War II, military officers had primarily come from upper class families, and military 
service seen as part of their duty to countries. The notion of gentlemen officers rooted in 
the Napoleonic tradition was part of an officer’s ethos and education (Hughes, 2012). 
However, on the left, there was a great distrust of the professional military, for fear of 
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military power becoming concentrated in the hands of elite politicians (Kier, 1995). 
Indeed, many former military officers pursued politics after their time in the military was 
completed. It was worried that the military to politics pipeline would undermine the 
diversity of representation that should be part of a democracy. In particular there was fear 
that former officers would hold undo sway because of the allegiance to officers that 
conscripted troops felt (Kier, 1995). The left therefore argued for short-term conscription 
to keep the military decentralized and not powerful. They argued that if soldiers did not 
have as much time to build an allegiance to their officers, members of the officer class 
would not hold as much sway. The compromise on this tension was a reduction in 
conscription time from 3 years at the end of World War II, to 12 months by 1970, and to 
10 months by 1990. Concurrently, the percentage of the military that was made up on 
conscripts was reduced to 29% by 1950. In adapting to these changes, the military was 
able to keep the citizen soldier ideal through the continuation of conscription, while also 
relying on the professional military to adapt to changes in global politics.     
During and between the World Wars, and in the early years of the Cold War, 
France had a conventional focus (Siegl, 2008). Its primary focus was on maintaining 
control of its colonies and thwarting foreign invasion at home. French military personnel 
were stationed throughout the French empire, charged with both protecting the colonies 
and training indigenous forces in conventional military tactics (Chafer, 2002). However, 
in the post-World War II era, the military focus shifted. During World War II, French 
Africa had been an important part of the fight against Axis powers. However, in the 
aftermath of the War, it because apparent that France would not longer to hold on to its 
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colonial powers indefinitely and that conventional forces were not ideal for protecting 
French sovereignty on the European continent. Military defeats by the Nazi forces, and 
subsequent loses of colonies, resulted in a reevaluation and redefinition of the French 
military tactics and strategies.  
In the aftermath of the wars in Algeria and Indochina, the French military took a 
critical look at itself, particularly around the way in which it viewed the use of force. 
Constantin Melnik, a French political scientist and Army Officer who participated in the 
war in Algeria from 1959 – 1962 noted that the extreme use of violence by the French 
“ultimately resulted in support for the FLN, and hurt the French cause” (Melnik, 1964, p. 
143). Melnik’s report officially documented and elevated to the highest levels of French 
policy what many French officers noted in their reports during the war. The lessons from 
the decolonization wars shifted the French focus from conventional force to restraint in 
using force. For example, Captain Eyraud, a French officer stationed in the outskirts of 
Algiers at the beginning of the conflict, went so far as to argue that the FLN should be 
treated with dignity and respect, and that the French military should focus on constraining 
rather than using force, especially in the more rural areas (Eyraud, 1958).  
While there were immediate structural changes to the military in the 1960s and 
70s (including the reduction of troops that trained for foreign invasion, the prohibition of 
conscripts from engaging in foreign wars, and a tightening of the political control 
exercised during war), it was during the 1980s that the military’s identity shift – away 
from a focus on conventional warfare and towards constraint and the perpetuation of 
democratic values – took place. Though France did not altogether abandon conventional 
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tactics (it still maintained a conscripted ground force for the eventuality of a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, and was one of the early adopters of nuclear 
weapons), its primary focus turned towards those military activities, such as 
peacekeeping, that were less focused on brutality and more focused on utilizing the 
diverse talent pool of French citizens. Retired French Colonel Henri Bore notes that the 
most effective use of French military personnel is to “engage with the community,” rather 
than enact violence (Bore, 2006).      
 The changing nature of the French military throughout the 1980s can be seen in 
two primary areas: its role in the Peacekeeping and the doctrinal evolution between its 
1972 and 1994 Defense White Papers. In discussing their role in the UN Missions in 
Lebanon, a French officer noted that the most remarkable aspect of their mission was 
ensuring that “over 9000 Palestinians were able to withdraw and return with dignity and 
safety.”64  A stark contrast to the actions in Algeria, French soldiers were rewarded for 
their restraint. Additionally, France was the lead nation in passing UN Resolution 13/141 
(December 1988) that asserted that peacekeeping forces had an obligation to ensure 
corridors of safety to ensure that victims of the conflict were able to receive humanitarian 
assistance.  
 French military participation in peacekeeping operations in the 1990s greatly 
increased. Citing the reviews they had done of their practice and policies post-Algeria, a 
French military officer noted that the military was focusing on embracing the 
 
64 News reel access available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cS1BpzkoFXs 
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“ambiguity” and “human” aspects of military actions, and that peacekeeping fit will with 
their new identity (Sorin, 2004). 
 The focus on restraint on the use of force was echoed in the differences in 
France’s 1972 and 1994 White Papers. While the 1972 White Paper focused primarily on 
the physical defense of France and its interests abroad, the 1994 White Paper focused on 
a global need to promote democracy and curtail violence.  The 1994 White Paper also 
highlights that France’s defense interests are inextricably linked with humanitarianism 
and human security (Balladur, 1994). The 2012 White paper further affirmed this, and 
noted that national security issues often begin far from France’s boarder. Because of this, 
they concentrated their efforts on expeditionary human security, focusing on peace-
promoting and goodwill training missions to prevent some of the causes of conflict. 
Under President Chirac, France began to commit itself to becoming experts at “Chapter 
VI-1/2 Missions,”65 as they fit with both the value base of the country and the training 
and force structure abilities of the military. 
 A 50,000-person strong expeditionary unit was formed that could “sustain itself 
for at least 1 year” in overseas operations. The purpose of the unit was to be “on patrol” 
around the world for crises response and humanitarian intervention. President Chirac 
hoped that this force would help to establish France as a leader in promoting stability and 
security (Isnard, 1996).  Throughout the post-Cold War era, France further offloaded 
immediate territorial defense issues to the European Defense Community to focus on 
their expeditionary forces. Though a Western nuclear power, France decided to downplay 
 
65 Missions that straddle the UN Charter’s Chapter VI (Peace Keeping) and Chapter VI (Peace 
Enforcement) missions.  
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its conventional forces and focus on strengthening its role in peacekeeping and human 
security.  
 The focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian security also changed the way that 
leadership was viewed and rewarded. While military might was favored in the colonial 
wars, in the years that followed, political-military restraint surrounding the use of force 
became more and more valued. This can be seen in France’s decision to differentiate 
themselves from the United States’ response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. 
Feeling that the United States was too eager to engage in kinetic operations, France 
agreed to align with the multi-national force only under the condition that it could 
maintain a distinct military presence to act as a “friend to all Lebanese factions” (Wood, 
1998).  Indeed, a positive emphasis on “soldier-diplomats” emerged by the 1990s 
(Coulon, 1998). Throughout the years following the end of the Cold War, officers’ 
education was extended, and thoughtful response to crisis was preferenced over brute 
force.66  
The emphasis of French military doctrine of an operational culture that 
“understands foreign cultural norms, beliefs and attitudes and is operationally relevant 
…for general officers as well as infantry squad leaders to navigate complex human 
terrain” (Bore, 2009) has positively interacted with the claims rooted in institutional 
equality to provide a permissive environment for women’s integration. Throughout each 
 
66 In the 1990s, the requirements at Ecole d’etat-major ( the senior officers’ academies) was expanded to 
include course in language, culture, negotiation, civilian protection, and natural resource mamagement in 
addition to traditional tactics (Archived at www.defense.gouv.fr)   
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of the three ears of global political change, this positive interaction supported women’s 
integration into the military.  
 
Era 1: The final years of the Cold War 
 Workplace Equality and the Feminization of the Military (1970-1992)  
 In the final two decades of the Cold War the French military underwent a process 
known as “feminization”. It begins with the formalization of women’s military 
participation in the professional armed forces in the 1970s and the adoption of the 
Equality Law. This era was the first in which women were formal participants in the 
military. In the first 2 decades after women were formally allowed into the military they 
had substantial policy, tactical and strategic impact. In this first era of integration, claims 
about women’s participation in broader public life coincided with the military’s 
restructuring in the post-colonial era. This created a permissive environment for the 
process of integration to take place.   
 
Legal and Structural Provisions  
 The initial legal and structural provisions at the beginning of the first era of 
integration were a result of the wide sweeping changes to laws about women’s 
participation in public life. Table 4.2 summarizes the legal and structural provisions at the 
beginning of this period of women’s integration.  
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- Access to professional military via 1972 Equality 
Law and 1973 Statute  
- 1973-1975 integration of military schools and MOS’ 
- Women not conscripted (men only) 
- Some caps on school attendance and billeting on 
ships  
Childcare / Parental 
Leave 
- Maternity leave and provisions for motherhood 
stipulated in the 1975 laws (applied to all French 
citizens)  
-  Creche Care strengthened under 1973 Statue & 
1985 Declaration  
- Expanded night care opportunities  
Sexual Harassment - Outlawed under the Equality Law. All handled 
outside the military   
   
 The 1972 Equal Pay act was instrumental in both women beginning to achieve 
structural equality in the public sector, and in highlighting the impact of women’s 
movement in shaping public policy. An additional, and potentially unintended, 
consequence of the law was that it began the process of integration for French women in 
the military.  In debating the 1972 law, a prominent feminist lawmaker asserted that men 
and women “serve the same Republic” and are therefore entitled to “equal pay, equal 
rank, and equal opportunity for promotion.”67 The idea of “serving the same Republic” 
would become seminal in opening the door for women’s military service. 
 Women’s integration was further helped by the military’s restructuring to focus 
on retaining professional soldiers and relying less on conscripts. Throughout the 1970s 
and 80s, the military focused on retention, with preference given to volunteers who 
 
67 13 July 1972  
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would carry a continuity of service. Both the length of conscription and the degree to 
which the military relied on conscripted forces.  Historically, military conscription had 
been a “socialization” process for French males into political society, resulting in a 
masculine character to the military. A criticism of the French military’s ability to 
successfully thwart the Nazi invasion is that the military was more a tool of masculine 
cultural indoctrination and less of a force focused on meeting global threats (Boulegue, 
1991).  The success of women in the Resistance (as well as later success in Indochina and 
Algeria) made it impossible to ignore the impact that women had on military success. To 
both attract and retain talented women, the military focused on the professional nature of 
service, and focused on its role as an employer, not just an army of conscripts.  
 As an employer, the military was thus subject to the provisions of the 1972 Equal 
Pay Law. In interpreting the law for the military, the minister of defense went beyond 
simply stating that everyone was to be paid equally, and stated that “all citizens wishing 
to make a career of the armed forces shall have an equal possibility to do so.”68 Further 
clarification of the application of the 1972 Equal Pay Law to the military was contained 
in Statute passed on March 23, 1973.69 Of note, this statue integrated the previously 
single-sex staff noncommissioned officer school and the advanced military officer 
schools. Much like the trade unions identifying women for skills training that would 
increase the likelihood of promotion, the 1973 Statue encourage commanders to identify 
women that would benefit from advanced training. The formal opening of advanced 
 
68 Minister of Defense’s comments on Loi no 72-662.   
 
69 Statue on the “special status of women’s bodies in the armed services”  
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military schools and academies created an environment where military leaders could 
benefit from the diverse nature of all French citizens who chose to join (Reynaud, 1988; 
Alexis & Dubois, 2010). Both the exposure to women and the unique perspectives that 
they brought impacted the male students.  
 While women were allowed in the formal professional military, at the time that 
the 1972 Equality Law was put into effect for the military there were still restrictions on 
the roles that women could hold in the military. Women were prohibited from 
participating in infantry units and submarines because of the “unique” and “exceptional” 
nature of those jobs and their “unsuitability” for female participation (Sorin, 2003; 
Prévot, 2010). Using the cost of providing billeting spaces and berthing as primary 
rational, military officials placed caps on women’s participation in certain occupational 
specialties ranging from 3.5% for combat support to 7% for shipboard service. Further, 
no more than 20% of a given class at the St Cyr military academy could be female 
(Belmokhtar, 1980).  Additionally, the Gendarmerie requested a formal exception to 
policy stating “qu'en raison des conditions de mise en oeuvre et d'intervention des 
formations de gendarmerie et des sujtions du service, les emplois des sous-officiers et des 
officiers de l'arme de la Gendarmerie ne sont ouverts qu'aux hommes.”70 His initial 
request was granted due to what was perceived to be the exceptional nature of the work 
of the Gendarmerie.           
 In addition to the structural provisions for equality that the 1972 law and the 1973 
statute provided, women in the military benefited from the 1975 law forbidding 
 
70 Translation: Due to the conditions and requirements for employment, NCOs and Officers of the 
Gendarmarie’s armed units will only be men 
 143 
pregnancy to be a consideration for employment. Prior to the 1975 law, the military could 
discharge or separate women who were pregnant, or deny mothers recruitment into the 
military. The 1975 law, however, applied to the military as well, and pregnancy and 
motherhood were no longer disqualifying factors. Further, the law required that 
employers make accommodations for pregnancy and motherhood. Creche Care 
protections were also further expanded under the 1975 law, ensuring that women had 
access to child care at all time they were expected to be at work.  
The initial policies associated with the Equality Act in the early 1970s were 
essential for allowing women to gain a foothold in the military service. Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s there were many changes in the policies surrounding women’s 
participation. In 1982, Minister of Defense Charles Hernu established the Committee to 
Study the Perspective of Female Service Members (La Commission d’Etude Prospective 
de la Femme Militaire). This Committee consolidated many of the recommendations 
made by women service members throughout their initial years in service. The result was 
a series of revisions to the personnel code aimed at better integrating women into the 
French military between 1983-1984. Rooted in the language of the original 1970s’ 
equality legislation revisions and improvements to policies on child care, maternity leave, 
and parental benefits highlighted the Committee’s engagement with female members of 
the military. Examples of these policies were allowing service members to remain in the 
same geographic region throughout their career (barring operational necessity), and 
ensuring night childcare was available at every duty station for service members. All of 
the policies were based on women’s suggestions, and with the hope of attracting women’s 
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enlistment and retention (Reynaud, 1988). Additionally, between 1983 - 1987, overhauls 
to facilities and equipment (including ships) were undertaken in order to ensure that there 
would be no arbitrary constraints on women’s service due to berthing, hygiene, or 
maternity facilities  (Dufoulon, Saglio & Trompette, 1999).71 Under Ministry of Defense 
directives, facilities had to be built or converted to accommodate as many women as may 
possibly volunteer and be qualified to serve in a given position. This did away with the 
caps that had been put on women’s service, as access to (or the cost of converting) 
facilities could no longer be used as an excuse for limiting women’s service.  
 The 1980s also saw the restrictions on women’s service lifted. Decrees made on 9 
May 1985 and 31 May 1985 gave women the ability to both serve in and rise to the 
highest noncommissioned and commissioned officer ranks in combat arms units. Further, 
the 31 May decree declared that not only could women attain these posts but that they 
should. This exemplifies the belief that women should not only have the same 
opportunities as men, but that there is benefit to be gained from women’s leadership. The 
recognition by the government that women were beneficial for the military at large 
helped to solidify women’s position in the French military, and codify the influence that 
women were able to have on it.  
 There were also legal changes made to the Gendarmerie. Though not part of the 
military per se, the Gendarmerie serves a military-like purpose. As noted above, the 
Gendarmerie claimed exception to integrating women under the Equality Act. Due to the 
exceptional nature of the Gendarmerie, this claim went largely unchallenged until 1983. 
 
71 Submarines were not required to be retrofitted, however all future builds had to have berthing and 
hygiene facilities for women.  
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On 10 February 1983, Decree 83-94 mandated that the Gendarmerie come into line with 
the military services with regards to gender equality. When pressed on the rational for 
excluding women, the Director-General could only speak to the history of the 
Gendarmerie, and failed to produce any concrete evidence pointing to the need for 
excluding women.  The 1983 Degree thus sent a message that tradition or perception 
were not adequate reasons for maintaining gender segregation.  
 
Functional Participation     
 In addition to advances in the legal aspects of women’s service, there were 
important advancements in the functional participation of women in the French military. 
Table 4.3 highlights the functional participation of women in this first era.  
 





- Increase from 2.74% to 8.5% of the total force (over 
20% of professional forces) 
Type of 
Participation 
- Primary fields: Information Technology, Senior 
Administration  
- Sharp increase in participation in infantry and 
combat arms (including Gendarmerie)  
- Between 20-30% of school classes and increased 
participation as instructors  
Overseas 
Participation 
- No numerical data, but antidotal information on 
women’s participation in peacekeeping and in the 
Gulf War.  
 
 Before embarking on a discussion of women’s functional participation during the 
1970s and 1980s it is important to emphasize that conscription still existed for male 
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French citizens. The reliance on conscription means that the vast majority of junior 
enlisted service members were male. Conscripts were viewed as cheap, expendable, and 
temporary labor, and therefore given the jobs that required the least amount of training 
(Martin, 1981). Enlisted women, part of the professional force, were primarily in 
positions that required more schooling and specialty training, such as intelligence, aircraft 
maintenance, and medical services. As a result of the increased schooling timeline, 
women entered the operational forces at a later time than men (Ministère des Armées, 
1984). The continued practice of male conscription, coupled with the training-intensive 
occupational specialties to which women were most often assigned, resulted in a figure 
on women’s military participation that has been argued to be skewed in favor of men. 
Indeed, throughout the 1970s, women only averaged 2.75% of the total military forces, 
however 14% of the professional forces were women, as were between 10-25% of the 
staff NCOs (depending on service), 12% of senior administrative professionals, and over 
50% of the information technology specialists72 (Martin, 1982). In the 1980s, women’s 
service continued to rise. By 1985, a quarter of new recruits and officer candidates in the 
Army and Air Force were women and ascension into the Navy and Marines more than 
doubled from the previous decade.  
Table 4.4: Percent of New Women Recruits/Officer Candidates by Service73 
 Army Air Force Navy Marines 
1975 15 15 5 3 
1985 25 25 10 7 
Source: Monrique 2004 
 
72 Early computer operators and cryptologists 
 
73 Excludes Gendarmerie, since they did not admit women until 1983  
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Notably, women achieved this level of participation despite some of the caps put on 
aspects of their service.      
 Not only did women join the military, but they remained in it for a considerable 
period of time. While there is not data on retention rates kept in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
continued increased percentage of NCOs and Senior Officers indicate that women were 
both remaining in the military and advancing through the ranks.   
Table 4.5: Percentages of Officers and NCOs 196274 vs 1979  
 Army Air Force Navy 
 Sr. Officer NCO Sr. Officer NC0 Sr. Officer NCO 
1962 0.5% 6.1% 0% 4.8% 0% 18.1% 
1979 21.1% 36.9% 23.8% 24% 22.7% 18% 
Source: Ducret-Schaeffer 1980  
 
The percentages in Table 4.5 are the as a proportion of the professional force, that is they 
exclude conscripts from the total numbers. Throughout the 1980s, the percentage of 
officers rose by about 5% as well (NATO 2000). The sharp increase in women in 
leadership positions, coupled with the fact that the percentage of women in more senior 
ranks is higher than the overall percentage of women in the professional forces gives 
credence to the assertion that women in the French military were dedicated to staying in 
the military and make it a career. Not only were they included in the military through the 
allowance for them to participate, but they remained in and were competitive for 
promotion.  
 As women answered the call to military service, they proved themselves capable 
of meeting the challenges. Not only did they meet the physical and tactical standards 
 
74 Data on 1962 is available as it is 10 years after women were first admitted into the military. While 
numbers of the late 1960s and early 1970s are not available, Ducret-Schaeffer (1980) indicates that these 
numbers are representitive of the averages just before the passage of the 1972 law and 1973 Statute.  
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required of them for military service, they excelled in socializing their male peers to the 
benefits of women’s inclusion in the military (Prévot, 2010). The relatively long time that 
women spent in school had the advantage of allowing them to succeed in a low-
consequence environment and gain the trust of their male peers before having to engage 
in operational activities. The ability of women to perform according to standards coupled 
with the strategic benefit that they brought to units resulted in women being listened to 
and respected as fellow service members.  
 Not only did the percentage of women joining in the military overall increase, but 
the percentage of women in combat-related fields sharply increased. Women’s 
participation in ground combat arms specialties rose by nearly 30% between 1975-1990, 
outpacing the traditionally gendered specialties such as healthcare (8% growth) 
(Monrique 2004). Additionally, by 1990, 25% of the women serving in the military (or 
military-like activities) were in the Gendarmerie (Jauneau, 2012).  
 During this period of growth in women’s participation in the military, the military 
response to global politics was rather calm. Coming off of heavy casualties in Indochina 
and Algeria, the military used this time to embark on a period of regrouping, 
restructuring, and training. The first opportunities for women thus came in the form of 
domestic schooling and training. In 1977, women were admitted to the Ecole superieure 
gu gurre (War College). This gave officers access to the flag rank, as school attendance 
was mandatory for promotion to brigadier general. Additionally, the number of women 
NCOs attending the newly-integrated NCO academies resulted in women having 
leadership roles in the domestically based training exercises. Once senior level schools 
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were open for women, women comprised 20-30% of each class (Martin, 1982). From 
1972-1979, the number of female NCOs in leadership roles rose from 6% to 30% 
(Ducret-Schaeffer, 1980).    
 The domestic strengthening of France’s military was beneficial when global 
politics turned resulted in attention increasingly abroad. In the 1980s, France turned its 
attention to bolstering its presence in NATO. Though not part of the formal command 
structure, French troops took active roles in leading NATO exercises and in occupations 
in Germany. It is in such roles that women were able to tactically shine. As Katia Sorin 
(2000) notes, women’s leadership in multi-national exercises began to re-shape the ideal 
type military leader.  One result of the military defeats in its former colonies was a loss of 
faith in the traditional leadership styles of male service members. For many service 
members, the style of male leadership was seen to be detrimental; the reason that they 
lost colonies and suffered heavy casualties (Boulegue 1991). Women stepped in with 
what Jean Boulege (1991) refers to as a “charismatic authority” that served as a foil to 
traditional masculinity. According to surveys done by Boulege, though there was some 
initial trepidation to women’s ability to perform in the military, those that had served 
with a woman overwhelming saw their leadership style as positive and an asset to the 
overall mission of the military.  
The focus on peacekeeping in the 1980s also opened space for women to serve 
internationally. In both Lebanon and Bosnia, there were women engaged positively in 
peacekeeping operations. Women peacekeepers helped to prevent local women from 
being used as human shields, and were instrumental in creating a permissive environment 
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for humanitarian actions (Murphy, 2007). Indeed, even amongst the controversies that 
have surrounded Western involvement in peacekeeping operations, the role of women has 
generally been found to be a positive contribution in minimizing violence, and achieving 
tactical and strategic objectives (DeGroot, 2001; Molloy, 2004). 
The credibility brought about by women’s service in peacekeeping missions 
resulted in their being instated as instructors and leaders in military academies and 
specialty training schools. Their positions in schools was critical for women to continue 
to influence policy and doctrine (Monrique, 2004). Not only did their roles as instructors 
solidify the idea that women’s style of leadership was beneficial, but gave experienced 
women the ability to influence military curriculum (Sorin, 2004).    
 Memoirs and statements from women who were among the first to achieve senior 
ranks highlight that they both joined and remained in the service because they had the 
opportunity to participate in meaningful ways as women (Bertrand, 2013: Sorin, 2003).  
As one female Navy officer in the mid-1970s asserted,  
for me it was always ‘the Navy or Nothing!’ when my friends 
were competing for college or the workplace, I pursued the 
Navy. … I knew it would be challenging, but it also the place 
where these is a career, schooling, and responsibility. 
(Unidentified officer quoted in Bertrand 2013)  
 
 Women not only achieved rank in the military, but positions of influence. The 
arena where this happened the most was in schools. As noted above, the 1970s and 1980s 
were relatively peaceful for the French military. As a result, leadership in schools as 
among the most influential and prestigious that one could attain during this period. 
Women were active both in the teaching and administration of military schools. In 
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addition to active duty service members, many women that had been active in the 
Resistance and in France’s military operations in Indochina took on tactics and strategy 
positions (Sorin, 2004; Prévot, 2010).  Women were not just able to join the military, they 
did so and remained in, while having a meaningful impact.  
 
Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture  
 The laws and statutes of the 1970s provided the conditions under which women 
were able to join the military, and the changing personnel policies throughout the 1980s 
are reflective of the claims that women made about participation in public life. These 
claims were strengthened by the visibility of women in leadership roles in Lebanon and 
Bosnia, their positions in military academies, and their enduring military service. The 
claims rooted in institutional equality interacted positively with French military culture to 
help create the permissive environment for women to join and advance in the military, 
ultimately resulting in their ability to make changes to policy and tactics. Because of the 
military’s de-emphasis on violence and killing, military leaders were able to frame a 
career in the military as a means of serving the country as a woman, focusing on values 
and a restraint of force. Socially, as women were increasing overall in the workforce, and 
the role of the working mother being more accepted, military service was framed as a 
way to be “a role model to France, and a role model to your daughter” (Monrique, 2004, 
p. 21). The focus on the military as a career coupled with the values emphasis of the 
military led women to be more open about their identities as both woman and soldier. 
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Especially among more senior women, there was a growing comfort in identifying 
oneself as feminine and capable of being a military professional.75  
 Many of the claims made by women drew from the stories and experiences of 
women in the Resistance, Indochina, and Peacekeeping missions; and highlighted the 
strategic and tactical importance of the “feminization of coercive power” (Boulegue, 
1991, p. 350) to French military success. Because of the limited opportunities for 
deployments during the 1970s and 1980s, women strengthened their claims through the 
experiences of women in previous operations to highlight their importance. Women such 
as Betty Albrecht, Georgette Gerar, and Madeline Riffaud,76 key figures in the Resistance 
were employed to teach French counterinsurgency forces and codify lessons learned from 
the Resistance into French strategy (Trinquier, 2006). The focus on brining women in in 
to share their unique experiences and enhance overall military effectiveness is 
emblematic of what French historian Jean-Charles Jauffret (2013) describes as the 
“French touch” to military operations that is focused on the humanity and individualism 
in both its troops and the enemy. The emphasis on the tactical impact of the difference 
between men and women was well-received by the military culture. Unlike most Western 
militaries that carried an expectation that women would conform to masculine norms if 
they were to succeed in the military (Herbert, 1998), women in the French military were 
 
75 The interview transcripts from Sorin 2004 (conducted between 1989-2000) reveal a shit … by the mid 
1990s, women frequently define themselves as both “woman” and “soldier” in the same interview, 
suggesting a shift in cultural, such that being openly a woman was not a detriment to being a soldier. 
  
76 For narratives of their actions see: Weitz, Margaret Collins (1995) Sisters In the Resistance: How Women 
Fought to Free France 1940-1945. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.   
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expected to use their differences in ways that would benefit the overall strategic 
objectives.   
 However, the focus on the difference between men and women did not always 
result in increased participation by women in the armed services. Military leaders initially 
used the difference between men and women to constrain the number of women serving 
in particular units. Included in the equality laws of the 1970s were requirements to 
provide accommodations for pregnant women and new mothers so that their biological 
difference would not interfere with their competitiveness in the workplace. The military, 
as an historically all-male organization did not have the infrastructure to support many 
women-specific needs. Accommodating women would mean having to build new 
facilities or retrofit existing ones, a costly proposition. This resulted in restrictions being 
placed on women’s initial entry into the military.   
 The restrictions drew backlash. From within the military, women asserted that the 
restrictions on the numbers of their service ran counter to the guarantees for equal 
opportunity and evaluation promised in the 1972 and 1975 laws. Citing the historical 
success of women in the Resistance and Indochina, women claimed that it was 
detrimental to France’s well-being to artificially constrain the contribution of women. As 
Catherine Bertrand, a French Naval officer from 1974-2000 asserted in a statement on the 
condition of the military and personnel training for the French Army’s Historical Review:  
The Secretary of State, in 1973, remarked that equality 
between men and women is a Constitutional guarantee.  And 
France very much recognizes the role of women in the 
military and the appeal that the military has to young girls. 
Why are they limiting us? Just as the feminist movement is 
giving space to women’s rights at home, we need it to give 
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way to women’s rights in Defense. France may fall again if 
we do not allow for full equality between men and women 
in the military (Bertrand 2013, 7-8).  
 
Assertions such as those made by Bertrand resonated with both women and military 
leadership and resulted in changes to military policy that allowed women to more fully 
participate.  
 The impact of women’s claims was further strengthened by the decrease in 
reliance on conscripts. As Cold War politics were more reliant on deterrence and 
containment and less focused on conventional warfare, the emphasis in recruiting shifted 
to professional forces, preferencing skills over recruiting more bodies. By the mid-1970s, 
less than ¼ of the force was comprised of conscripted soldiers (Belmokhtar 1980). 
Indeed, the focus on recruiting professional soldiers rather than relying on conscripts, 
coupled with the momentum from the women’s movement in encouraging women to 
pursue employment opportunities resulted in a steady increase of women both joining and 
remaining in the military as a career (Monrique, 2004). The interaction of the claims 
made by women and the military culture resulted in a more robust supply of women who 
not only needed to join the military but wanted to, seeing that their unique contribution 
was valued and could impact the institution.  
 In many countries, women expressing discontent with “women’s issues” has been 
used as a reason to discount their service, and used as rational for the claim that women 
do not belong in the military (Gutmann, 2000; Van Creveld, 2000). However, the 
emphasis on the specific aspects that women bring to the table was compatable with the 
French military culture that was focused on cultural evolution and values. France stands 
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out as exceptional in this case. This is not to say that the French military was exempt 
from sexism. Like most militaries, women in the French military expressed discontent 
with cultural issues around sexism and discrimination (Sorin, 2004).  However, the fact 
that their grievances were addressed rather than used to try and push them out, is 
exemplary of both the acceptance of women’s role in the military as women, as well as 
the beliefs rooted in institutional equality that the government has both the ability and 
obligation to formally address the conditions of inequality to allow women to equally 
participate and contribute. As the Cold War came to a close, women had not only proven 
that they were necessary in military actions, but that creating enabling structures that 
encouraged women’s participation was beneficial to national security broadly.  
 
Outcome 
 The results women’s integration during this first period of global politics were 
largely seen in changes to military policy. As women joined the military in increased 
numbers, a process that became known as the “feminization” of the military began 
(Prévot, 2010; Observatoire de la feminisation, 2006). While important changes were 
made to military policy, the process was not always smooth for those involved. 
Historically, conscription in the military was a cultural signal of the transition to 
manhood. While women had been participating in military operations since the French 
Revolution, they had largely done so outside of formal institutional channels. Despite 
women being essential to tactical and strategic successes, the institution of the military 
had long remained the domain of men, many of whom resisted the formal inclusion of 
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women into their institution (Ehrenreich, 1999). Indeed, in the early years of all military 
occupations being open to women, they were attempts to relegate women to gendered 
roles such as quartermaster, cook, and supply (Observatoire de la feminisation, 2006; 
Prévot, 2010; Monrique, 2004).  However, as women continued to remain in the military 
and make claims about the benefit of their participation to military operations the 
“feminization” process took root. 
 The first outcome of the feminization process was changes to personnel policies. 
For example, while the 1970s equality legislation addressed child care, and Crèche Care 
had been established in the 1960s, child care still posed a problem for many women. 
Despite the legal provisions ensuring care, there was still a sense that women were not 
respected for their motherhood choices (Boulegue, 1991). As a response, the March 20, 
1984 parliamentarian record emphasized that “men and women’s equality is necessary 
for the security of France, and access to child care is part of that equality,” effectively 
reframing Crèche Care into a national security issue. The proclamation recognized that 
there is a difference between men and women with regards to their needs around 
pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare and emphasized that provisions such as “free 
medical and child care, as well as all necessary nutritional assistance … [in order to 
ensure] equal access to all financial, cultural, social, and security aspects of French life”77 
was to be guaranteed.    
 The Committee to Study the Perspective of Female Service Members (La 
Commission d’Etude Prospective de la Femme Militaire) was another key outcome 
 
77 Jounral Officel de la Republique Francaise, 20 Mars 1984, Article 12-16 
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women’s integration during this first period. The Committee was established in 1982 by 
Minister of Defense Charles Hernu as a formal channel for the growing number of 
women in the services to voice their concerns and ensure that their needs were met. As 
noted above, the number of women in the military grew form in the single digits 
(between 2-4%) to around 10% very quickly (Monrique, 2004). Having a formal channel 
for communication to political leadership ensure that women were able to voice their 
concerns and impact structural change. The Committee’s recommendations, including 
opening positions to women, dropping caps on service, and mandating that all facilities 
are in line with the equality law, are the root of the substantive legal changes that set the 
initial formal conditions for the second cycle of integration.  
 The provisions in the 1994 Defense White Paper further highlight the impact that 
women had on the military. The White Paper is the first written after the end of the Cold 
War and is primarily focused on how the military would evolve to meet the changing 
world. Throughout the White Paper, new threats are identified, and holistic strategies 
proposed to address them. Specifically, it mentions the increased threat of terrorism, 
religious extremism, instability in the former Soviet States, economic uncertainty in 
Africa, and propaganda from globalized information flows as the most pressing issues to 
French security. The White Paper identifies the best way to face these threats as ensuring 
that all military actions “emphasize the social dimension,” and focus on a “preservation 
of life that is necessary to preserve French interests and the interests of the international 
order” (Balladur, 1994). Peacekeeping missions also draw particular attention.  Drawing 
heavily from the lessons of Balkans on the importance of having both the capacity to 
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engage militarily but also the diversity of skills to effectively operate in culturally foreign 
environment, the White Paper emphasized the importance of effective culturally sensitive 
peacekeeping in preventing many of the contributors to extremism such as resource 
degradation, religious antagonism, and the trauma of violence. Peacekeeping forces had 
to be capable of militarily enforcing the peace when necessary, while also ensuring long-
term conditions for peace were not disrupted (Lanxade, 1995). Drawing from the lessons 
learned in Lebanon and Bosnia, women were an essential component in ensuring that the 
cultural dimensions of peacekeeping were respected.     
 These lessons are echoed in the twin emphasis on military capability and cultural 
sensitivity. Particularly in France’s role in establishing humanitarian corridors during the 
mission in Bosnia, the ability to transition seamlessly from traditional combat activities to 
social engagement was highlighted (Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 2005). Women were an 
essential part of this. With combat roles now open, there were infantry-trained women 
that were able to both effectively engage militarily and serve as important liaisons in 
society.  
 The dedication to restraining the use of violence and the emphasis on the post-
conflict environment was indicative of a permissive environment for women to continue 
to join the military in meaningful ways. This was not only the case in the peacekeeping 
environment, but also with regards to France’s participation in more conventional wars. 
During the Gulf War, French generals credited the women in their units as a “positive 
force for restraining force,” and making France a “model military” in living up to its 
stated values (Monrique, 2004, p. 19). The role of women in the French military was 
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impactful. Foreign observers remarked that France’s emphasis on incorporating women 
into their tactical and strategic plans was their way of differentiating themselves from 
other Western militaries (Riding, 1991). Indeed, throughout the 1970s and 1980s and into 
the 1990s women’s impact was not only noticed but incorporated into the conduct of 
military operations, furthering the feminization of the military.  
   
Era 2: Post-Cold War 
Professional Feminization into the 21st Century   
 As the Cold War came to an end, not only did the French military continue to 
refine its doctrine with regards to the promotion of values and restraint on violent action, 
but it made a move towards full professionalization. The decision to end conscription in 
1996 and transition to an all-volunteer force was primarily made out of forces structure 
requirements. The length of conscription had decreased to only 10 months, resulting in 
conscripts being viewed primarily as unskilled labor used to perform menial tasks. 
Further, the military was primarily composed of professional service members rather than 
conscripts (over 87% professional), alleviating concerns about being able to fill the ranks 
with volunteers (Boene and Martin, 2000).  Substantively, the move to professionalism 
was largely symbolic, as the reframing of the role of the military in the 1980s and 90s had 
made it an attractive career field for men and women alike (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 
2000). The professionalization of the military, while not intentionally aimed at women’s 
integration, created space for women to further influence the military. In this section I 
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show how professionalization and France’s response to the post-Cold War changes in 
global politics resulted in further integration of women into the French military.  
 
Legal and Structural Provisions    
By the end of the Cold War, there had been many improvements to the legal and 
structural provisions that made it more accommodating for women to join the military. 
Table 4.6 highlights these.    
 





- No Barriers  
- End of Conscription  
Childcare / Parental 
Leave 
- Expansion of Maternity Leave for Military  
- Special provisions for dual military couples   
Sexual Harassment - Themis Cell “toolkit” on prevention    
   
 The most profound structural change was the end of conscription, resulting in the 
full professionalization of the military. The decision to end conscription was made in 
1996, with the timeline to phase it out by 2001.78 Though by 1996 the overwhelming 
majority of forces were professionals, the ending of conscription had an important 
cultural impact for both the military and the country as a whole. Despite women’s 
increased participation in the military throughout the 1970s – 1990s, the continuation of 
the policy of male conscription allowed for a masculinized nationality to endure. Even 
 
78 2001 was the first year in which there were no conscripts in the military.  
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though conscripts were a very small minority of those serving, the gendered nature of 
conscription could be used to undermine women’s contributions. Military was still often 
seen as the passage to manhood. Though there were mechanisms for women to address 
their grievances and the injustices that they faced, such as the Committee to Study the 
Perspective of Female Service Members, cultural discrimination still existed with regards 
to the role of men and women. The end of conscription was one of the final hurdles to 
effectively overcoming gendered discrimination (Sorin, 2003).  
 Concurrent with professionalization, the French military drastically reduced its 
size, cutting personnel by nearly 40%.79 French officials wanted to send a message that 
the military was going to be focused on professionalism and recruiting the best qualified 
individuals, not just having a large standing army, in order to ensure that the transition 
away from conscription was a success (Boene & Martin, 2000). 
 There were also structural changes made that specifically impacted women. In 
2000 maternity policies were overhauled. Mothers were given 16 weeks for their first 
child and 26 weeks subsequent children, and 156 weeks of “flexible” time in which they 
could take additional leave as necessary to fulfill maternal duties (NATO, 2016). Women 
in the military were afforded 3-4 weeks more leave than their civilian counterparts in 
order to address the physical and emotional aspects of motherhood more effectively.   
 The military also took direct measures to address sexual harassment and assault. 
Though still prosecuted under civilian law, the Themis Cell developed a sexual 
harassment “prevention kit” during the transition to the all-volunteer force. Part of the 
 
79 In the 1990s, force strength was around 500,000. By 2012 it was 300,000. (Source: World Bank Data)   
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professionalization of the services was focused on troops not only being models of values 
of equality to the international community, but among their brothers and sisters in arms 
(NATO, 2013). Additionally, the Themis Cell worked to coordinate legal representation 
for service members that had been harassed or assaulted, and ensured that all the proper 
administrative work was done so that service members could continue to receive their 
pay and benefits while going through the legal process (NATO, 2014).  
 Policy and structural changes that France made in response to the passage of UN 
Resolution 1325 also influenced the military. As France set out to create its National 
Action Plan (NAP) it focused on the goal of becoming a leader in combatting the cross-
cutting impact that conflict has on women.80 Elevating women into combat leadership 
positions was seen as essential for ensuring France’s credibility in their commitment to 
peace in post-conflict societies (NAP, 2010). Additionally, gender advisors were 
incorporated into the military specifically to ensure that operations were planned and 
executed with the multi-level considerations of gender taken into account. Not only were 
French Gender advisors used in support of French operations, but also deployed in 
support of NATO allies (NATO, 2016).  
 
Functional Participation 
 In the years post-Cold War, women’s participation in the military continued to 
expand. Women also continued to have longevity in the military, choosing to make it a 
career. Table 4.7 highlights the functional participation of women in the military. 
 
80 When France had the presidency of the European Union this language was also used in the EU’s security 
policy language.  
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Professionalization positively impacted the total percentage of women in the military, as 
conscripted forces no longer diluted the gender balance. Yet not only did the total 
proportion of women increase, but women also continued to increase their presence in 
operationally deployed forces and in leadership roles.  





- 15% total force 
Type of 
Participation 
-  5.5% of combat arms  
- Concentrated in Naval and Expeditionary Forces  
Overseas 
Participation 
- 7-10% of deployed forces  
  
 At the end of the Cold War, France reasserted its focus on collective security, 
peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Conventional military operations and nuclear 
deterrence took a further back seat to actions designed to promote international peace and 
stability. The 1994 Defense White Paper focused on a need to promote democracy around 
the world. This was again affirmed in the 2012 White Paper which also noted that 
national security issues often begin far from France’s boarder. The role of women in the 
military was largely a result of the focus on expeditionary human security, peace-
promoting and goodwill training missions that may prevent some of the causes of 
conflict. Coined by President Chirac, France committed itself to becoming experts at 
“Chapter VI-1/2 Missions,”81 as they fit with both the value base of the country and the 
training and force structure abilities of the military.  
 
81 Missions that straddle the UN Charter’s Chapter VI (Peace Keeping) and Chapter VI (Peace 
Enforcement) missions.  
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 In response to both the military downsizing and the emphasis on values-based 
deployments, when the end of conscription was announced, a 50,000-person strong 
expeditionary unit was formed that could sustain itself for at least 1 year in overseas 
operations. The purpose of the unit was to be “on patrol” around the world for crises 
response and humanitarian intervention. President Chirac hoped that this force would 
help to establish France as a leader in promoting stability and security (Isnard, 1996).  To 
compensate for downsizing the military while having a more expeditionary focus, France 
offloaded immediate territorial defense issues to the European Defense Community. 
Though a Western nuclear power, France decided to downplay its conventional forces 
and focus on strengthening its role in peacekeeping and human security.  
 During the transition from conscription to the AVF and the downsizing of the 
force, the military engaged in a process of direct recruitment for NCOs in order to fill 
leadership roles in technically-demanding fields. In order to fulfill the expeditionary 
mission the military needed not just bodies to fill ranks, but highly skilled and educated 
leaders.  Notably, a significant portion of the French direct recruits were women. Table 
4.8 highlights the number of women in such positions.  
Table 4.8: Percentage of Women NCO Direct Recruitment Candidates 1999 
 Army Air Force Navy Gendarmerie 
% Candidates 36 43 39 21 
Source: (Sorin, Women in the French Forces: Integration versus Conflict 2004) 
 
 The relatively high proportion of women who were eligible for the “line jumping” 
into leadership as a result of the direct recruitment program is indicative of the belief that 
women played an essential and important role in military leadership. Because direct 
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recruits were not part of the military system at the time of their recruitment, they were not 
socialized into military culture. Indeed, the women brought in as NCOs were put in 
command of junior troops strengthened the beliefs begun in the previous decades that 
women had leadership value that was distinct from men. Women were not expected to 
conform to men’s image, but to lead in ways that they saw as effective and efficient.  
 Not only did women join in leadership roles, and take on new operational 
responsibilities, but they remained in the military. While the direct-recruitment of NCOs 
skew the numbers of NCOs as a measure of the longevity of service, at nearly every point 
in the military career there was a positive retention rate of women when compared to 
men. From 1995-2015, there was an average retention rate of 6.15%, meaning that the 
military retained 6.15% more women than men (NATO, 2016).  In response to the needs 
of post-Cold War global politics, women were stepping up to serve their country.  
 
Claims About Women’s Service and Interaction with Military Culture 
 Claims about women’s service were strengthened by the focus on humanitarian 
security and peacekeeping throughout the post-Cold War era. This focus also changed the 
way that leadership was viewed and rewarded. While military might was favored in the 
colonial wars, in the years that followed, political-military restraint surrounding the use 
of force became increasingly valued. This can be seen in France’s decision to 
differentiate themselves from the United States’ response to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982. Feeling that the United States was too eager to engage in kinetic 
operations, France agreed to align with the multi-national force only under the condition 
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that it could maintain a distinct military presence to act as a “friend to all Lebanese 
factions” (Wood, 1998).  Indeed, a positive emphasis on “soldier-diplomats” emerged by 
the 1990s (Coulon, 1998). Throughout the years following the end of the Cold War, 
officers’ education was extended, and thoughtful response to crisis was preferenced over 
brute force.82  
 The focus on education and restraint of violent force provided an opening for 
women to re-engage with claims about their service as a woman. Given the emphasis on 
the difference between men and women by the women’s movement, women were able to 
capitalize on qualities typically associated with the feminine. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, the French feminist movement emphasized that society had largely been 
responsible for the difference between men and women. In addition to being used as 
leverage to lobby for policies that specifically addressed women’s issues, these 
differences were used to highlight the importance of women’s military service. In 1998, 
the first women were successful in completing commando training and serving in a 
previously all-male commando unit. Much like the women of The Resistance used their 
femininity to gather intelligence and conduct raids against Nazi and Vichy officers, 
female commandos used the perception of their femininity to move in spaces that were 
traditionally and typically closed to their male commando counterparts (Monrique 2004). 
 Women’s integration into previously all-male units coupled with the overall move 
towards professionalization continued the process of feminization of the French military. 
 
82 In the 1990s, the requirements at Ecole d’etat-major ( the senior officers’ academies) was expanded to 
include course in language, culture, negotiation, civilian protection, and natural resource mamagement in 
addition to traditional tactics (Archived at www.defense.gouv.fr)   
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By 2000, France had instituted gender-training in all of its units (Sorin, 2004). 
Additionally, gender became part of the focus of career management. As the force 
professionalized, there was a conscious effort to ensure that women’s service continued 
to be valued. While there was an overall move to increase the number of women, it was 
coupled with ensuring that the women recruited would stay in service. Military schools 
specifically focused on targeting high-achieving women in order to ensure that there was 
a large talent pool of leaders to choose from. Incoming academy classes averaged 
between 17-20% female enrolment (NATO, 2016). In the 2000 report to the NATO 
Committee on Gender Perspectives, a French official noted that “professional gender 
equality will increase feminization, and emphasize the importance of women’s role in the 
armed forces” (NATO, 2000). The continued overall stability of the post-Cold War years 
allowed France to continue to emphasize their role in perpetuating values and norms. 
Indeed, a mission set that allowed women to participate as women ultimately also helped 
recruiting and retention efforts. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, France 
scaled back its direct recruiting of women into NCO position. However, the number of 
women in both the military at large, and in leadership positions in particular, continued to 
grow (Schjølset, 2010). Rather than explicitly targeting women, recruitment was focused 
on mission set and mission type in such a way that it emphasized that the contributions of 
all French citizens were necessary to meet the challenges of the changing world. 
Appealing to differences (though not explicitly targeting women) is reflective of the 
claims rooted in institutional equality. Just as women’s movements focused on the notion 
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that France was stronger when all citizens participated in cultural, economic, and political 
life, the military appealed to the value of difference.  
 
Outcome 
 By the dawn of the 21st Century, the French military was a fully professional 
force that was experiencing a high level of integration. The discussions leading up to the 
adoption of the French National Action Plane highlight the role that women played in 
shaping French attitudes and high-level policy. French military women were included in 
the drafting process, and the result was a document that had both the role of women in 
managing and mitigating conflict and cultural sensitivity (especially to former French 
colonies) as priority areas in the plan (Miller, Pournik & Swaine, 2014). When the Plan 
was adopted, money was set aside for French military women to hold gender-based 
training in French-speaking countries and former colonies.  
 On a tactical level, women were directly engaged in responding to the new 
challenges of the post-Cold War global political environment. Ground combat units were 
intentionally loaded with more women than would be otherwise the case in order to meet 
the cultural challenges that arose in the post-Cold War world. For example, in Kosovo 
women were essential to ensuring protection of humanitarian evacuations and provisions. 
French infantry soldiers – trained to engage in the combat that they would see – were 
deployed to ensure the safe evacuation civilians. Their gender helped to calm the 
Kosovars and build a rapport that was important for creating a long-term relationship 
between France and Kosovo (Koeth, 2010). 
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 Though the full extent of women’s integration in the professional military remains 
to be seen, there is evidence, especially in the post-September 11th actions in 
Afghanistan, that French women are in essential component of the French military.  
 
Era 3: Post-9/11 in Afghanistan 
Putting Feminization to the Test  
 The 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban would be the 
first real test of feminization in an offensive military operation. Throughout the 1990s, 
while the military had remained active, it had been in support of peacekeeping missions 
and humanitarian assistance. Combat engagements were thus primarily defensive in 
nature. Engaging in direct and deliberate offensive combat is something that had not been 
done since the feminization of the armed forces took place. Indeed, offensive combat 
could still be considered the province of men, or at least untested and un proved as 
women’s work in any operational way.   
 The peacekeeping focus of the 1990s prepared France for parts of its role in 
Afghanistan, but left it woefully unprepared for others. Indeed, much France’s initial 
contribution to the US-led operations in Afghanistan were intelligence-gathering foot 
patrols in and around Kabul. The nearly 4000 troops in country in the early years of the 
war conducted themselves similarly to how peacekeeping troops patrolled in Africa and 
Bosnia.83 However, in 2008, when President Sarkozy agreed to increase France’s 
contribution to the coalition forces, they learned quickly that peacekeeping skills were 
 
83 France’s initial contribution was limited to light infantry and air power. 
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not directly related to offensive combat.  France was assigned to the Kapisa province in 
the Tagrib Valley. Unlike many European countries that ran support for American 
infantry groups, the French forces took operational control of the province with their 
infantry units as the main focus of effort. Their first efforts at offensively-focused 
infantry actions were met with disaster. On 19 August 2008, 10 French forces were killed 
and 21 wounded, the most significant casualties for French forces since the Drakkar 
building attack in Lebanon in 1983.  
 In response to the loss of life, the French revamped their fighting style both 
doctrinally and technologically.84 Doctrinally they combined their intelligence (or 
“human terrain”) and combat forces, integrating the gendered nature of peacekeeping 
intelligence with traditional combat tactics. Because of the integration of women into 
commando forces that had taking place in the 1990s, the gendered assets necessary for 
intelligence gathering were organic to the units stationed there. Indeed, violence was 
often inevitable in the operations in Afghanistan. However, the integrated gendered-
intelligence worked to mitigate causalities on both the French and Afghan side (Foust, 
2012).   
 The best practices from Afghanistan – primarly the use of expeditionary forces 
and a gendered prespective to intelligence – were codified and implemented in 2013 
missions in Mali and the Central Africal Republic. One of the most important lessons 
learned was in the importance of fully integrated combat and human terrain teams. 
 
84 Interview transcript with Colonel Aragons, French commander in the Tagrib Valley, that describes these 
changes available at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afghanistan/actualites/12-03-09-afghanistan-6- 
mois-en-kapisa-interview-du-colonel-aragones  
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Because of the gendered nature of COIN operations, women are essential parts of human 
terrain teams. As learned in Afghanistan, such teams were best composed of individuals 
who had been parts of commando units from their initial training, rather than attached at a 
later date (Shurkin, 2014). As Shurkin (2014) notes, without the success of integrated 
commando teams capable of simoulstanious and seamless intelligence and combat 
operations, France would not habe been able to develop the expeditionary doctrine 
practiced in later interventions.      
 France’s role in Afghanistan, and their subsequent missions in Mali, highlighted 
that there is a role for women to be in modern militaries as women. Indeed, units 
integrated from day one, and intentionally composed of women in human terrain and 
intelligence teams, proved to be an asset for the French military. As noted in Chapter 1, 
the composition of these units were so successful that President Macron has called for 
specific recruitment of women to meet the challenges of ISIS and homegrown terrorist 
attacks.    
 Today, France’s military is entering into another process of change. Though the 
military is considered at a high level of integration comparatively, there are still 
problems, especially with issues of sexual harassment and cultural isolation of its women 
soldiers. Though instances of workplace sexual harassment and assault have declined 
drastically in the French military, there historically have not been mechanisms for 
military commanders to address issues that occur outside working hours. This has hit 
women in the military especially hard, as they are often living with their male 
counterparts and the lines between work and social situations are frequently blurred. 
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Marlene Schiappa, the French Minister for Gender Equality, is working to eradicate 
sexual harassment through wide sweeping social reforms to the penal code.85 She’s 
working closely with the Themis Cell, and other the Ministry of Defense units that have 
developed innovative techniques at combatting workplace discrimination. Though the 
military is not the specific target of her actions, any measures passed will benefit the 
military and continue to make a permissive environment for women.   
 Women are also continuing to prove essential and innovative in the national 
security arena in France. In the years since France’s initial entry into Afghanistan, they 
have introduced gender advisors to their ranks to ensure that a gendered perspective is 
taking into account when planning and executing missions on both the strategic and 
tactical level. 30,000 of France’s slightly over 200,000 troops are currently deployed in 
support of international COIN operations. Nearly 7% of the forces deployed in these 
COIN operations are women, with the majority of then being concentrated in the officer 
ranks (NATO, 2014-2016). Notably, women are both proving strategically important in 
these operations, and those who participate are more likely to remain in the military 
beyond their initial obligation than those who do not deploy (Bigio, 2017).  As a result, 
the women currently serving in operational leadership positions have the potential to 








CHAPTER 5:  
Norway 
Making Soldiers and Citizens 
 
Norway was an early leader in gender integration, with claims rooten in 
citizenship equality being consistant with the internally focused values based identity of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces. Indeed, as long as women claimed their sameness to their 
male counterparts, a permissive environment for integration existed. Further, they types 
of missions that the Norwegian military tended to participate in reinforced the benefits of 
a gender neutral egalitarian force.  
 However, the benefits of gender-neutrality were put to the test with Norway’s 
participation in ISAF operations in Afghanistan. Within ISAF Norway was seen as 
progressive due to Colonel Ingrid Gjerde command of all Norwegian forces, as she was 
the first female infantry commander of that level. Indeed, by many countries, she was 
hailed as a model of success and evidence of gender-integration.86 However, despite the 
overall commitment from ISAF to gender being an essential part of the mission in 
Afghanistan, Col Gjerde was chosen by the Norwegians for her success as an infantry 
officer, not her gender. Though Norway maintained a  gender-neutral assignment policy 
 
86 See footage at: https://www.csis.org/events/women-combat-arms-conversation-colonel-ingrid-gjerde 
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For their units, operations in Afghanistan were such that women became important not 
only for their skills as soldiers but for their gender. Even moreso than in peacekeeping 
missions, women provided an essential function in counterinsurgency and village 
stability operations. From gathering intelligence to training security forces and 
politicians, Norwegian women were essential to mission effectiveness. Special 
operations, in particular realized the need for women’s unique contributions. “In 
Afghanistan, one of our big challenges was that we would enter houses and not be able to 
speak to the women. In urban warfare, you have to be able to interact with women as 
well. Adding female soldiers was an operational need.”87 
 The need for women to both perform their military duties and retain some of their 
gendered characteristics created a tension between claims about women’s service and 
military culture. As a result, women’s integration has stalled, with women having less of 
an impact on the military in the years since counterinsurgency operations have taken 
center stage in global politics. To address these challenges, the Norwegian military is 
restructuring and attempting to make space for the new roles that women are needed to 
serve.   
 
Norway: Moderate Level of Integration  
 The claims rooted in citizenship equality are largely responsible for the moderate 
level of women’s integration in the Norwegian military. This is seen in both the nature of 
 
87 Capt Ole Vidar Krogsaeter, Norwegian Special Operations Officer, Afghanistan  
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the laws and policies that have been implemented with regards to women’s access to and 
participation in military, and the operational practices of the armed forces. Consistent 
with the beliefs about citizenship equality highlighted in Chapter 2, military policy and 
practice largely downplayed the difference between men and women. From universal 
conscription to gender-neutral berthing, the military has become more inclusive of the 
Norwegian citizenry, while remaining the institution for creating model citizens. Indeed, 
women’s integration has been approached in a de-gendered manner, with both men and 
women expected to converge around the norms and practice of “Norwegianness” that has 
historically shaped the citizen-soldier. However, in recent years, the approach to gender 
integration has begun to shift, as gender differences are becoming more important in the 
changing international security landscape.  
 The result of Norway’s de-gendered approach is a moderate level of integration. 
Norway was a pioneer in gender equality in the military. However, after initial successes 
in integration, the impact that women had on the military stalled. Throughout the 20th 
Century, women in the military were largely seen as symbolic of citizenship status rather 
than a substantive force. Women were seen as the serving in the military to be 
Norwegians, rather than for a specific strategic purpose. However, experiences in 
Afghanistan have resulted in Norway pivoting away from gender neutrality in order to 
leverage women in counterinsurgency operations. The inward and value orientation of the 
military culture was in tension with these new claims, making it hard for women to have 
an impact quickly. However, there are indications that the military is becoming more 
receptive to gendered claims.  
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 Table 5.1 highlights the current measures of the various components of 
integration in the Norwegian military.   
 
Table 5.1 Current Measures of Women’s Integration into the Norwegian Military  
Measure Value 
Legal - No restrictions on women’s functional or 
geographic service.  
- No preference given to women for infantry service 
- 6 weeks Maternity / 10 weeks paternity leave  
- 49 weeks of parental leave 100% paid; 59 weeks 
at 80% pay 
- National childcare and early education programs  
- Mixed-gender training as sexual harassment 
mitigation  
Functional - 9.5% of military force 
- 3.5% in ground combat force  
- 16% in international operational forces* 
Durability - 2% retention rate 
- 2% of flag officers  
- 12% of senior officers  
- 36% of Noncommissioned Officer  
Institutional Impact  - Women’s inclusion in conscription  
- Establishment of Hunter Troop 
*Includes Norther border guard units that receive a hazardous duty designation  
 Norway’s components of integration are themselves representative of a moderate 
level of integration. However, it is the way in which they interact that highlight that 
women have had a limited amount of change on the military that is the focus of this 
chapter. The foundational belief that men and women are the same as citizens has guided 
the process of integration of women into the Norwegian military. The laws and policies 
that begun the process of integration have shaped it as a gender neutral. From the military 
giving more time for paternity leave to mixed gender training and berthing in the border 
units, the Norwegian military has downplayed gender as an aspect of its tactical or 
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strategic initiatives. This has given women room to succeed on their merits and 
achievements, with little questioning of the suitability for women in the military in 
general or combat roles in particular.   
 In this chapter I show how the core tenants of citizenship equality, and the claims 
made by women’s movements about women’s role in public life influenced the process 
of integration, by engaging with the Norwegian defense culture of citizen-building before 
militarism. I begin by discussing the Norwegian military culture. Next, I highlight how 
the claims made about women’s participation in the military have unfolded over the three 
eras of global political change noted in Chapter 1. In the first, the 1984 decision to 
include  women into all aspects of the professional force was a defining feature. In the 
second, debates around universal conscription for all Norwegian citizens (including 
women) took center stage. In both of these eras, gender neutrality coincided with military 
culture to allow for women’s continued gender integration. However, in the third, gender 
integration stalled, because of the change in the claims made about women’s service.   In 
the aftermath of actions in Afghanistan, gender-focused units, epitomized with the 
creation of the Hunter Troop, the all-women special operations unit, have been 
developed. While there has been success with the Hunter Troop, the claims about 
women’s service continued to be in tension with military culture.  
 
Norwegian Military Tradition: Citizen before Warrior  
 Though a war fighting organization first and foremost, the Norwegian armed 
forces are highly regarded as “an important contributor to the formation of common 
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national values” (Friis, 2000, p. 119). In addition to fighting wars, the armed forces have 
been at the forefront of creating a uniquely Norwegian identity. Given Norway’s 
relatively late independence, the military was a way to accelerate and codify a new 
identity, giving the citizens of Norway a way to both craft a common identity, and an 
institution through which Norwegian values would be transmitted to young citizens. As 
Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute Historian Stale Ulriksen notes,  
The Norwegian Defense Tradition is not the aggregation of 
the experiences had by the Norwegian armed forces in war. 
Rather, it is a result of a series of more or less conscious 
choices about the historical aspects of nationalism worth 
celebrating, and a gradual institutionalization of these 
choices. The Defense Tradition is in part a result of the 
historical experiences different actors have been concerned 
about, or have chosen to emphasize, coupled with the needs 
of identity in a new nation, and beliefs about how best to 
represent that identity.  
It has been created for a purpose. Not necessarily by one 
person, or a particular group of persons, but through a 
national debate or general public discourse. It has been 
honed and adapted to national trends in times when 
important policy choices have been taken and when the 
central political ideas of what “Norway” would be were 
formulated. (Ulriken, 2002, pp. 25-26) 
 
While military victory certainly is an aim of the Norwegian armed forces, military victory 
is not its primary purpose in society. Rather, it is a socializing vessel, focused on 
promoting values to a domestic audience and creating a distinctly Norwegian cultural 
tradition shared by all citizens.  
 In order to differentiate themselves from their previous colonizers (Denmark and 
Sweden), a belief about “ideal Norwegian” was created. Coastal Norway was seen to be 
heavily influenced by its contact with other cultures and traditions. Therefore, the 
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Norwegian mountain farmer was see as “exemplary, or at least ideal, because he was a 
true Norwegian” (Tordsson, 2003, p. 97). Survival skills in the harsh winters became 
synonymous with the ideal citizen, and exploration, especially of previously unexplored 
arctic or polar regions, became an essential function of the armed forces in the early 20th 
Century (For histories of Norwegian solder-explorers see: Christensen, 1993; Pedersen, 
1997). Despite its long coastline, the naval tradition in Norway has been grately 
downpayed. Rather, it was the soldier on skis, with his ability to cope with rough terrain 
and harsh climates, that personified the pride of Norway to its citizens (Rones, 2015).  
 In the early years of Norwegian indpendence, military conscription became a way 
for young male citizens to be socialized into the Norwegian ideal. The purpose of 
conscription in the first half of the 20th Century was character-building through 
introduction to the uncivilized and harsh wilderness that was seen to be the “true 
Norway” (Woodward & Duncanson, 2017). While other Western nations were engaged 
in identifying their militaries through weaponry and tactical innovation, Norway focused 
on those things that were the most Norwegian. Indeed, the military was more a tool of 
nation building and identity conformation than offensive, or even defensive, violence.  
 In the latter half of the 20th and into the 21st Century, Norway became a more 
prominent military power on the international stage. Officially neutral during World War 
I, and occupied by Nazi forces during World War II, Norway had been able to keep it’s 
military insular and focused on national identity rather than force projection for the first 
several decades of independence. However, at the onset of the Cold War, it’s membership 
in NATO and strategic geopolitical position with regards to Russia, made it a valuable 
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ally of the United States. Yet even with this growth of prominance, military policy was 
kept as soft as possible. While troops from NATO allies reguarly trained in Nowary, and 
the country was a physical defense against potnetial Russian advances, Norway was 
reluctant to engage in an arms race or physical force projection (Riste, 2001). Rather, 
Norway largely viwed its military as an activist institution, promoting its foundational 
beliefs about equality beyond Europe. The self-identification of the military’s role is best 
captured by former Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godel: “The Norwegian society’s deep 
respect for humanitarian values has made the promotion of Human Rights a cornerstone 
of all our policy. This is of special importance to our military policy, where it combines 
idealism and self-interest.”88  
 In the post-Cold War years, the Norwegian military became more involved in 
using kinetic action, rather than rhetoric, to promote its values. In Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo, human rights were promoted through military action. As Thune and Ulriksen 
(2002, p. 15) note, Norwegian officials justified their increased deployment of troops 
through a belief that “’hard security had moved into ‘soft fields, and therefore ‘hard’ 
means were necessary to reach ‘soft’ goals.” Participation and leadership in international 
military operation was seen as an extension of building a national identity. As discussed 
in Chapter 2 egalitarianism human rights were a cornerstone of national identity on which 
Norwegians focused to differentiate themselves from their Scandinavian neighbors. 
Military action specifically in support of such goals thus strengthened the unique 
 
88 Speech to Parliament 1996  
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Norwegian commitment to egalitarianism and continued to promote a unique Norwegian 
identity.  
  Even as Norway has increased its military participation abroad, rather than 
counting military success as a matter of conquests, enemy body counts, or even thwarted 
foreign invasions, it is measured by the ability to spread values of egalitarianism and 
secure human rights (Thune & Ulriksen, 2002; Woodward & Duncanson, 2017). A 
modern example of this can be seen in a 2008 public media debate about the way that 
Norwegian snipers were greeted upon their return from Afghanistan. Criticisms from the 
American media that the Norwegian people did not greet the returning soldiers with a 
“heroes’ welcome,” were met form a response by the Minister of Defense that Norway 
did not have a warrior culture built on killing, and should not strive for one (Matlary, 
2008).  
 The Norwegian military culture is one of citizen-building first, war-making 
second. Against this backdrop, women in Norway were able to make claims that put the 
Norwegian military on a trajectory of being one of the earliest adopters of codified 
gender equality. Indeed, the focus on citizenship rather than violence, provided women 
with an opening for the military, and lessened many of the typical military cultural 
barriers to entry driven by hegemonic masculinity. Within the Norwegian military 
tradition, women have been viewed as essentially equal to their male counterparts, as 
citizens first (Gustavsen, 2013). In the sections that follow, I show how this was to 
women’s advantage early on, but has come into tension with claims made as global 
politics increasingly required the military to engage in gendered activities.  
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Era 1: The final years of the Cold War: Citizen Claims for Full Inclusion 
in the Professional Armed Forces (1970-1992) 
 The process of full integration of women into the Norwegian military began in the 
1970s with the passage of the Equal Status Act (ESA). During the waning years of the 
Cold War, the  professional forces were opened to women a result of the ESA, though 
there were restrictions on service. In 1984, all restrictions were lifted on women’s 
service. In the 1970s Norway was on the forefront of gender equality and military 
integration. As a result, women had a substantial impact on the military during the early 
years of integration. In the years following the laws dropping any restriction for women 
in the military, the percentage of women in the military jumped from 3.2% in 1980 to 
upwards of 8% by 1990. By 1986, over 6% of Norway’s contribution to the UN Mission 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were women, including the highest ranking officer in UN’s 
dispersed peacekeeping operations (Karamé, 2001). The emphasis on peacekeeping and 
values promotion within NATO suited Norway’s military culture, and a conducive 
environment for women’s integration existed.  
 
Structural Provisions  
 The Equal Status Act (1978) was the landmark legislation of women’s equality in 
Norway. Beyond just guaranteeing equal economic and political rights, the law was 
centered around creating a more egalitarian society. The armed forces, however, were 
partially excluded from immediate full compliance with the act until 1984 when all 
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occupational specialties were open to women.  Yet the areas of the act that did impact the 
military were important in initiating military integration.  





- Access to professional military  
- Ground combat opened 1984 
- Not conscripted 
Childcare / Parental 
Leave 
- Childcare under 1975 Law (all children up to age 
6 regardless of parent’s economic status)  
- Parental leave under Equal Status Act (42/52 
weeks and access to job + expected benefits 
when return)   
Sexual Harassment - Outlawed under Equal Status Law, but no 
specific NorAF policies  
 
 Table 5.2 summarizes the structural provisions that contributed to women’s 
integration in Norway’s during this first period. The Equal Status Act allowed for the 
formal participation of women in the professional forces. The shape of global politics 
during the end of the Cold War resulted in a shift in emphasis form conscripted troops to 
professional soldiers that allowed for women to be elevated in status as a result of their 
military participation.  
The Equal Status Act was instrumental in solidifying a strong professional 
military. After World War II, the military focused on creating a military comprised of 
“robust, conscripted, and dedicated citizen-soldiers” (The Norwegian Armed Forces 
Museum, 2015), save for a small professional officer corps. After the devastating 
occupation during World War II,89 Norway realized that isolation and neutrality would 
 
89 It is estimated that over 11,000 Norwegians lost their lives during the liberation alone. 
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not save them and sought out alliances with stronger countries.  Norway’s geostrategic 
position vis a vis Russia made it a valuable ally to the United States in the early years of 
the Cold War. While defense policy remained focused more on soft projections of power, 
the Norwegian military began to organize itself more like the United States, with an 
emphasis on infantry soldiers, in order to keep in its favor (Bitzinger, 1989). The heavy 
focus on conscription (to quickly build up a force) and infantry (a traditionally masculine 
military role) was seen as necessary to ensure favorable standing within NATO (Græger, 
2005). This twin focus, while helping to solidify the position of the military also 
essentially excluded women, as they were still not part of conscription nor the infantry. 
While this focus was necessary to gain standing with the United States, the military still 
put a premium on the traditional Norwegian “cultural skills” such as skiing and winter 
survival. Though having to adjust some of its practices to conform to the stronger allies, 
the military retained its cultural focus on traditional aspects of Norwegianness.   
The Equal Status Act led to a shift in the Norwegian military’s personnel 
composition, with a pivot from conscripts to professional soldiers. In order to give 
women equal status, it was necessary to increase the professional ranks in both size and 
prominence.90 As a government department, the Ministry of Defense was subject to the 
rules around gender parity in appointed government committees.91 This meant that on the 
 
90 While the Equal Status Act allowed for the NorAF to be partially exempt, as a government ministry it 
had to comply in ensuring women “equal pay and access to promotion” in the ministry. Therefore 
professional access to everything but infantry was opened.  
 
91 Per the Equal Status Act: Any government committee that has 2-3 members must have both genders 
represented; 4-6 members must have at least 2 people from each gender; 6-8 members must have at least 3 
people form each gender; 9 members must have at least 4 people from each gender; 10 or more must have 
at least 40% from each gender.  
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civilian side, women were very active in the Ministry of Defense. Not only are women 
active in lower level committee positions, but since the passage of the Equal Status Act, 
six women have ascended to the position of Minister of Defense. Women in both lower 
level and leadership positions within the Ministry helped to ease the transition from a 
conscript army of men to a more professional force that practiced gender parity, as 
military leadership already had experience working with women. Indeed, their presence 
in matters of security and defense was not seen as out of place.   
As a result of the Equal Status Act, the military began to emphasize 
professionalism in order to provide more opportunities for women to both participate in 
military activities and advance into leadership positions. However, the ESA also 
recognized that the functional role of the military was unique and made provisions for the 
“King [to] issue regulations providing that the service of women in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces shall fall partly outside the scope of this Act.”92 In practice this meant that 
while women were ensured the professional benefits of military service in the same way 
as their male counterparts, there were restrictions to the roles that they could hold. At the 
passage of the act, the King prohibited women from serving in direct ground combat 
roles.  
However, his decision did not go unchallenged. The decision to put restrictions on 
women’s service resulted in discontent and pressure from the sorting to drop the 
restrictions. The 1984 “Military Occupational Equality for Men and Women” act gave 
men and women the same opportunities in the volunteer professional Norwegian armed 
 
92 Text of the Act Relating to Gender Equality and Equal Status Act accessible at: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-act-relating-to-gender-equality-the-/id454568/  
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forces. Legally, this decision brought the military into full compliance with the equal 
status act, and therefore in line with the rest of Norwegian society in both the private and 
public sphere. The dropping of gender-based restrictions on combat occupations and 
postings meant that citizenship-producing and reinforcing mechanisms were now open to 
both genders equally and that the military could, in theory at least, no longer be 
considered a masculine enterprise (Værnø & Sveri, 1990). From the time of the passage 
of the act there was an emphasis on purposefully growing the number of women in the 
military in order to practically realize the theoretical equality. In particular there was an 
effort to mirror the success of the civilian government to attract and retain women. The 
Norwegian government has historically been the largest employer of women in the 
country (Steder, 2014). This is indicative of the foundational beliefs about citizenship 
equality. Women benefited greatly from the Norwegian government, and in return, they 
often worked as public servants. As highlighted in Chapter 2, part of the argument used 
by the Norwegian women’s movement to gain expanded economic and political benefits 
was that being engaged public citizens was an obligation as members of the welfare state.  
Though women were allowed to serve in all roles in the professional military, 
there was a disparity in service obligation. Conscription was a requirement for men, but 
not for women. The Equal Status Act only extended to access to the professional armed 
forces, and excluded women from conscripted roles. While the Act resulted in a shift of 
focus from conscription to professionalization, roughly 10-20% of the military remained 
filled by conscripts.93 Women’s entry into the professional ranks, and their exclusion 
 
93 Norway MOD records  
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from ground combat, meant that more and more conscripts were used to fill infantry 
ranks, and professional soldering focused on logistics, intelligence, and transport roles in 
order to show competitiveness between men and women. 
Members of the military, as the rest of society, were able to take advantage of the 
Act’s guarantees around parental leave. In addition to a generous leave allowance (52 
weeks at 80% pay or 42 weeks at 100% pay) and mandated maternity and paternity leave 
periods, parents were assured not only a return to their position, but accommodation for 
any “improvements in their working conditions or time-based promotions they could 
have reasonably entitled to during their absence.”94 The provisions of the act thus 
removed a great deal of both social stigma and professional hardship that may be 
associated with parenthood.  
 
Functional Participation  
 The initial entry of women into the military in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was 
not in large numbers. By 1980, only 3.2% of the Norwegian military was women. 
However, after all occupational specialties were open to women, their numbers increased, 
reaching 9% by the mid-1990ss. Despite their relatively small numbers, they proved an 







94 Text of Acts available at:  https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-act-relating-to-gender-
equality-the-/id454568/  
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Table 5.3: Summary of Functional Participation during the First Era of Women’s 




- 3.2% - 9% of the total force  
Type of 
Participation 
- Primary fields: Medical and Logistics  
- When infantry opened to women, proportional 
representation to the medical and logistic fields   
Overseas 
Participation 
- 5-6% (nearly identical to domestic breakdown)  
 
 Table 5.3 highlights the components of functional participation during this period. 
While limited in number, they were not relegated to domestic and non-deployable jobs. 
Additionally, their active role in UNIFIL would prove to be important for their claims for 
dropping any restrictions on their service 
Unlike many countries that kept women in domestic administrative roles (NATO, 
2000-2016), Norway set women on international missions in their first years in the armed 
services. Indeed, of early contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, Norway was the 
only country that’s deployed demographics reflected its overall gendered composition. 
Though the overall numbers were still low, the Norwegian Armed Services were 
cognizant to ensure that all international missions were reflective of the overall gender 
breakdown of the military.  
The UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was one of the earliest 
examples of the functional impact of women in Norwegian Armed Forces. In the early 
years of UNIFIL, women were instrumental in helping to bolster Southern Lebanon’s 
economy (Karamé, 2001). When, in 1980, the UN made it a policy for peacekeeping 
forces to move into the community (and out of tents), the peacekeeping troops were 
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responsible for buying provisions from the local community. The presence of women in 
the peacekeeping units helped to boost the economic status of many local women through 
shopping for the daily necessities. Given the gender roles in the Lebanese society, there 
was a dedicated “women’s section” or the commercial area. Even beyond buying the 
essentials, women from the Norwegian peacekeeping battalion would socialize in these 
areas, frequenting cafes and restaurants.95 In such visits not only did they help to stabilize 
the economy through their patronage, but they learned valuable insights into Lebanese 
culture that would help them in their day to day operations.  
When the 1984 act was passed, Norway was heavily invested in UNIFIL. By 
1985,96 the first Norwegian female infantry officers and soldiers arrived as part of the 
mission (Karamé, 2001). The addition of women in the infantry contributed to both the 
UNIFIL mandate and furthering the culture of the military in domestic life. Including 
women in the infantry served not only a functional purpose (women were capable 
soldiers) but also a cultural one. Women in the Norwegian military modeled behaviors of 
equity to the other countries engaged in peacekeeping operation,  (Værnø & Sveri, 1990).  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the majority of women in the Norwegian 
military were in the medical profession and logistic communities. Though there are not 
official records of the gender breakdown of each unit97 antidotal accounts of military life 
 
95 Interview with Captain Ingrid Gjerde in Oslo, 1999 as quoted in Karme, 2001.  
 
96 The “lag” was due to the time it took to train women into the infantry.  
 
97 The Norwegian Ministry of Defense did not start keeping gender-based demographic data by occupation 
specialty until 1999  
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paint a picture of life in the military during these years.98 Because of the gender-neutral 
language in much of the legal provisions, women experienced life much as any other 
soldier would. Those that were deployed in support of operations in Lebanon or to the 
Northern Border Guard described their careers as “challenging,” and lamented long 
separations from their family, but at nearly the same rate as men (Steder, 2015).  
While the overall percentage of women in the military was low, it is notable that the 
percentage of women deployed international mirrored the overall percentage of women in 
the military. Indeed, deploying a force that was reflective of the domestic breakdown of 
military forces was a testament to Norway’s belief that the military’s purpose was 
centered around value transmission. Additionally, the women who did join largely had 
service longevity. Some of the longevity of was a result of male citizens still being 
subject to conscription. Because women were part of the professional (rather than 
conscripted) force, their terms of service were necessarily longer than their male 
counterparts. Also, because of the restrictions put on their service, they were generally in 
career fields that had a longer training pine line and therefore greater service 
commitment. While exact numbers of women in leadership roles in the late 1970s and 
1980s is not available, survey results put women’s average time in service as greater than 
ten years (Carreiras, 2002). Additionally, approximately 5% of the leadership contingent 
of Norway’s UNIFIL contribution was women.99 Given that this percentage is larger than 
 
98 The Aftenposten, A Norwegian daily newspaper conducted a series of interviews with the women who 
were among the first to join the Norwegian military as professionals. They overwhelming speak of medical 
and logistic services.  
 
99 UN Peacekeeping Contributor Country Profile  
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the overall percentage of women in the military, it shows that women are staying in and 
gaining the required skills for leadership promotion.   
 
Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture  
 Early claims about women’s military service must be looked at from both the 
supply (women choosing to join the military) and demand (the military wanting women) 
side. Since the passage of the Equal Status Act and the focus on professional forces, there 
has been an effort by the Norwegian government to increase the role of women in the 
military (Steder, 2014; Wooten, 2014). In line with the egalitarian arguments about 
women’s role in society as citizens, once women were allowed into the professional 
forces, there was a push to bring them into the service in an equal way as their male 
counterparts. Because of the focus on sameness between men and women, the women 
who chose to enter the professional service strongly mirrored their male counterparts. 
Concurrently, debates about opening all military roles to women centered around duty 
and obligations to the country rather than physical attributes or warfighting experiences.  
 As noted above, one of the primary purposes of the Norwegian military was to 
create an “ideal” Norwegian citizen, someone that was rugged and adventurous. The first 
women that joined the military largely mirrored the ideal type. The overwhelming 
majority of women who chose to enlist in the 1970s and early 1980s came from the 
“Midt-Norge” (central) region of Norway. They were largely from families that had a 
strong tradition of hunting and adventure sports, and were said to value “ruggedness and 
strength” as central to their Norwegian identity (Fauske, 2015). Such women saw it as 
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part of their duty as Norwegians to help perpetuate and preserve the unique Norwegian 
culture. As Norway was increasingly being involved in international treaties and 
operations, the military worked as a means of maintaining and perpetuating Norwegian 
values (Korsvik, 2014). Women emphasized their part in maintaining “Norwegianness” 
as justification for military participation.  
 As women started to join the professional forces, the Sorting was engaging in 
debates as to whether or not to open all military roles to women. The justification to 
exclude women from combat roles was initially made by King Olav V, a career military 
officer before ascending to the throne in 1957.100 King Olav V’s justification rested 
primarily on the fact that he had not served with any women during his tenure in the army 
(Skaine, 2011). However, many members of the Sorting did not believe that his 
inexperience with women alone was reason enough to exclude women in total from 
infantry units. Especially members of the more liberal Labor party saw it as their duty to 
“formalize gender balances” in all aspects of public life as part of their national 
dedication to equality (Siim & Skjeie, 2008, p. 325). The military was seen to be a 
necessary part of the formalized gender balance. Members of the Sorting drew on the fact 
that women in Norway had been leaders in receiving political and economic rights to 
argue that they should equally be a part of the military to fulfill their role as citizens 
(Sainsbury, 2001).    
 
100 Olav attended military school in the UK and Sweden and rose through the ranks of the Norwegian 
military to become a general in the army. He was known as “the people’s king” because of the fact that he 
did not fulfill his military obligation in a symbolic way, but engaged in the same training and service as all 
Norwegian citizens.  
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 From both the supply and demand side, claims about women’s military 
participation focused on their role as citizens. Little distinction was made between male 
and female citizens, as witnessed by the focus on being an “ideal” Norwegian, rather than 
a female soldier. For the non-combat roles that women were able to join, there was one 
standard for all soldiers, further strengthening the de-gendered claims. If women were to 
be full citizens, then their participation in the military was necessary. Such claims were 
consistent with the military’s culture focused on making citizens. Indeed, it was difficult 
to discount claims that women were equal citizens and therefore should be subject to the 
same military opportunities as men.  
 
Outcome 
Women’s initial entry into the professional arm of the military had a quick and 
meaningful impact. The most notable change that occurred was that all restrictions to 
women’s service were lifted in 1984. This decision was not made necessarily because the 
Norwegian military wanted women in combat arms positions but because it would better 
promote citizenship equality if men and women were subject to the same service 
requirements (Kristiansen & Steder, 2015). Debates in the Sorting focused more on what 
the obligations of women in Norway should be rather than on what women should not do.  
 The 1984 decision to open all occupations to women and hold men and women to 
the same training and operational standards was exceptional in the international 
environment. Not only was Norway on the leading edge of allowing women into all 
military occupations, but they were also proactive in ensuring that women were a part of 
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the totality of military operations in a meaningful way but setting objective standards and 
fully integrating all aspects of training (Steder, 2015). Indeed, as soon as women were 
allowed into combat roles they became active in the military apparatus. Women 
immediately joined the UNIFIL operation as infantry officers. While women were active 
in engaging with Lebanese women in the host society, during operations their actions 
were dictated by “their rank and uniform, not their gender” (Karamé, 2001, p. 89). 
Indeed, women’s success was largely due to their similarity to their male counterparts.  
 Norway’s early leadership with regards to women’s military integration was 
largely due to the fact that women’s claims about service, as well as the roles they 
performed matched closely with military culture and beliefs about the purpose of the 
military. The experience in Lebanon gave credence to their claims, and helped to ensure 
that women were included equally in all aspects of military life.   
 
Era 2: Post-Cold War 
Universal Conscription for a Citizen Army   
 During this era, the primary military issue women faced was around universal 
conscription. From a conceptual standpoint, women transitioned from being limited 
participants to being lawfully integrated into the military in the same way as their male 
counterparts. This gave women the ability to claim even more citizenship rights. It is 
notable that through Norway was on the leading edge of integrating women into the 
military, they did not achieve the numbers of many of the Western militaries that opened 
combat positions to women later did. Targets for service have ranged from 7-10% 
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depending on who is in power (NATO, 2000; Steder, 2015). Though smaller in number, 
the women that did join the military had career longevity and often rose to command 
positions. The small, but durable, force of Norwegian women helped to solidify 
egalitarian policies around citizenship and service. However, the egalitarian focus also 
came under criticism for stalling women’s advancement in a changing global security 
environment.  
 
Structural Conditions  
 The legal and structural conditions for women in the post-Cold War military were 
largely the same as those for men.  
 





- Access to professional military  
- No restrictions to women’s service 
- Air Defense Unit 50/50 
Childcare / Parental 
Leave 
- Childcare under 1975 Law (all children up to age 6 
regardless of parent’s economic status)  
- Parental leave under Equal Status Act (42/52 weeks 
and access to job + expected benefits when return)  
- Life-phase oriented personnel policies 
Sexual Harassment - Outlawed under Equal Status Law, but no specific 
NorAF policies  
 
Table 5.4 summarizes the structural provisions for women’s military participation 
in the Norwegian military. Notably, the provisions were aimed at promoting citizenship 
equality, formally downplaying the difference between men and women.   
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The changes in policies that came after the 1984 Military Occupational Equality 
for Men and Women act were aimed at increasing the number of women in the armed 
forces. In the two decades following the formalization of military equality, there were 
199 unique suggestions – from academic, politicians, and military leaders – aimed at 
increasing the share of women in the military (Værnø & Sveri, 1990; Sand & Fasting, 
2012). Suggested measures include implementing gender-based evaluation measures, 
engaging in recruitment in elementary schools, more direct officer commissions, and 
increase diversity training for younger troops. The widespread and diverse focus of these 
suggestions highlights the weight that the Norwegian government put behind wanting to 
remain a pioneer in gender equity, especially among its Scandinavian neighbors. As 
egalitarianism was a central part of its national identity, having a military that was 
reflective of its values in practice and not just policy was important. However, most of 
the suggestions were ultimately rejected on the grounds that they disproportionately 
favored women and were therefore in violation with the Equal Status Act.101   
The suggestions that were implemented and ended up having an impact on 
women’s military service were those that fall under what is referred to as “life-phase 
oriented personnel policies” (Steder, 2014, p. 303). These policies recognize that an 
individual does not have the same life-family-professional balance needs throughout their 
career, and make efforts to address the variations in challenges that individuals meet at 
various life-stages.  For example, an effort was made to give mid-level officers and 
enlisted soldiers a longer time in one geographic region. This was done in recognition of 
 
101 Interview with Frank Steder – August 2017  
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the fact that at this time in one’s life (generally in their early – mid 30s) that it is more 
critical for children to have geographic stability for both schooling consistency and the 
development of social skills. It is notable that these policies were seen as equally 
applicable and important for both genders.  As highlighted by the impact that the “daddy 
quota” has had on norms about childcare and family roles in Chapter 2, parenthood has 
become increasingly de-gendered in Norwegian society. Life-phase oriented personnel 
policies were thus what was the most acceptable, as they were not seen as overtly or 
disproportionally favor women.   
The military also used operational organization to attempt to increase the number 
of women. Though a minority of the overall force, some units were intentionally 
balanced at a near 50/50 ratio. In particular, the elite air defense units underwent a 
reorganization in the late 1990s/early 2000s to ensure gender parity in numbers, and in all 
living and operational conditions. The purpose of this reorganization was to highlight that 
female soldiers were “just soldiers” and that men don’t set the tone in either military life 
or operational conduct (Braw, 2017). By manufacturing an environment where men and 
women were equal in all aspects – standards, living quarters, and number – the military 
showed that there was little to no difference between the genders in hopes of appealing to 
the beliefs about citizenship.  
 
Functional Participation   
 In the post-Cold-War era, women’s participation in the military was important to 
both international and domestic participation. Internationally, women’s biggest impact 
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came in peacekeeping missions. As noted above, women were essential to the UNIFIL 
mission. Their success in UNIFIL was mirrored in UN missions around the globe.   





- Steady around 9% of total force 
Type of 
Participation 





 Table 5.5 highlights components of functional participation. While not high in 
number, women’s proportion of the force did increase, and women represented an even 
spread across the occupational specialties. The work that women in the military did in the 
decades following women being allowed in all occupational specialties further de-
gendered women in the service. As they took on newly opened roles, women served as 
citizens, emphasizing that it was their service, not their gender that made them successful.  
 Norwegian women’s success in peacekeeping operations provided them with 
accolades and allowed them to ascended the ranks quickly. The global emphasis on 
women’s increased participation in peacekeeping operations was in line with Norwegian 
views about the cultural role of the military. The military was an institution to share the 
values of equality and citizenship with the rest of the world. “We did not lobby to train 
women to kill,” was a common refrain of the leaders in the UN peacekeeping circles 
(Skjelsbaek, 2016), emphasizing that women helped to temper the brutal nature of the 
military and enhanced its role in promoting values. Though there was an emphasis on 
training women in the skills required for infantry action, it was done so because it was 
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necessary to ensure the peace, not because there was inherent value in killing. Infantry 
officers in particular were rewarded in the Norwegian military because of their restraint 
in using violence during peacekeeping operations. Women were included in these 
promotions and took on important leadership roles in peacekeeping operations. In the 
1990s, female officers were made commanders in the UN missions in the former 
Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and were the leads in NATO-sponsored trainings for potential 
peacekeeping forces (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2016).   
Major General Kristin Lund was named the first female force commander of a 
peacekeeping mission, highlighting the importance of Norwegian leadership around the 
world. Major General Lund emphasized the Norwegian view of gender equality when 
speaking about her role as a woman force commander. “There’s no difference in what 
men and women can do in the military,” she remarked in an official UN interview 
(Childs, 2017).  Though the coverage of her leadership was framed as “exceptional” and 
“groundbreaking” by press in the United States and throughout Europe, she viewed 
herself as largely no different than her predecessors.   
 While internationally women were proving themselves as equals peacekeeping 
missions, domestically women were making strides in the border guard units. The border 
guards provided a valuable tool for the military in their role promoting the image of the 
ideal citizen. During the Cold War the border guard provided a valuable physical service 
in defense of the country.  Yet rather than disband at the end of the Cold War, the border 
guard took on a symbolic role. In the years after the Cold War it became the unit where 
the ideal soldier could act. The area patrolled by the Norwegian border guard is among 
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the most rugged terrain in the country. The soldiers of the border guard epitomized the 
hearty ruggedness and adventuresome spirit that was part of the Norwegian identity. 
Women in these units, living and working alongside their male counterparts, became 
idealized by other Western nations in the process of integrating women into their 
militaries. When asked by an Australian reporter if the women in the unit became “one of 
the guys” when stationed on the border, a male soldier responded, “maybe you should ask 
her if I become ‘one of the girls.’ We all do the same things here. Patrol the same ground 
and survive in the same wilderness.”102 Though not a 50/50 split as in the case of the air 
defense battalion, men and women in the border guards shared lived in mixed housing 
and engaged in fully gender integrated training and patrols. They physically demanding 
work was split evenly between men and women, with no special conditions made for the 
female soldiers. Border patrol work was truly gender neutral and served more to be a 
model of Norwegian citizenship. 
 Though the number of women who chose to enter military did not reach the 
thresholds that leadership desired, the women who did join largely remained in at the 
same rate as their male counterparts. By 2009, 10% of all flag officers were women, as 
were 10% of all Lieutenants (Strand, 2015). The nearly consistent level of women 
throughout the rank structure is indicative of retention policies that neither overly favored 
nor harmed women. Indeed, they are consistent with other policies in Norwegian society 
that were applied evenly regardless of gender.  
 
102 Norwegian Television Network. “Gender Mission: How the Norwegian military is breaking down 
gender divisions in the quest for a better force.” Air Date August 18, 2014  
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Women’s retention may have in part been aided by the male conscription law. As 
noted above, despite all positions being open to women, women were not subject to 
conscription. Though the overall percentage of conscripts as part of the total force 
remained low, conscripts only served one year. The fact that some men left after a year 
due to the length of their conscription contract could artificially inflate women’s retention 
rate. It is for this reason that it is important to look at the officer ranks.103     
As women gained seniority, it is notable that they also gained authority. In 
addition to women moving up the rank structure in a similar fashion as men, they also 
gained positions of authority, command, and influence at the same rate. From 
peacekeeping missions to border guard units, women held command at a proportional 
rate to their male counterparts (Karamé, 2001; Strand, 2015).  
Concerning retention efforts, there have been debates about whether or not to 
specifically target women. As the military has been unable to hit its target percentages, 
there has been discussion as to the merits of specifically using leadership to grow the 
overall percentage of women. For example, a 2007 Ministry of Defense White Paper 
emphasized the need for women in “management” and “leadership” roles in the military 
(Ministry of Defense, 2007).  As a result, women were intentionally selected for 
leadership roles in schools and prominent positions in both domestic and international 
units. Between 2007-2011, the number of women in leadership positions in schools grew 
by 2 women per year (FFI 2015 data). By 2011 this resulted in women being 
overrepresented in command positions (approximately 16-18% of O-6 and above 
 
103 While male conscripts have the option to go to officer candidate school after their initial conscription 
obligation is fulfilled, men are not conscripted into the officer corps.  
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command positions held by women). In 2011, however, the number plateaued, as 
artificially inflating the number of women leaders was not sustainable given the 
population of available officers. Since 2011, the number of senior officers has decreased 
(8% in 2015), and now more closely mirrors overall service numbers.  
 
Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture   
 As women established themselves in all occupational specialties in the armed 
forces, both supply and demand side claims were shaped by women’s experiences in the 
military. Citizenship equality remained a central tenant of the claims. In particular, the 
demand side of the argument focused on universal conscription being the last remaining 
difference between men and women’s service. Given the success that women had 
adhering to “male” standards and berthing and bunking with their male counterparts, 
proponents for universal conscription argued that it was a natural progression. Laila 
Gustavsen, a long time Labour Party parliamentarian was one of the fiercest proponents 
of including women in military conscription. “Rights and duties should be the same for 
all,” she asserted in an interview.104 Indeed, military conscription was framed as the 
dutiful counterpart to the rights afforded to all Norwegians by the welfare state.   
 The arguments about conscription being a duty were strengthened by changes to 
military composition at the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Norway was an 
important geopolitical ally in NATO. To that end, they established a robust border guard 
 
104 Reuters Newswire. “Norway become first NATO Country to Draft Women into the Military” June 14, 
2013. Access at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-women-conscription/norway-becomes-first-
nato-country-to-draft-women-into-military-idUSBRE95D0NB20130614 
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force to defend the alliance from Moscow as well as a sizable Arctic maritime 
detachment. However, at the end of the Cold War, Norway substantially contracted the 
size of its military. Whereas the Cold War force structure relied heavily on conscripts to 
fill its ranks (60-80%), since 1993, conscripts have made up approximately 10% of the 
overall force. However, eligibility for conscription remained an important part of 
Norwegian citizenship. Between 2000-2013, each year there were approximately 60,000 
males that qualified for the selection process for conscription. Of that group, less than 
10,000 were needed to go to training and only 3,000-5,000 given operational roles 
(Steder, 2015). However, the shared experience of completing the conscription 
requirements created a bond between Norwegian men that reinforced citizenship and 
promoted a common understanding (Kristiansen & Steder, 2015). The arguments were 
therefore not made that women were necessary for fighting war, but that women should 
engage with the same citizenship duties as their male counterparts.  
 Norway’s increased participation in peacekeeping operations further contributed 
to women’s claims about military service. Indeed, in the early years after the end of the 
Cold War, peacekeeping became a major part of both the UN and NATO’s agenda, with 
Norway taking a lead both operationally and in training (Karlsrud & Osland, 2016). As 
noted above, peacekeeping was in line with their beliefs about the role of the military as a 
transmitter of values. Further, peacekeeping operations were seen as a way to “build 
better citizens,” as Norway took a leadership role among its NATO allies (Khanna & 
Sandler, 1997). The emphasis on building citizens continued coincide with Norwegian 




 Though it took nearly 30 years from the time that women were allowed to serve in 
all occupational specialties, universal conscription including women passed the Sorting in 
2013, with legislation written into law in 2014. With the passage of the legislation, 
women were included in the Joint Selection Process for General Conscription (JSPGC) to 
determine their eligibility and suitability for various military positions. Universal 
conscription was touted as being both culturally and institutionally beneficial for the 
military. In an address to the OSCE, the military advisor to the permanent delegation 
asserted that conscription represented a watershed moment for Norway.  
Universal conscription is important for two main reasons. 
Firstly, in all parts of society women and men have - and 
should have - equal rights, obligations and opportunities. 
Secondly, from a military perspective, the armed forces need 
to be able to recruit among the most capable candidates. 
Operational demands and high levels of specialization and 
technological sophistication dictate the need to recruit as 
widely as possible. We cannot afford to exclude half of the 
population in the recruitment process. In terms of human 
resources, the state sends a very clear message that 
competency is not down to gender, in this case the male 
gender. (Dalaaker, 2017) 
 
 The appeal to both sociopolitical equality and military effectiveness highlights the 
twin functions of the military. This appeal to equality continued the tradition of the 
military being a means of citizenship socialization. Including women in the process of 
conscription signified the completion of citizenship ideals. The appeal to the functional 
purpose of the military, namely the focus on operational demands, signaled that Norway 
was committed to its military obligations. Such a statement was essential to ease the 
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concerns of NATO allies that Norway was being political at the expense of its military 
effectiveness.  
In the first year that women were included in the JSPGC (2015), they represented 
25% of the eligible and willing conscripts.105 To qualify, individuals have to be able to 
compete physically and mentally in any job that a conscript could have. In practice, this 
means that all conscripts must physically meet the infantry standards regardless of what 
job they ultimately have. Though only about 10% of the overall conscripts ultimately get 
called into service, the presence of women in the eligible pool will necessarily increase 
the number of women in the armed forces. However, more important than numbers, 
women’s inclusion in the conscription pool signals the commitment to egalitarianism that 
has historically been one of the foundations of national identity. The neutrality with 
which conscription was applied to men and women is consistent with the claims about the 
similarities between citizens.  
 
Era 3: Post-9/11 and the Hunter Troop 
New Claims for a New Model?  
In both ISAF operations in Afghanistan and United States-led coalition activities 
in Iraq, Norwegian women played an active role in military operations. In combat their 
actions were gender neutral, performing their duties based on their assigned occupational 
speciality with little regard for their gender. The result was women, such as Colonel 
 
105 There are provisions for conscious objectors or those pursuing educational opportunities to serve in 
ways other than the military.  
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Gjerde, being promoted to leadership positions. However, Norwegian forces struggled in 
village stability operations, often lacking the cultural skills necessary to interact with 
women in Afghanistan or Iraq. Counterinsrugency proved difficult for troops that had 
emphasized gender neutrality.  
As a result of the struggles in Afghanistan, discussions in the Ministry of Defense 
began to center around the importance of highlighting the difference between men and 
women. Particularily, there was an interest in harnessing the unique differences that 
women brought to military operations. The creation of the Jegertroppen or Hunter Troop, 
an all-women special operations commando unit, was a result of realizing the unique 
differences between men and women, and creating a means of harnessing them. Though 
special operations had been open to women since 1984, very few women had ever 
attempted to join. Women had not been specifically recruited in the past, nor had a course 
of training or operations been devised to differentiate between what men and women had 
to offer.  
 The Hunter Troop was desigend to be women-only in order to both harness 
women’s unique characteristscs and show that women were able to do everything that 
men could in demanding environemnts. Indeed, the Hunter Troop was truly gender-
focused with a Norwegian spin; though designed to capture women’s unique 
contributions, the similarily in training between men and women furthered the claim as to 
women’s equality. Though still in its early days (the Hunter Troop has completed its 
initial year of training yet not been deployed operationally), benefits are already being 
seen and the claims made about women’s service beginning to change. Through the 
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training, it was highlighted that women excelled at things that men did not. In addition to 
being able to access a wider percentage of the population, female trainees excelled at 
shooting and scout-observation techniques (Braw, 2016).   
 While the domestic “experiment” with the Hunter Troop has been a success, there 
is wariness to use it operationally. “It goes against our culture to have men and women be 
separate,” Frank Steder remarked (August 2017). “I’ve been grappeling with the question 
of increasing the number of women in the military for a long time, and while the Hunter 
Troop did good work, I just don’t know if they’ll be accepted by their male comrads. 
They’re too womanly now.”  
 The tension between claims made about the needs for the Hunter Troop and the 
historical commitment to internal values and equality of the military, have resulted in a 
contentious environment for what could be a third cycle of integration. Though the 
program has been renewed, there are still no plans to operationalize the unit or bring its 
members into larger military planning exercises. Indeed, while women in Norway’s 
military were pioneers in the early years of integration, the emphasis on sameness has 
resulted in a stalling of progress in the changing global security environment. In a 
security environment that needed women to be different, they did not have the claims nor 






United States:  
Ask what you can do, if you can do it like a man 
  
In the United States, there has been much emphasis on the successes (and failures) 
of prominent individual women in the military. Indeed, the United States leads Western 
countries the greatest number of women general officers and senior enlisted. However 
“women,” as a group, have not benefited from the successes of these prominent 
individual women. Further, the lack of government involvement in issues of equality has 
allowed the military to pursue its own rules with regards to women’s participation. While 
women in the United States have been successful in the private sector, they have lagged 
behind other Western countries with regards to women’s military integration, despite 
having a high percentage of women in the organization. The United States highlights the 
importance of differentiating between integration and inclusion.      
The challenges faced by women in the United States military during the conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight their low level of integration. Early on in the conflicts, 
both top military officers and DoD civilians recognized the need for women’s service in 
order to be successful in counterinsurgency operations. The nature of conflict in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan required service members engaging with villages, at least 50% of whom 
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were women. The formal restrictions on women’s service106  meant that women could not 
be permanently assigned to or stationed with ground combat units in the theater of 
operations. To get around the restrictions, the military created Lioness and Female 
Engagement Teams (FET).107 Women in these teams would attach to infantry units for 
specific missions and be co-located (rather than assigned to) with infantry units. The 
women usually received less (and different) training than their male counterparts, and 
were often unprepared for the combat in which they found themselves.  
 FET teams and the Lioness program served an important function and both 
objectively and subjectively benefited mission accomplishment (Erwin, 2012). Village 
Stability Operations in which FET teams were present were more likely to meet both 
short and long term objectives than those that did not have women formally involved in 
the operations (Harding, 2012). However, the legal restrictions around women’s service 
proved problematic. Army infantry officer and Iraq veteran Steve Griffith notes that to 
the general population, the restrictions on women in combat may appear to be a non-
issue, but for operators on the ground, the difference is stark.  “Combat units can’t “own” 
female soldiers, but they can accept them on “loan” from other, non-combat units” 
(Griffin, 2012). The result is that while women have been essential to the successes of 
infantry units conducting counterinsurgency and village stability operations, they have 
 
106 Women were not allowed to serve in ground combat units or be stationed with units where their “risk” 
of ground combat was likely.  
 
107 For overview of the FET teams see: Lizette Alvarez, “GI Jane Breaks the Combat Barrier,” New York 
Times. August 16, 2009; Keally McBride and Annick Wibben, “The Gendering of Counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Vol 3, No. 2 (2012); Lemmon, Gayle 
Tzemach, and Kathe Mazur. Ashley's War. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2015.; Stephanie K. Erwin, The 
veil of Kevlar: An analysis of the female engagement teams in Afghanistan. Diss. Monterey, California. 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 
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not been fully accepted as part of the units.108 Though there have been a steady increase 
of women in the military, they have not been integrated, that is they have not been able to 
impact the military in a meaningful way. Rather, women have had to conform to male 
standards in order to find success in the military.   
  
United States: Low Level of Integration 
Though there are a comparatively large number of women in the United States 
military, and there are several prominent individual women in the services, the United 
States has an overall low level of women’s integration. Despite their numbers, and the 
prominent position of women such as General Janet Wolfenbarger,109 General Ann 
Dunwoody110 and Sergeant Major Evelyn Hollis,111 women writ large have not been able 
to make a substantial impact on either military personnel policies or tactics and strategies. 
The women that have been successful have largely done so despite their gender, and 
through adhering to masculine norms. Additionally, while the United States has a high 
percentage of women in the military at any one given point in time, retention is a 
challenge, with most women leaving the military after their initial contract is done. 
Though in the past four years the military has dropped all formal restrictions on women’s 
 
108 The official Army position was that FET teams “do not have a combat function” and therefore did not 
require infantry training 
https://www.army.mil/article/101111/fet_to_fight_female_engagement_team_makes_history  
 
109 4-Star Air Force General and first woman to command Air Force’s Material Command 
 
110 4-Star Army General and first woman to command Army’s Material Command 
 
111 Army Command Sergeant Major, first woman to be a command Sergeant Major of a combat arms 
battalion (1st Bn, 31st Air Artillery Defense Brigade)  
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service and women are now present in combat arms units, they are still not well 
integrated. To achieve success in the military in general and combat arms in particular, 
they have had to adopt and adapt to male standards and a masculine-dominant culture. 
The low level of integration in the United States is reflective of the lack of 
cohesive claims about gender equality. Further, the focus of women’s participation in the 
military has been on emphasizing how the successes of individual women has been 
within the constraints of military culture and practices. The lack of consensus about the 
role of women in society, coupled with a military that is rooted in combat operations has 
left little room for women to influence it.  
Table 6.1 Highlights the current measures of the components of integration for the 
























Table 6.1: Current Measures of Women’s Integration in the United States Military  
Measure Value 
Legal - No Restrictions on Women’s functional 
participation  
- De Facto restrictions on women’s geographic 
participation  
- Service-Dependent parental leave policies (range 2-
12 weeks)  
-  Privately contracted child care services with no 
guarantee of availability  
- Chain of command decision on sexual harassment  
Functional - 14.9% of military force  
- 0% of ground combat force* 
- 10.1% in international operations 
Durability - -15% retention rate  
- 1% of Flag Officers  
- 9% of Senior Officers  
- 13% of Noncommissioned Officers  
Institutional Impact  - Few Changes to policies 
- Continued commitment to primary of conventional 
arms  
*Though women have qualified in infantry, tank, and artillery MOS’, they have not yet 
been in operational units. This is primarily due to the timeline between training and 
operational assignment   
 
While the numbers of women appear high, the inability to have an institutional 
impact is indicative of a low level of integration for women into the United States 
military. There have been changes in laws and policies that have created more 
opportunities for women in recent years, yet there have been little changes in the 
supporting structures that enable women’s participation. Further, these changes have been 
done in such a way that the male physical standard and masculine cultural experience is 
preferenced. In the Women in the Services Review to congress, mandated by the 2012 
National Defense Authorization Act, for over 90% of the military occupational specialty 
standards and advanced schools, the male physical standard was listed as the “one 
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standard” to which all service members would be required to adhere (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness, 2013). While there has been an emphasis 
on counterinsurgency policy, and the importance of women in the recent conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, new policies and doctrine have been written by men, and have treated 
women as a group to be used in certain tactical situations rather than an integrated part of 
the overall force.   
 In this chapter I show how the foundational beliefs that individuals are 
responsible for proving their own worth coupled with the military’s culture of combat has 
created a contentious environment for women’s attempts to integrate into the military. I 
begin by discussing beliefs about the role of the military and military culture in the 
United States, focusing on how it has continued to remain combat centric in its values 
despite changes in global politics. I then discuss how throughout the three periods of 
global politics, integration has not been very successful in the United States. I show how 
the contention between the claims about women’s service and the military culture have 
resulted in an inability for women to impact the military in a meaningful way. The 
changes that have been made that have impacted women’s service have been done in a 
manner that is inclusive of women at the expense of their integration. I conclude by 
discussing how the conflict in Afghanistan has created an environment in which 





United States Military Tradition: Combat Tested, Culture Approved   
 Perhaps more than any other Western military, the United States has traditionally, 
and continues, to adhere to a combat-oriented, male-oriented warrior tradition. As army 
veteran Brian Mitchell asserts on his discussion on the suitability of women in the 
military, “The major social value of our military is the warrior image, particularly the 
masculine warrior image” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 44) He continues to decry women in the 
military, emphasizing that the presence of women shifts the military’s focus away from 
fighting wars and towards ensuring that women are taken care of and not subject to too 
much stress. While Mitchell’s views are extreme, they are reflective of a military in 
which the ideal type soldier remains male, white, conservative, and adherent to Judeo-
Christian values (Dunivin, 1994). Both the training for and conduct of war have 
reinforced the combat-centric nature of the military tradition in the United States (Hunter, 
2018). While arguments have been made for the military as a cultural socialization tool 
(Krebs, 2006), the emphasis in the United States remains on combat achievement and 
conventional force projection.  
 As one of the earliest Western militaries to abandon conscription in favor of the 
all-volunteer force, the United States military has adopted a culture that is been argued to 
be divergent from the majority of civilian citizens (Janowitz, 1975; Moskos, 2001). 
Indeed, recent demographic work on the military reflects this. Over 80% of military 
members come from a family where an immediate family member was also in the 
military (Zucchino & Cloud, 2015). Nearly half of all active duty troops come from 
California, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, most from a town within 25 
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miles of a military instillation. Further, the size of the military, both in terms of numbers 
and in percentage of the population that is serving, has continued to shrink. The growing 
divide between the military and the civilian population has resulted in a military that had 
both developed a distinct and separate culture, and has become very entrenched in its 
beliefs.  
The roots of the distinct culture predate the all-volunteer force, and are largely 
entrenched with the way in which the officer corps was treated as uniquely separate from 
society. In a 1962 address to the cadets at the Military Academy at West Point, General  
Douglas MacArthur asserted, “Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure 
knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose the nation will be 
destroyed” (MacArthur, 1962). The emphasis on winning, and the relative separation 
between military professionals and the civilian public created a culture that has 
emphasized the importance of the destructive power of the military as a means of both 
personal and professional survival (Janowitz, 1988).   
 The combat-focused identity of the military is reinforced both internally and 
externally. The origin of this identity is seen, both by service members themselves and 
from citizens of the country they serve, as a result of the conduct of war. When services 
members are lauded by civilians as ideal citizens it is more for bravery and willingness to 
fight in wars on behalf of the citizenry than it is for their possession of certain values or 
characteristics. Internally, service members have used combat and militarism as a way to 
distinguish themselves as the “best” among an already small and distinct group of service 
members (Snider, 2000). 
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 The masculine and combat-focused identity is prevalent in the way that members 
of the military talk about themselves and others. The roots of this identity are forged in 
initial training. Broadly, the purpose of recruit training is to take civilians and turn them 
into members of the military by both “indoctrinating” them into military life and 
“inoculating” them from the potential horrors of their chosen profession (Mills, 2012). 
The United States military is focused on creating a new moral code and identity among 
its members (Toner, 2013). They are not to be ideal civilian citizens, but ideal warriors, 
ready and able to do violence on behalf of the country. Even service members that are in 
occupational specialties other than ground-combat undergo extensive small-arms and 
hand-to-hand combat training, emphasizing and reinforcing that violence is the central 
part of identity (Hunter, 2018).  
 The result is a group that feels a separation from, and in some cases a distain for, 
the citizenry that reveres it (Ricks, 2007). The separation from the civilian population has 
resulted both in an entrenchment of military culture and a hierarchy of military identities 
among service members and veterans (MacKenzie, 2015). Because they are largely 
separated from the civilian population, and therefore don’t often compare themselves to 
civilians in a formal manner, members of the military have created an informal internal 
ranking system. In line with the masculine combat-focused culture, ground combat is 
seen to be the most prestigious and important job in the military. Seen as the “main 
effort” in military operations, the infantry is held up as the superior to the rest of the 
military. While conducting focus groups, several male soldiers and Marines wore patches 
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that stated “If you ain’t Infantry, you ain’t shit,” not only affirming the primacy of the 
infantry, but downgrading those not engaged in the direct conduct of war.112    
 Beliefs about the superiority of combat arms are reinforced by both personnel 
policies and military strategy. The majority of flag officers in the Army and Marine 
Corps have come from ground combat specialties. Only one Commandant of the Marine 
Corps113 and none of the Chiefs of staff of the Army have been from non-ground combat 
communities. Indeed, leadership sets the tone from their personal experiences, and 
without diversity in leadership there is little chance that there will be change in the lower 
ranks.  
 Strategic guidance has remained focused on ground combat operations and the 
defeat of the enemy. Though recent national security strategies have noted the importance 
of new theaters of war (i.e. cyber) and non-infantry tactics (i.e. cultural competency), 
ground combat remains the primary focus of military doctrine. A central component of 
the most recent National Security Strategy is to “defeat America’s enemies” through an 
“expanded force” (National Security Strategy, 2017). Indeed, military defeat is 
preferenced over restraint of force.  
 External civilian factors have also contributed to the military’s combat-focused 
culture. Politicians, in particular, have been instrumental in propping up the idea of the 
warrior-combatant has the ideal. This was best typified by Governor Mike Huckabee’s 
 
112 The Army and Marine Corps are the most severe adherents to this culture. However, in the Air Force it 
exists within the fighter community and in the Navy among the Special Warfare community. 
 
113 General James Amos, the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps was an F-4 and then later F/A-18 pilot   
 
 218 
response at 2016 Republican Primary debate when he asserted that, “the purpose of the 
military is to kill people and break things.”114  Such a comment wasn’t made in isolation. 
During the draw-down of forces in Iraq Congress pressure military leaders to return to 
combat training and prepare for “real war” now that the cultural missions were over 
(Brooks, 2017).  
 Internationally the United States has remained hawkish and emphasized the 
presence of its military around the world. For example, the United States invaded Iraq 
without UN approval, a move that then Secretary General Kofi Annan declared illegal, 
showing its willingness to defy international norms. Additionally, the United States 
maintains a sizable permanent military force around the world. From Germany to Japan, 
troops have a permanent residence across the globe. Even when not actively engaged in 
war, the United States military conducts regular large-scale military training exercises 
that showcase the combat capability of the its forces. 
Because of its size and status, the US military is able to maintain its focus on 
combat even when other countries are becoming more engaged with values. As a result, 
the cultural standard of the military has become that of the infantryman. Those that do not 
fit the mold have a hard time being successful in the military either culturally or 
professionally. As I will show in this chapter, the pervasiveness of the masculine combat-
focused culture contributes to the low level of integration of women into the United 
States military. The culture has resulted in practical obstacles for women that their claims 
have not been able to overcome. Moreover, the women that have been successful in the 
 
114 Transcript of the debate available at: https://www.nytimes.com/live/republican-debate-election-2016-
cleveland/huckabee-seems-to-hold-back-on-gay-and-transgender-issues/  
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United States military have largely done so by conforming to the traditional military 
culture. While they have been individual successes, they have done little to integrate 
women as a whole. Indeed, despite the inclusion of women, the military is still very much 
a man’s world in the United States.  
 
Era 1: The End of the Cold War 
Equality through a Masculine Enterprise? (1970-1992)  
Though discussions about and policies on women’s military service began nearly 
immediately following World War II, the possibility for beginning a process of 
integration emerged in the 1990s, with the opening of combat aircraft and sea service to 
women, and genuine discussions about the suitability of and possibility for women in 
combat roles. Though the early 1990s is the starting point for integration, it is important 
to note that many of the arguments on both sides of the debate about women’s military 
participation have their roots in the 1970s, in the debates over the ending of conscription 
and the adoption of a all-volunteer force. Most notably, the debate around women’s role 
in the professional military highlighted the degree to which both emotion and cultural 
ideal types played a central role in women’s service. Since the United States lacked an 
overarching equality or equal rights law, the military was not required to admit women. 
This allowed the perpetuation of beliefs about the masculine nature of service, and the 
resulting exclusion of women.  
Concurrently, the lack of structural support, including child care and consistent 
parental leave policies, resulted in many women leaving the service earlier than they 
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otherwise would have due to financial needs. The twin challenges of lack of combat 
service and early departure for family obligations resulted in a dearth of women in 
leadership positions where they could effectively make change.  
 
Structural Provisions 
 Though women have been participating in the military in the United States since 
the Revolutionary War, and the United States boasts a comparatively high percentage of 
women in the military currently, the legal status and enabling structures for women in the 
military are not very permissive. The United States, unlike France and Norway, does not 
have a comprehensive equal rights or equal status law. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
equal rights laws provided part of the baseline provisions for women to be allowed into 
all military specialties. Absent such wide-sweeping legislative requirements, policies 
were created specifically for and by the military and did not necessarily reflect larger 
trends in policies regarding women in public life.  





- Banned from ground combat roles, combat ships, and 
combat aircraft  
- Geographic restrictions on women’s service  
- Segregated training  
- Not included in the Selective Service  
Childcare / Parental 
Leave 
- Child care the responsibility of individual service 
members 
- Parental leave left up to individual services  




Table 6.2 highlights the structural and legal provisions for women in the United 
States military during the final years of the Cold War. There were many restrictions on 
women’s service. These restrictions were largely based on emotion and historical belief 
about gender roles and military culture rather than evidence on women’s capabilities or 
operational performance. Additionally, women bore the burden of individually making 
arrangements for most of the historical “women’s issues” such as child care and health 
services. The extra work contributed to low retention rate of women and difficulty for 
women in being able to change the military.  
 The legal provisions for women’s military service in the United States have 
historically been reflective of both the military’s culture and the belief in limited 
government intervention to ensure equality. Though strides were made for women’s 
professional service throughout the second half of the 20th Century, women were allowed 
in service positions only. The 1948 “Women’s Integration Act” allowed women to serve 
in the regular military rather than auxiliary corps.115 However, there was a cap both on 
the total number of women allowed to serve and the ranks they could achieve. Women 
could make up no more than 2% of the enlisted ranks, officer corps, or total force. 
Additionally, while enlisted were unrestricted in rank, officers could only achieve the 
rank of O-6. Women were also restricted in their benefits. Children and spouses of female 
service members were not considered dependents, and therefore not eligible for benefits 
 
115 Women’s Armed Services’ Integration Act P.L 625 
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such as health care or on-base housing. Enlisted women were discharged if they got 
pregnant.  
 Public Law 90-130, passed in 1967, lifted the 2% cap on women’s service and 
gave women unrestricted access to rank. It also provided limited benefits to the spouses 
and children of female service members.116 However, it did little to actually elevate the 
status of women in the United States military. Women were still trained separately and 
had different training requirements. Despite the lifting of restrictions on rank, women 
were still a segregated from and de facto subordinates to their male counterparts. As 
Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote notes:  
Women … were never referred to as soldiers … they were 
never trained to defend themselves or to defend their units. 
They were trained for administrative, personnel, medical, 
public relations work. They were not permanently detailed 
to any [operational] army unit; they were detailed only 
temporarily (As quoted in Katzenstein, 1998, p. 57) 
 
It was not until 1975 that women received any weapons training, and then it was limited 
to defensive tactics. These restrictions on women’s service reinforced the masculine 
nature of the military culture and prevented women from attaining leadership positions.  
 The 1970s and the advent of the all-voluntary force provided more structural 
opportunities for women. With the ending of conscription, manpower numbers 
necessitated an increasing the pool from which the military could draw. Though there 
were policy conversations and Congressional testimony as to the impact of the end on the 
 
116 Children of female service members were given health care under the law. However, in order for the 
male spouse of a female service member to receive healthcare, or for the female service member to qualify 
for base housing or an increased housing allowance she had to prove that her spouse was dependent on her 
for more than one-half of his financial support.  
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draft on the need to recruit more women into the armed services (Janowitz & Moskos, 
1979) there was no concrete laws passed as to what the status of women in the military 
would be. Rather, it was left up to the DoD, and often the individual services to 
implement their manpower plans for the all-volunteer force. Individual services launched 
recruiting drives to attract women into logistics and supply positions so that male 
volunteers could be concentrated into the infantry and other combat arms.  
 The policy changes that came in the 1970s and the professionalization of the 
armed services were an important part of women having the potential to choose the 
military as a career. In 1975 women began defensive weapons training in initial recruit 
and officer training, and in 1977 women began going through the same initial weapons 
training as men. In 1976 women were first admitted to the Service Academies, and by 
1977 administrative, logistics, and medical occupational specialty training schools were 
integrated. Such changes provided an opportunity for women to be seen as “soldiers” 
rather than women, and the possibility to obtain the experiences and qualifications (i.e. 
overseas service or ship-board service) necessary for promotion into leadership roles.  
 In 1978, Congress also amended the 1948 Act to allow women to serve on 
noncombat ships such as tenders, repair ships, and salvage and rescue ships. Assignment 
to such ships, however, was to be a “temporary duty.117 While women could serve on 
ships, they were still effectively banned from holding command positions or senior 
leadership roles at sea, an essential prerequisite for naval flag officers, due to the ban on 
permanent stationing.  
 





 While women have been a part of every war the United States has fought since 
the Revolution, both their operational participation and their formal status as service 
members or veterans has been limited. To understand how the claims about women’s 
service interacted with military culture to constrain integration, it is important to briefly 
discuss the functional participation of women in the United States military in final years 
of the Cold War. Until the last part of the 20th Century, women in the United States 
military were not only banned from combat, but also given differential training, Notably, 
women were not trained on how to use weapons, nor operate or survive in austere 
environments. The legal restrictions coupled with lack of training severely restricted 
women’s functional roles.  





- Approximately 8-10% of overall Force 
Type of 
Participation 
- Primarily Medical Logistics and Administrative  
- Banned from Combat Arms  
Overseas 
Participation 
- 1-5%  
   
 Records on women’s overseas participation began in the 1960s. Approximately 
7,000118 women served in Vietnam, with the vast majority as medical personnel (nurses) 
 
118 Because the Army still had a separate auxiliary corps, official DoD records are conflicting. There were 
nearly 6000 active duty nurses from the Army, Navy and Air Force in country, along with 60 female 
administrative Marines. Auxiliary corps histories range from 300-1500 women serving in Vietnam. 7000 is 
the most commonly agreed upon number in the historian literature.  
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and auxiliary corps administrative personnel (Stur, 2011). During the Vietnam War era, 
women made up less than 1% of professional the active duty force, with most women 
employed as contractors or on a limited auxiliary status (National Center for Veterans 
Analysis and Statistics). In the operational theaters, while women were not engaged 
directly in the fighting, they played a vital service to the war, despite serving in a highly 
gendered capacity. Women in the Vietnam War “straddled a line between girl next door, 
providing an image of home to wounded men, and a combat soldier, who came face to 
face with the fear and death that accompanied the war” (Stur, 2011, p. 106). The ability to 
continue to gender women’s Vietnam service, framing nursing and administrative work 
as inherently “women’s work,” allowed for women to continue to be sidelined in 
conversations about mainstream military service. While women had an important role, it 
was a woman’s role.  
  Further, restrictions of the number of the women in the service and their ability to 
obtain ranks necessary for leadership hindered their functional participation. Indeed, 
because of the restrictions on numbers, women were primarily utilized to fill 
administrative roles in the United States while men fought. Though the formal 
restrictions on women’s rank were dropped in 1967 with P.L. 90-130, women still often 
lacked the practical experiences necessary to achieve both rank and leadership roles. The 
lack of weapons training – even defensive – meant that women were only able to have 
command of units that served a purely administrative or medical function. Women who 
did attain leadership posts did so as commanders of garrison bases. Such commands 
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carried a de facto ceiling of the one-star rank, as combat service was seen as necessary to 
be promoted into more senior ranks (DACOWITS, 1980-2000).  
 The expansion of women’s roles in the military, and the introduction of weapons 
training for women in the late 1970s provided an opportunity for women’s expanded 
functional participation. The introduction of coed military occupational specialties, 
coupled with women’s training on small arms and crew served weapons began the 
transition from women being viewed as “women” to “soldier.” However, this transition 
period came at a time of relatively low international operations for the United States. 
Between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, the United States was not involved in any 
sustained conflict. During this period, combat-focused operations were limited in scope 
and personnel, with little need for support units. Therefore, given the international 
environment, women still only had opportunities to lead in garrison, continuing to limit 
their opportunities. The United States also did not have a large focus on peacekeeping 
missions in the 1980s, limiting some of the possibilities for women that were seen in 
other Western Countries.  
 Though women were afforded more opportunity as a result of the all-volunteer 
force, they were still largely viewed as unequal members of the military under the law. 
The first test of the potential for more equal policies came in 1979 with the reinstatement 
of the Selective Service after the military transitioned to the AVF. Despite the fact that 
the military had been struggling to retain enough men to fill the ranks in the case of a 
national emergency (Janowitz & Moskos, 1979), Congress did not believe that women 
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should be included in the Selective Service. In its official statement on the formation of 
the Selective Service, the Senate Armed Service Committee Stated:  
The committee feels strongly that it is not in the best interest 
of our national defense to register women for the Military 
Selective Service Act, which would provide needed military 
personnel upon mobilization or in the event of a peacetime 
draft for the armed forces. (Senate, Committee on Armed 
Services, June 19, 1979) 
 
The arguments on both sides of the debate around women’s inclusion in the Selective 
Service will be discussed below. However, it is important to note the rationale behind the 
Senate’s ultimate reasoning when discussing structural and legal provisions. The 
Selective Service was envisioned to be the infantry reserve manpower that would be 
mobilized in case of a total war. Because women were banned from ground combat units, 
it was reasoned that they should be excluded from the Selective Service as well (Stiehm, 
1989).  This rational perpetuates the culture of the masculine warrior and that the military 
is solely comprised of foot soldiers. As will later be shown, women’s exclusion from the 
Selective Service was also used as an argument against their full integration into the all 
military specialties.   
 The Gulf War, from August 1990 – February 1991, was the first opportunity for 
women to fully participate in the United States military as regular members in an 
operational capacity.119 Over 35,000 active duty service women participated in the Gulf 
War (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2011; United States Department of Defense, 
1992). An ABC news report called the Gulf War a “watershed” moment for women in the 
 
119 Though women were still banned form combat service, it was the first major international operation 
during which there was no longer an auxiliary corps and women were regular members of military units.   
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military and the United States more generally (Herf & Jacinto, 2003). Unlike Vietnam, 
women found themselves in the thick of battle rather than being relegated to rear-echelon 
or headquarters bases. While still barred form ground combat roles, women served as 
truck drivers, logisticians, supply officers, military police, and transport pilots, in addition 
to the more traditionally gendered medical and administrative roles. With the increased 
participation of women also came war’s consequences. Fifteen women were killed in the 
Gulf War, and three, Rhonda Cornum, Crystal Rickett, and Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, taken 
prisoner of war (United States Department of Defense, 1992). The presence of women on 
the battle field, coupled with the unprecedented media coverage of the Gulf War put 
women in the military front and center.     
  Despite their participation in the Gulf War, women in the military faced both 
cultural and practical barriers to service that led to their departure at higher rates than 
men. Culturally, they were confronted by (male) senior leaders that did not see them as 
future leaders. Women often did not have access to the mentorship or encouragement that 
their male counterparts did with regards to their career progression. They were frequently 
ignored, or even discouraged from pursuing service after their initial commitment. At an 
Armed Services Committee Hearing, Dr. Edwin Dorn, a senior staff member at the 
Brookings Institution and specialist in military and personnel issues, asserted “I was 
struck by the complete failure of senior officers to assert leadership during a seminar,120 
when a young woman asked a serious question about her career opportunities as a Navy 
 
120 The Seminar being referenced was a “flag panel,” an open forum where flag officers answered questions 
from mid-level officers.   
 229 
flier and was greeted with derision” (United States House of Representatives, Armed 
Services Committee, July 29-30, 1992).  
   
Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture   
 To discuss the claims about women’s service in the United States military, it is 
important to look both at the claims for women’s participation in the military and the 
claims against it. The claims for and against came from both inside and outside the 
military. Further, women were leaders on both sides of the argument. The tensions over 
women’s military service reflects the women’s movement in the United States lack of 
unified belief about the role of women in public life and the difference between men and 
women, as seen in arguments for individual women’s right to serve in the military often 
being in tension with claims about the role of the military or military culture.    
 The claims for women’s increased participation in the military largely took the 
form of feminist interest-group activism, with individual women coming together to 
“demand the right to job assignments based on competence, not gender … and the right 
to be treated with the same respect as the men next to whom they work” (Katzenstein, 
1998, pp. 46-47). In the case of women in the military, the “interest” being pursued was 
individual access to jobs or careers. For those that were vocal about women’s increased 
participation, it was not to further the equality of women more generally or to enhance 
women’s political rights, but to ensure that each individual was able to able to achieve 
her own desires based on her own competencies.  
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 The role of formal women’s groups in lobbying for women’s increased 
participation was limited, and often surprising. Second wave feminist women’s 
movements in the United States were largely anti-war, and saw “peace as a feminist 
issue.”121 However, despite the general anti-war sentiment, NOW became an unlikely yet 
important ally to those seeking greater opportunities for women in the military. NOW’s 
1980 position paper on the “Registration and Drafting of Women” is emblematic of the 
duality of impact that the women’s movement in the United States had. On the one hand, 
the position paper argued for a shrinking of the military and an abolition of the selective 
service all together in order to diminish the “war atmosphere” in the United States and by 
extension the world more broadly. However, NOW is realistic in acknowledging that the 
military is not going to disappear, nor are the militaristic aspects of government.  
 In the name of equality, NOW therefor argues both for the inclusion of women in 
the Selective Service and expanded opportunities for women in the active duty military 
forces. NOW’s logic rests on two primary aspects. First, it focuses on the operational 
impact and necessity of women in the military. Women “will have to fight,” the position 
asserts, “because the military has difficulty attracting sufficient numbers [of men] who 
are educated and technically trainable.” As 50% of available pool of the youth workforce, 
women were argued to be necessary to fill the ranks. NOW’s argument doesn’t end with 
numbers. Women were argued to be better, for both the military and the country. Though 
overall opposed to war, the position paper recognized that if a war was to be fought, a 
 
121 This mantra would continued to be used into the 21st Century with protests against the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan led by members of NOW.  
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force that was the most competent and most able to handle the changing technological 
landscape of war would be necessary. As women were proving themselves in university 
and the workforce, the argument was made that they were better suited for the ever-
evolving technological capabilities of the military. Yet the position paper also asserts that 
including women is the only way to work towards a society “free from war.” If war is to 
be stopped in a democracy, the whole of society has to be responsible for fighting it. By 
including women, they would be sure to vote against going to war.   
 Also pronounced throughout the position paper is the idea that gender-based 
discrimination in the military has an overall negative professional impact on women. The 
ultimate result of restrictions placed on women, NOW argued is that “women are given 
fewer training, educational, and advancement opportunities in the largest single 
vocational training institution in our country.” The crux of the argument was not about 
war and fighting, but about affording the opportunity for women to advance within the 
military as a career, as well as receive equal opportunities for post-military employment 
in the civilian world.  
 These claims based on occupation and economics had more staying power, and 
resonated more closely with members of the military than those based purely on women’s 
rights or equality. Indeed, individual women in the military were more concerned with 
their professional prospects than the strategic goals of the nation. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
women’s claims to service were less about their operational accomplishments and more 
about their access to the professional aspects of the military. As one enlisted Air Force 
mechanic put it, “there were no women on the flight line, and you can’t get to be a tech or 
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master [sergeant] without leadership time on the flight line … so I knew it wasn’t going 
to be a career for me” (Stiehm, 1989, p. 261).   
 Absent an overarching equal rights framework, those making claims for increased 
women’s participation relied on the experiences and stories of individual women. For 
example, individual female military aviators were crucial in gaining support for the 
language in the National Defense Authorization Act that lifted restrictions on women’s 
combat flight service (Gellman, 1991). In 1991, nearly a dozen female pilots flew into 
Washington, DC to share their personal experiences with members of Congress on the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committee.  While Air Force General McPeak 
publically voiced his opposition to women’s service based on his beliefs about women, 
female aviators were there to give their first-hand accounts of being able to “pull-Gs” 
(physically endure the gravitational force of rapid acceleration and aircraft maneuvering), 
conduct bombing missions, and endure the possibility of having to survive behind enemy 
lines or as a prisoner of war (U.S. Senate, June 19, 1991).  
 In addition to discussing their personal capabilities, women focused on their 
inability to be professionally competitive with their male counterparts because of the 
legal restrictions on their service. For examples, experiences and claims by women that 
did not choose flying careers in the Air Force were as important as those that did in this 
respect. For example, Heather Wilson,122 one of the first women to graduate from the Air 
Force Academy, twice turned down appointments to flight school, despite her lifelong 
love of aviation (she had learned to fly before she learned to drive). Upon being asked 
 
122 Wilson was appointed Secretary of the Airforce in May 2017, and has been a vocal supporter of 
women’s increased combat participation (DACOWITS, 2018).  
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why, she responded I didn't want to be kind of driving a bus from Dover, Delaware to 
Frankfurt, Germany … The Air Force is about combat, you can't get around that … If 
you want to command, you really need that experience. Do you want to join a law firm 
when you know you'll never be a partner?" (As quoted in Gellman, 1991).  Wilson left 
the Air Force as a Captian in 1989, citing her belief that she could do more good for the 
country out of uniform than in, due to the de facto limitations on women’s leadership 
(DACOWITS, 2017). As restrictions have been dropped from women’s service, they 
have been hailed as a win for women’s professional possibilities.  
  While organizations such as NOW and individual service women were 
supporters of women’s increased opportunities in the military, not all women felt that 
increasing women’s role would be beneficial for either the military or women. Both from 
within and without the military there was a move to discredit those advocating for 
military integration as “radical feminists” who do not have the “interests nor realities of 
women in the military or military operations in general” at heart (Miller, 1998). The 
tensions between feminists, largely self-identifying as liberal, and military leaders, 
largely identifying as conservative played out in this debate.  
From outside the military, Phyllis Schlafly, founder of the Eagle Forum, and 
Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness, personified what was 
dubbed the “antifeminist” movement.  As noted in Chapter 2, the antifeminist movement 
was largely a backlash to the possible ratification of the Equal Rights amendment. It 
focused on self-professed “family values,” and argued that a women’s role was that of a 
domestic nurturer. Women’s increased military service, especially in positions that could 
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result in combat service, was antithetical to their professed values. In a 1991 report for 
the Heritage Foundation, Phyllis Schlafly asserted that  
The combat exclusion laws are a rational legislative 
recognition of fundamental differences between men and 
women … Fighting wars is a mission that requires tough, 
tenacious and courageous men to endure the most primitive 
and uncivilized situations and pain in order to survive, plus 
determination to kill enemies who are just as tough, 
tenacious and courageous, and probably vicious and sadistic, 
too. Men are attracted to serve in the military because of its 
intensely masculine character. The qualities that make them 
good soldiers - aggressiveness, risk taking, and enjoyment of 
body-contact competition - are conspicuously absent in 
women. Pretending that women can perform equally with 
men in tasks that require those attributes is not only 
dishonest; it corrupts the system. (Schlafly, 1991, p. 6) 
 
Schlafly’s arguments were reflective of the masculine combat-focused culture of the 
United States military. The arguments against women’s participation were based largely 
on emotion rather than the experiences of women in the military or systematic 
operational studies. They drew on the belief that men would be unable to perform their 
duties in the presence of women, and that for society to function properly women must be 
protected from war (MacKenzie, 2015).  
 The need to protect women, not only from war, but from what was deemed the 
“reality” of being in the military was used as an argument against women’s increased 
participation. Elaine Donnelley, then a member of the Presidential Commission on the 
Assignment of Women in the Armed Services deemed sexual assault an “occupational 
hazard” that women in the military would inevitably be exposed to not only at the hands 
of the enemy but by their fellow service members (As quoted in Washington Post, June 




 While the policy changes of the 1970s and the all-volunteer force provided more 
opportunities for women in the military, structural enabling conditions made the reality of 
service difficult. For example, women were discharged from service when they became 
pregnant, and single mothers were not allowed to enlist. To address these issues, women 
often took legal action against the Department of Defense or particular service. For 
example, Stephanie Crawford, a 21-year old single woman was discharged from the 
United States Marine Corps upon becoming pregnant. Further, she was denied 
reenlistment, even when she presented evidence to a recruiter that she had secured child 
care to cover any potential duty requirements. For both the discharge and the denial of 
reenlistment she sued Commandant Robert Cushman, claiming that the decision to 
discharge her was made solely on the basis of gender. The court in Crawford v. Cushman 
(1974) found that discharging women upon the discovery of a pregnancy was a violation 
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, yet upheld the services’ right to consider 
pregnancy on a “case by case” basis.123  As a result, women could not be discharged 
merely for being pregnant, but if commanders deemed that motherhood interfered with 
operational requirements, women could be separated. Because neither Congress nor the 
Department was willing to engage with motherhood, it was left up to the courts.   
 




 Benefits for dependents were also decided in the courts. In Frontiero v. 
Richardson (1973) it was decided that benefits could not be differentially given to service 
members based on sex.124 Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the Air Force, sued the 
Department of Defense over the provision that she to prove that her husband was 
dependent on her for more than one-half of his financial support. Notably, the case had to 
reach the Supreme Court before Lieutenant Frontiero was granted benefits for her spouse. 
Lower courts ruled that the provision was “reasonable” because men were frequently the 
breadwinners, and women claiming support could result in frivolous expenses for the 
government (Stiehm, 1989). However, the Supreme Court found that the provision 
violated the due process clause, and made an arbitrary distinction between men and 
women.  
 These course cases are representative of the legal action that service women had 
to take to either receive the same benefits as their male counterparts or overcome gender-
based discrimination (Stiehm, 1989). Many of the individual services’ provisions were 
written by male senior officers and constructed in line with the conservative values that 
military leadership has historically espoused (Janowitz, 1988). Without overarching legal 
protection for gender equality, women had to make individual claims and hope to gain 
structural provisions in a piecemeal manner.   
The final years of the Cold War saw two major policy changes initiated from the 
top-down (rather than through bottom-up pressure). First is the codification of restrictions 
 




on women’s occupational assignments. In 1988 the Department of Defense adopted a 
universal policy on women’s occupational assignments. Deemed the “Risk Rule,” it 
revised the standard to be used when determining women’s military service. Rather than 
universally barring women from permanent assignment to ships or combat units, it 
“excluded women from units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile 
fire, or capture were equal to or greater than the risks in the combat units they support” 
(Burrelli, 2013). This rule allowed women to be permanently assigned to support 
(noncombat) units and ships so long as that unit was not under reasonable risk of 
engaging in direct combat. While the rule opened nearly half of all occupational 
specialties to women (U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1988), it was also 
subjective, leaving it up to the services to determine what constituted “direct combat” and 
“risk.” Decisions on where to assign women were left up to the male commanders who 
often defaulted to conservative definitions of risk, choosing to keep women non-
deployable units as much as possible. While this rule increased the professional 
opportunity for women in the military, the subjectivity of assignment policies would 
ultimately hinder women’s functional participation. The impact of these restrictions will 
be discussed in more detail below.  
Second is the dropping of some restrictions on women’s ship and aircraft service. 
After the fallout from the Navy’s Tailhook scandal (Boyer, 1996) and the reality faced by 
women in the Gulf War (Nantais & Lee, 1999), there was a renewed push to evaluate and 
expand the formal roles open to women in the military. The National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 1992-1993 addressed this by repealing the statutory prohibition 
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on women’s assignment to combat aircraft and Naval vessels. It also allowed for women 
to be permanently assigned to sea-duty, increasing the potential for promotion and 
command opportunities. The act also established a Presidential Commission on the 
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to study the impact of increased 
opportunities for women and offer advice and guidance as to whether any more wide-
sweeping policy changes should be enacted. 
On November 15, 1992, the Commission issues its report (Presidential 
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, November 15, 1992). 
Among the Commission’s many recommendations are the following:  
- Military readiness should be the driving concern 
regarding assignment policies; there are circumstances 
under which women might be assigned to combat 
positions.  
- The sense of the Commission is that women should be 
excluded from direct land combat units and positions. 
Furthermore, the Commission recommends that the 
existing service policies concerning direct land combat 
exclusion be codified. Service Secretaries shall 
recommend to the Congress which units and positions 
should fall under the land combat exclusions.  
- Retain the DOD Risk Rule as currently implemented. 
Navy policies which implement the Risk Rule should be 
modified to reflect the changes made in the NDAA for 
FY 1992-1993.  
 
It is notable that the Commission used “combat positions” in their recommendations 
concerning where women would be necessary, but “direct land combat” for their 
recommendations on exclusion. This continued the belief that women were unsuited for 
ground combat and the protectionism spirit of the laws related to women in the military. 
Indeed, the recommendations of the committee echoed those of many military general 
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officers at the time.125 Notably there was little objective research on the suitably for 
women for or their impact on combat units (Harrell & Miller, 1997). Decisions were 
made more on emotion and upholding the traditional military status quo.  
 While there were increased opportunities for women that emerged in the later 
years of the Cold War, women were not able to effectively impact the military. Women’s 
increased participation was predicated on women adhering to male standards and 
masculine culture. For women to succeed, they had to adhere to military culture. The 
structure of the military did little to accommodate women or leverage their unique 
characteristics.  
 
Era 2: The Post-Cold War World 
Proving Women’s Success   
 In the post-Cold War World, the United States military shifted its focus from 
balancing the Soviet Union to grappling with more complex and multi-dimensional 
definitions of security (Buzan, 2008). The military began to shift its focus from large-
scale war towards “military operations other than war” and “security and stability 
operations” (Moskos, 2000, p. 17). However, despite this shift in mission, the military 
remained focused on combat readiness, and continued to preference conventional military 
operations and forces.  
 
125 For example, in a 1991 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Senator William Cohen (Maine) 
asked air force General Merrill McPeak  whether or not he would permit a “woman pilot of superior 
intelligence, great physical conditioning, in every way superior to a male counterpart vying for the same 
squadron position” to fly in combat missions. General McPeak answered “No, I would not. I admit it 
doesn’t make much sense, but that’s the way I feel about it.”  
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 Additionally, in the post-Cold War era, women were able to take advantage of 
newly opened positions on ships and in aircraft. However, the continued to face 
opposition both from within and without the military. Even with women’s continued 
success in the military, the United States was one of the last countries to formally allow 
women access to all military occupational specialties and operational environments. The 
individual success of women did little to help “women” more broadly gain access to the 
military. Women were still largely expected to achieve success on their own, and the 




At the end of the Cold War, women had access to previously closed positions on 
ships and in the air. However, despite these de jure allowances, there remained many de 
facto restrictions to their service.  
Table 6.4: Summary of Structural Provisions during the Second Era of Women’s 




- Banned from ground combat roles 
- Allowed in combat ships and aircraft   
- Geographic restrictions on women’s service  
- Segregated training  
- Not included in the Selective Service  
Childcare / Parental 
Leave 
- Creation of on-base child care facilities, but not 
guaranteed access 
- Parental leave left up to individual services  




 Table 6.4 highlights the structural conditions at the end of the Cold War. While 
gains were made that allowed women to formally participate in the military, much of the 
enabling structure was left up to the individual women. Many of legal changes made at 
this time were a response both to the recommendation of the Commission on the 
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, and needs of the services in the post-Cold 
War era. 
In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, then Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspen issued a memorandum clarifying definitions in the Risk Rule and 
offering guidance to Service Secretaries with regards to the assignment of women (Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, January 13, 1994). The memo stated that effective October 1, 
1994 “Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are 
qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the 
brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.” Direct 
Combat was further defined as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or 
crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fires and to a high probability of 
direct physical contact with the hostile forces personnel. Direct ground combat takes 
place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat 
them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.” Secretary Aspen further asserted that the 
services could impose additional restrictions on women’s assignments when:  
- The cost of appropriate berthing and privacy 
arrangements being prohibitive; 
- Units and positions doctrinally required to physically 
collocate and remain with direct combat units that are 
closed to women;  
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- Units are engaged in long range reconnaissance 
operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and  
- Job related physical requirements would necessarily 
exclude the vast majority of women Service members. 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 13, 1994) 
 
While these provisions did open more positions to women, they continued to allow for 
subjectivity in the actual assignments of women.  
 In addition to changes in what women were allowed to do in the military in the 
1990s, there were also changes in structural provisions. H.R. 1277, passed as part of the 
FY 1990 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to use 
Department of Defense Funds for the “operation and maintenance of military child care 
facilities.”126 The passage of the law was largely in response to concerns about both the 
unique demands on military life and the affordability of child care for lower-paid enlisted 
personnel. Unlike Norway and France, the United States did not have a national childcare 
scheme, and parents were this left with the burden of both finding and paying for child 
care that would cover the hours required of military work. While the act expanded the 
network on on-base Child Development Centers (CDC) and created a payment scheme 
based on rank and family income, it did not guarantee that childcare would be available 
for all service members. Both availability127 and accessibility128 have often made utilizing 
 
126 This is included in the post-Cold War era as it was not to be implemented until 1993 
 
127 Waitlists for care are upwards of 3 years in the larger duty-station areas (DACOWITS, 2017)  
 
128 Service members are put on a waitlist for any CDC within 30 miles of their duty station, given 
infrastructure constraints this can add 2-3 hours of commute time, often resulting in parents exceeding their 
maximum daily allowance for child care (DACOWITS 2018)  
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the facilities impractical for service members. While there were changes made to account 
for child care, parental leave was up to the individual services.129   
 Concerning sexual assault and harassment, it was largely left to commands to 
handle allegations of misconduct or abuse on a case by case basis under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. It was argued that the mission of the military was such that 
civilian interference in issues of good order and discipline would harm the unit cohesion 
necessary to win the nations wars (Stiehm, 1989; Stimson, 2013). It was not until 2004 
that then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld created the Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Response Office (SAPRO). Yet even with the creation of SAPRO, commanders 
maintained jurisdiction over adjudicating accusations. SAPRO’s purpose was the track 
incidence and create sensitivity and awareness training, not to prosecute or provide legal 
assistance for victims.  
 Keeping prosecution of sexual assault and harassment in the hands of 
commanders has been the subject of much criticism. It has been argued that the 
relationship between commanding officers and their troops is such that victims will not 
report incidents that happen within the unit. Further, the inherent bias that exists towards 
men in the military prejudices commanders. As CEO of Protect Our Defenders asserts, 
leaving sexual assault prosecution up to unit commanders results in “standalone systems 
that create friction, broken processes, and victims who do not receive justice” (Jensen, 
2018). This has largely undermined the contributions that women have made to the 
military, and prevented meaningful change (DACOWITS, 2017).  
 




The functional participation of women in the United States military follows 
closely from women’s participation in the Gulf War. Occurring immediately before the 
end of the Cold War, the increased visibility of military women on the global stage paved 
the way for women’s increased participation in both domestic and international 
operations. However, despite increased participation, the United States military had a 
retention problem with regards to women’s service. Women were more likely than their 
male counterparts to leave the service after each cycle of enlistment.  





- Approximately 10-12% of overall Force 
Type of 
Participation 
- Primarily Medical Logistics and Administrative  
- Increase in aviation and surface navy  
- Banned from Combat Arms and submarine service  
Overseas 
Participation 
- 5-6%  
   
 Table 6.5 highlights the functional participation of women. Most notably during 
this period the security environment necessitated a change in function of individuals in 
the military, and women were often called to do things that were outside of the purview 
of the MOS for which they were trained, and often skirted the laws about women’s 
combat participation. The reality of women’s functional participation was thus more a 
reaction to external forces than an intentionally designed military force and highlighted 
the struggle that women in the United States faced with regards to integration.   
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The visible and ubiquitous coverage of women’s role in the Gulf War had an 
impact on their military participation. Women’s experiences in the Gulf War were used 
as claims for increasing women’s roles in the military. With women accounting for 
fifteen of the war’s casualties, it was hard to claim that women were not fighting or had 
been free from harm’s way. As Pat Schroeder, Representative from Colorado and 
member of the House Armed Services Committee asserted during a subcommittee 
hearing on the ground combat ban, “Women have proved themselves in the worst 
environment and dispelled the myth in this country that they wouldn’t be able to handle 
it” (United States House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, July 29-30, 
1992). Given the experiences of women in the Gulf War, it was difficult to continue the 
assertion that women were not suited for combat service. Additionally, having already 
braved bullets, it was further difficult to claim that women needed to be protected from 
war.  
 However, not all of women’s experiences were positive or praiseworthy. Female 
POWs recalled stories of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of their Iraqi captors 
(Nantais & Lee, 1999; Sciolino, 1992). A 1995 Department of Defense survey found that 
more than half of the women in the military reported experiencing some form of sexual 
harassment, with the percentage significantly higher for those that had deployed to the 
Gulf War. This rate was nearly twice the rate of civilian women (Firestone & Harris, 
1999; Bastian, Lancaster, Reyst, & E., 1996). Most of the women reporting harassment or 
abuse claimed that it was perpetrated by men in their own units. The prevalence of 
harassment between service members, coupled with the 1992 Tailhook Scandal 
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(Zimmerman, 1995) raised questions not about women’s physical or tactical competency, 
but about whether women were socially and culturally suited for war.  
 Largely because of the negative coverage of women’s service, in the years 
between the Gulf War and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, 
women again were primarily relegated to garrison service and leadership roles. With the 
combat exclusion and Risk Rule still in place, women experienced a de facto ban from 
reaching most of the highest ranks in the military. However, one place where women did 
make sufficient inroads in the mid-1990s was in the aviation communities. With the ban 
on combat aircraft lifted women had access to fighter and attack communities, as well as 
aircraft carrier service, necessary requirements for promotion to flag officer.130 The air 
force was the one service that did not experience negative retention rates in the 1990s, 
and has historically had the highest percentage of women service members.  
Despite the limitations on women’s service, the number of women in the United 
States government continued to grow. However, the percentages of women give only a 
snapshot of women’s service. Women spent less time in the military than their male 
counterparts and have historically been under-represented at senior ranks and in 
leadership positions. Though by the mid-2000s women comprised nearly 14% of the 
commissioned officer corps, they were less than 7% of senior officers. For the years that 
data on women’s rank and retention has been reported131 there is a -15% retention rate 
 
130 It is notable that the Navy and the Air Force have had the most senior leaders. In those services there is a 
clear path to flag officer for aviators, while the Army and Marine Corps largely require infantry service for 
their most senior leaders.  
 
131 The DoD does not report data yearly. Data points come from the years that NATO has requested it as 
part of their committee on gender perspectives or when specifically requested by DACOWITS. 
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overall between men and women (NATO 2016). In general, the retention rate is worse 
among enlisted service members than officers. Indeed, at every point in their career, 
women are more likely than men to leave the service (DACOWITS 2017).  
 
Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture   
In the years following the Cold War, women’s service remained in tension with 
military culture. Scandals such as Tail Hook were used as evidence that women didn’t 
belog in previously all-male units. The small number of women in these roles also 
allowed for dismissive tokenism. After combat aviation units were open to women, there 
were very few women that chose to fly these aircraft. From 1994-2001, there averaged 
less than one female aviator per combat unit. The small number of women made it 
possible to dismiss their success as being exception and out of the norm. Women that 
were successful recall being told that they were “not like other women,” or “really one of 
the guys.”132  
Individual women that were successful in the military further encouraged younger 
service women to adopt male characteristics in order to be successful. As Kate Germano, 
former commanding officer of the Recruit Training Batallion responsible for training 
female Marines recounts, “my goal was to make the place training women no different 
than any other place in the Marine Corps, and therefore female Marines no different than 
any other Marines” (Germano & Kennedy, 2018, p. 81). From the first days of training, 
women were told to be successful they were to act like men. This reinforced the 
 
132 Remarks by Amy McGrath, 2016  
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masculine culture of the military and made it difficult for women to make inraods to 
increased integration.  
The masculine culture of the military strengthened physical arguments against 
women’s service. Arguments were made that women were not “tough enough” to meet 
the physical demands of ground combat, or would “run away” if faced with the reality of 
having to kill the enemy (TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015). Further, the differential 
physical fitness standards for men and women were frequently used to argue that if 
women were to participate in ground combat units the standards would be lower, and 
they would therefore put their fellow infantrymen at risk (MacKenzie, 2015).  
 During the 1990s, claims against women’s service perpetuated because there was 
little operational evidence of women’s success. With the restrictions on women’s 
participation, assertions that women would be ineffective in combat situations went 
largely untested. It was believed that admitting women to combat positions would 
weaken the military as a whole (Bell, 2013). The Gulf War forced the conversation about 
both the changing nature of warfare and the reality faced by women in the military. Given 
the media coverage of the event, the American people were confronted with the reality 
that women in the military served an operational capacities. However, the momentum of 
women in the Gulf War was short lived. While the service of women was seen as 
exceptional, it was a “flash in the pan.” In the post-war years, and it was expected that 
women would return to “normal” support and administrative roles when they returend 




In the 1990s, attempts for women to claim increased participation had largely 
stalled. The military downsized in the post-Cold War World, and the women were not 
seen as necessary to fill the ranks. And while women were participating in previsouly 
closed occupational specialities, promotion and leadership roles remained largely closed 
due to perceptions of women’s service. In an interview on NPR, Major General Heidi 
Brown asserted that “gender shuts the door for me.”133 Despite commanding an Air 
Defense Artillery Brigade during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, MGen Brown viewed her 
gender as her biggest stumbling block. Throughout the interview she recognized how 
women were often “left behind” by military leadership due to the restrictions placed on 
them.  
 The cost of childcare and the demands of family life also caused women to leave 
the service at a higher rate than men (DACOWITS, 2018). Proposals to increase child 
care provisions were constantly met with resistance, forcing service members to often 
choose between a military career or family life. Of the women that have attained the rank 
of 3 or 4 star in the United States military, most have not had children.134 Family life is 
seen as largely incompatible with a military career, and often women feel that they are 
rewarded for foregoing “traditional” family lives (Rollins, 2011).  
 Military strategy and doctrine is further reflective of women having little impact 
on the military. The 2000 National Security Strategy focused on technological 
 
133 Rachel Martin, A Lonely Club for Women in Top Army Jobs, National Pubic Radio (February 25, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/25/134025084/a-lonely-club-for-women-in-top-army-jobs. 
 
134 Remarks from Lieutenant General Fran Wilson, Seas Service Women’s Leadership Symposium 2016  
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advancements and their ability to contribute to hard power projection against potential 
threats (House, 1999). While other Western countries were transitioning to focus on the 
human dimension of conflict, the United States remained focused on traditional military 
power and technologies. While individual women may have had the ability to succeed, 
women, in general, were still largely hindered from having a meaningful impact.  
 
Era 3: Post-9/11 
Finally an Opening for Integration?  
The post-9/11 era, and the United States’ involvement in the Global War on 
Terror (primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan) provided the testing ground for the impact that 
women are able to have on the military. The level of troop commitment and the 
frequency of deployments meant that over 85% of women in the armed services 
participated in a combat deployment between 2001-2009 (DACOWITS, 2010). Women 
now had experience to base their claims not only on acccess to a career but on operational 
outcomes. Indeed, (male) commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan noted the need for women 
if they were to be successful in both tactical and strategic outcomes (King, 2014; 
Lemmon, 2015).  
 As noted in the opening of this chapter, women in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
engaged in what essentially was ground combat despite the legal prohibition against it. 
As a result, women’s claims evolved from demanding equal access to a career, to 
demanding formal and legal access to the occupational specialities in which they were 
already de facto participating. Yet depite women’s active (and often public) participation 
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in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there remained open opposition to 
formalizing women’s participation in ground combat operations.  
 Even in the mist of operational evidence, requirements for military participation 
were a large part of claims against formalizing women’s participation in combat roles. 
Though women had proven necessary, and even successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, they 
weren’t infantry soldiers, and had not been through formal infantry training. The 
physicality of gound combat and the infantry military occupational speciality in particular 
was frequently discussed in addressing the suitability for women’s service. Fears about 
“lowering standards” so that women could participate was a concern voiced by both 
military leaders and civilians opposed to increased women’s participation (Schogol, 
2017).  Evidence used to back up these claims was based on the average physiology of 
men and women rather tha the actual performance of women in ground combat training. 
The reliance on averages135 was necessary because for most of the time that women’s 
service was argued in the public arena, women had not had the opportunity to attempt to 
meet the requirements of ground combat service.  
 Rebuttles to the claims against women’s physical capabilities were largely 
consistent with the individualistic nature through which women have historically faught 
for equality. While it was generally accepted that the average woman was less physically 
capable than the average man, arguments were made that the military was not focused on 
recruiting “average” citizens, but dedicated to finding the best (Schaefer, et al., 2015). 
Further, proponents of more formal inclusion for women argued that gender should not 
 
135 Often general averages among the American population, not averages of men and women in the military 
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be an arbitrary barrier for women, and that qualification should be based on individual 
competency.   
 Despite the role that women played in Iraq and Afghanistan, claims about their 
participation still largely were in conflict with military culture and the belief about the 
role of the military. In Afghanistan, women were called back from their missions when 
members of congress became concerned about their safety and the implications of women 
“being at the point of the spear” in combat operations (Bumiller, 2010). As a result, the 
women were severely restricted in what they were allowed to do operationaly, causing 
many of them to leave the unit. As one female Corporal noted, “I’m too much of a girl to 
make a difference” (Bumiller, 2010).  The feelings of helplessness of female 
servicemebers was reinforced through assertions that their presence was antithetical to 
the military’s “nearly spiritual glue” that enabled men to be successful in war (Newbold, 
2015 ). 
Yet even in this contentious environment, on December 3, 2015 then Secretary of 
Defense Ash Carter announced that all military occupational specialties would be open to 
women. His rational stated that opening these positions would allow the services to 
“harness the skills and perspectives that talented women have to offer” (Pellerin, 2015). 
Yet despite the opening of positions, the skills and perspectives of women have yet to be 
made a priority.  
 It is notable that the decision to open all occupations to women was met with 
fierce resistance both internally and externally to the military. Unlike France and 
Norway, where women’s military participation was accepted as part of larger measures 
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on equality, in the United States, the military was seen as different and distinct; not the 
place to hold “social experiments.” In response to women’s increased participation in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, lawmakers worked throughout the 2000s to reaffirm and strengthen 
the “Risk Rule,” and ensure that no women were facing the potential of engaging with the 
enemy on the ground (Tyson, 2005).  
 The tension around women’s participation in previously closed ground combat 
has created an environment in which even with the opportunities to participate in the 
occupations and mission sets often required for leadership, women are unable to affect 
meaningful change. Much of this is a result of the way that the military has implemented 
the new policies. Women who have qualified for infantry or other combat arms are 
concentrated in one or two units, and are barred from operational participation until a 
“sufficient number” of women have qualified (DACOWITS, 2017). This also creates the 
perception of a few special “female centric” units in which standards are lower and 
they’re not really preparing for combat.136 As s senior enlisted male noted, “Integration is 
more about moving women around to look good, not actually make better warfighters.” 
 Despite both the experience of women in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the changes 
in laws that have opened positions to women, emotion and opinion have dominated the 
attempted integration process. Indeed, the externally combat focused culture has allowed 
argument that women are a “distraction,” or antithetical to combat readiness to perpetuate 
(MacKenzie, 2015). Such an environment has continued to isolate women, rather than 
leverage their skills and perspective. A 2016 internal DoD survey found that nearly 70% 
 
136 Fort Hood, Texas focus group with first integrated unit.  
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of women did not feel that their perspectives were valid when it came to either day-to-
day operations or tactical missions (Fairley, 2017).  Indeed, despite continued increased 
participation, women are still largely unable to make the change indicative of integration.   
Women continue to express that they feel rewarded for acting like their male 
counterparts and conforming to a culture that “accepts that boys will be boys and that’s 
how you fight.”137 The culture of masculinity has indeed persisted, keeping women on 
the outside unless they are willing to conform.  
  
 





 In July 2016, civilian and military leaders from all NATO countries gathered in 
Warsaw, Poland to lay out its future security vision. It addressed issues ranging from 
cyber security to increased Russian militarism and aggression to how to address the self-
proclaimed Islamic State. While each country brought its own specific geographic 
concerns, and political and military solutions to the table, there was one overarching 
consistency among participants: the importance of women to the future of both NATO 
and global security. In the official Communique from the Warsaw Summit, leaders of 
NATO nations professed:138  
Empowerment of women at NATO and in our militaries 
makes our Alliance stronger. We attach great importance to 
ensuring women's full and active participation in the 
prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well 
as in post-conflict efforts and cooperation. Since our last 
Summit in Wales, we have made good progress in 
implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS) and related resolutions. Yet, more work is to be done, 
which requires enduring leadership, transparency, and 
accountability. We welcome recent high-level appointments 
in both NATO's civilian and military structures. However, 
there are still shortfalls in the representation of women at 
NATO that need to be addressed. … Our Strategic 
Commands are now operationalizing the approved Military 
Guidelines on the Prevention of and Response to Conflict-
 
138 Speeches Archived at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm  
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Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. … Our ongoing 
efforts and commitment to integrate gender perspectives into 
Alliance activities throughout NATO's three core tasks will 
contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive Alliance. 
 
Women’s participation, but more importantly their perspectives, was recognized to as 
essential not just for women’s issues, but for global security as a whole. However, the 
member states do not have a unified or consistent history with women’s integration, nor 
do they operationalize it in the same way. While several member states have National 
Action Plans, six still do not. Additionally, several of the National Action Plans are 
primarily externally-facing, highlighting how gender and women’s issues will be factored 
into their interaction with post-conflict societies or in international affairs, not with their 
domestic governments.139  Further, it was not until 2016 that the gender advisor program 
was streamlined within NATO. And while all but two countries140 are currently 
participating in the program, it also fails to address improving domestic integration or 
representation in either military or high-level civilian positions.  
 The high-level emphasis on the need for increased women’s participation yet lack 
of meaningful details on how to do so is representative of the divergent histories with and 
understanding of women’s integration into the military specifically and thereby the 
formal security sector more broadly. It has been largely accepted that women are not only 
a positive force, but a necessary one for enduring peace and security (Simić, 2010; 
 
139 For examples, the NAPs of the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, France, and Germany all 
emphasize the importance of “promoting women’s rights around the world. The focus of domestic 
representation is on their country’s representation to organizations such as the UN and NATO, with little to 
address how to increase women’s integration at home.  
 
140 Hungary and Luxemburg  
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Paffenholz, 2018; Willett, 2010; Hudson, 2012). However, how to ensure women’s 
participation in a sustainable and meaningful way still remains a question. Both civilian 
policy makers and senior military leaders have committed to increasing the number and 
influence of women in the military, yet even with increased targeted recruitment 
campaigns have met with little success (Yeung, Steiner, Hardison, Hanser, & Kamarck, 
2017). A contribution of this dissertation is in confirming that culture and meaningful 
structural support for women, matters. A one-size fits all approach to increasing the 
impact of women, even among NATO countries, will not be successful due to historical 
and cultural drivers that have and will continue to shape women’s engagement with and 
integration into the military.  
  
Integration: Slow Moving and Impactful  
 One of the driving motivations for this dissertation was to understand why 
women’s integration has been so divergent among Western militaries when several other 
aspects of military policy and doctrine have greatly converged.  From air power, to 
ground scheme of maneuvers, to rules of engagement and escalation of force policies, 
ISAF countries have adopted nearly identical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) 
in the past fifteen years.141 This convergence largely emerged out of operational 
necessity, allowing for militaries to work together in a joint environment towards 
common tactical and strategic outcomes. Given that gender perspective and increased 
 
141 See reports from the Joint Air Power Competence Center, and NATO and Afghanistan topic cell for a 
broader discussion on the convergence of tactics.   
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women’s rights were an espoused goal of military operations in Afghanistan, the 
convergence of the use of women in combat could be expected. Yet where operational 
decisions on the use of aircraft and tactical ground formations were easily adaptable, the 
cultural norms surrounding women made it harder to pivot both policy and practice 
towards convergence. Indeed, foundational beliefs about equality are entrenched, and 
even the exceptional nature of war cannot overcome them.  
 Notably, the external demands of warfighting in Afghanistan drove the 
convergence of many of the tactics and strategies of many ISAF countries. Whether the 
mountainous terrain (Posen, 2002) or the simultaneous kinetic military operations and 
state building actions (Capstick, 2007), ISAF countries reacted to the environment and 
worked together to come up with innovative and effective solutions to work jointly. 
Historically, the exceptional nature of the external demands of warfighting have been 
argued to be strong enough to overcome norms about women’s participation in the 
military (Goldstein, 2001). However, such studies focused almost solely on the wartime 
participation, and women’s participation in specific moments of fighting. Indeed, the 
exceptional nature of the war in Afghanistan did lead to women’s increased participation, 
and women engaging in combat activities at an increased rate. However, despite an 
increased participation by women in nearly every ISAF country, there remain variations 
on how women were used, the impact that they had, and their experiences in the military. 
Despite the exceptional nature of war, and the joint tactical and strategic aims, the 
underlying beliefs about gender equality were stronger than the external factors and these 
differences endure.  
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 The stickiness of the beliefs about women’s equality highlights that integration is 
a slow-moving process that unfolds gradually overtime. It cannot be understood by 
looking only at how many women are in the military at a snapshot in history, but requires 
a holistic and qualitative view of the impact that women have on the military. The twin 
forces of beliefs about gender equality and military culture interact to create conditions 
that are either permissive or restrictive for women to integrate. Internal factors and beliefs 
are more important than external necessities, and are hard to overcome. The process does 
not happen quickly. As Ronald Inglehart (1977) observed several decades ago, Western 
values are slow to change, and even when there are shifts in priorities, underlying beliefs 
and sociopolitical organizing frameworks, including gender roles and hierarchies, endure. 
The case of women’s integration confirms this, in that even in the face of a changing 
international security environment beliefs about equality endure and greatly influence 
women’s ability to integrate into the military. Additionally, integration as a slow-moving 
process confirms the assertions by March and Olsen (1989) as to the iterative nature of 
institutional change. The institutional nature of military culture is an important part of a 
country’s sociopolitical identity. Changing it results in a “series of actions and reactions 
that need to be calibrated before the ultimate consequences can be understood” (March & 
Olsen, 1989, p. 56). Integration is a cumulative and cyclical process that requires taking 
history into account to better understand it.  
Further, the dominance of domestic beliefs over international factors during war 
emphasizes the importance of focusing on the impact that women have, rather than the 
rate at which they are included. During war, there is often an increase in the number of 
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women. Women’s participation is often highlighted during war, as women’s presence on 
the battlefield is a stark contrast to the traditional image of the soldier. The number and 
prominence of women during war makes it an attractive course of study. They also 
provide quick and easily digestible snapshots into a complex and slow-moving process 
and have given policy makers a platform to tout successes in women’s recruitment in the 
past decade (Schjølset, 2013). However, these quantifiable moments in time do not 
explain the variations in either the tactical impact that women have had or their 
experiences in the military. By focusing on how women have shaped military policy and 
practices I have differentiated between inclusion and integration. Truly, if women are 
having an impact we can assume that they are more fully integrated as a part of the 
institution from which they were previously excluded. The experiences of France, 
Norway, and the United States highlight how integration is not something that can be 
accomplished quickly nor be measured by the numbers of women or laws pertaining to 
their involvement.  
 
Understanding Women’s Integration in a Global Context  
  In this dissertation I focused narrowly on three Western militaries. However, the 
lessons about the interaction between beliefs about equality and military culture are 
important in a global context. In recent years, nearly every NATO and NATO partner 
country has opened all military occupations to women142 (NATO, 2017). Additionally, 
 
142 Turkey is the only country that has not yet opened all positions to women and does not have a timeline 
for lifting of occupational specialties.  
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the overall number of women in militaries is continuing to increase. However, the 
experiences of women in the military, and the role and impact that women are able to 
have in the military remains varied across countries. As laws and numbers become more 
and more convergent, it becomes more important to understand the drivers of the 
difference.   
While the specific experiences with integration in each of the countries presented 
here are unique to historical and cultural context, there are lessons learned about 
integration that can be applied to and tested in a broader empirical context about the 
interaction between beliefs about equality and military culture and tradition. As Western 
countries are increasingly emphasizing the importance of joint missions,143 better 
understanding an aspect of the military that has not converged will be important for both 
military commanders and policy makers. While the emphasis of military operations is 
often on understanding the cultural nuances of the environment in which the military is 
operating, my findings show that the cultural differences among militaries required to 
work together is also important.  
The findings from the cases of France, Norway, and the United States are 





143 In 2006 and then again in 2016 NATO countries took a pledge for “Interoperability in Joint Missions.” 
All NATO members as well as the Partnership for Peace nations signed on to the pledge that their domestic 
training would be conducted in such a way as to ensure joint operating possibilities.  
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In France, the claims about women’s difference and the view that the government 
played an active role in promoting and ensuring equality interacted favorably with the 
military’s culture to create permissive conditions for integration. Women were able to 
draw on their experiences in the past to emphasize the importance of the unique 
contribution that they bring. This was echoed in the specially selected units in 
Afghanistan that ensured that women were present as infantry soldiers. The doctrine 
around values promotion and the definition of national security as being related to peace 
and democracy emphasized in the 2012 White Paper on National Defense further reflects 
the impact that women’s service has had on the military. While there were initial setbacks 
because of the focus put on the difference between men and women, the national 
structure that provided for the unique needs of women made a culture of finding equality 
in the difference possible. This allowed for adaptability when a women-focused unit was 
necessary.   
In Norway, the claims about women’s similarities and strong role of the 
government in social policies made it an initial leader in women’s integration. The 
military, like much of Norwegian society, as a model of egalitarianism and an incubator 
for the de-gendering society. However, the emphasis on the de-gendered aspects of 
service made it difficult to address the changing needs of gender in geopolitics as seen in 
the response to the cultural needs of women in Afghanistan. Though Norway had one of 
the most senior female combat commanders in Afghanistan, cultural norms made it hard 
to leverage gendered aspects of service in the operational environment. When external 
conditions dictated that women were needed to leverage their unique characteristics, there 
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was not the language or the claims to express this. This has resulted in a stalling of 
women’s integration. However, new efforts to revamp the military structure through 
efforts like the Hunter Troop, and universal conscription’s influence in increasing the 
visibility of women in the armed forces may be ushering in a new cycle of women’s 
integration into the military.  
In the United States, the individual focus and lack of congruent claims about 
equality, and a lack of government involvement in promoting equality, coupled with the 
military’s combat focus hindered women’s ability to have an impact and truly integrate in 
the military. Individual women achieved great success, though largely conformed to the 
conventional military culture to do so. While continually a leader in the number of 
women in the military at any given point in time, there has been little progress with 
regards to policies that impact women or tactics reflective of women’s unique 
contribution. Further, while great progress was made with FET and Lioness teams, there 
has also been backlash due to the temporary nature of the programs and the enduring 
legacy of the combat exclusion and risk rule policies. Despite the United States being a 
leader in several areas of military innovation, domestic beliefs have hindered women’s 
integration. It remains to be seen how the roles newly opened to women in the combat 
arms will either allow claims to be made more strongly or allow those successful in 
combat arms to serve as a basis on which future claims for increased integration will be 
made.  
Bringing these findings into a broader empirical context further highlights the 
importance of the nuance of the interaction between beliefs about equality and military 
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culture. Looking broadly across NATO, we see that France, Norway and the United 
States are representative of general trends in Western Democracies. One way to see this 
is through quantifying the measures of gender integration. Quantifying integration 
provides a helpful visualization of grouping countries for further study, yet is limited in 
its application. By assigning values144 to each of the components of integration discussed 
in Chapter 3, I am able to index the various components in order to quantify the variation 
between NATO countries.  
Figure 7.1: Quantified Women’s Index for Select NATO Countries 2016 
   
  
The quantification of women’s integration is most helpful as a visual 
representation for the variation that is present in advanced Western democracies, 
countries are frequently grouped together because of both their mutual security 
guarantees as part of NATO and their democratic political systems. It also allows for 
grouping of countries for future, more in depth study.  
 








USA CAN UKG FRA SPA POR BEL NTH GMY DEN NOR ITA
Integration Index 2016
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However, the quantification of women’s integration suffers from several data-
driven limitations. Fist is the lack of standardized definitions or reporting about women’s 
participation. NATO did not standardize their annual report form until 2016. Prior to that, 
there was no standard for how women’s participation was operationalized. For example, 
conscripted forces were often excluded from reports on the percentage of women in the 
services artificially inflating the number of women in the services (Schjølset, 2013). 
Additionally, for several countries, demographic data on members of the military was not 
kept until after the passage of UN Resolution 1325. As Frank Steder noted, “the number 
were so small that demographic data wouldn’t be very helpful.”145 Given the limited 
uniformity of the data, an historical comparative quantitative analysis is difficult. Indeed, 
the quantitative representation only presents a current snapshot of integration without 
taking historical progress into account.  
 Additionally, much of the data, specifically that concerning the use of child care 
and parental benefits, as well as instances of sexual harassment or assault, rely on self-
reporting by service members. Similar to the reporting about women’s participation, there 
was no standardized method of collecting this data until NATO’s 2016 annual report. 
While there is value in being able to see the progress of a country over time in this data, it 
the historical lack of standardization makes comparing across countries difficult. It also 
carries a potential self-selection bias of those that choose to participate in surveys or feel 
comfortable enough to report harassment or abuse. As a result, countries with strong 
norms around reporting harassment and a strong track record of prosecuting offenders 
 
145 Interview January 2018 
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(such as Denmark) look “worse” than countries in which harassment is not reported 
because it is believed it will not be properly adjudicated (such as Italy), despite antidotal 
evidence that the problem is wide spread.  
The observable difference in women’s participation highlights the importance of 
taking an historical institutional approach to studying integration and to more closely 
examining the variations in beliefs about equality that exist between Western countries. 
While there is value in observing the current variation, rather than focusing on laws or 
numbers, beliefs about the nature difference between men and women and the 
government’s role in ensuring equality need to be further examined. The process, and the 
path that a country took to integration is important for understanding the longevity and 
durability of integration. There are several countries that have recently opened their 
militaries to women (for example, Italy), and have achieved a seemingly very high level 
of integration in a very short time. However, without a greater understanding of the 
cultural and political history, and the degree to which the claims about women’s 
participation match with military culture, it will be difficult to determine whether or not 
integration is truly lasting or merely temporary.  Further, with converging policies, yet 
continued variation, understanding political culture is increasingly important to both the 
study and practice of military integration.  
 In addition to highlighting the importance of viewing integration as a slow-
moving process focused on qualitative outcomes, this dissertation makes contributions to 
both the scholarly and policy communities. From a scholarly perspective, it contributes to 
both the study of women in public life and the study of the military and war. From a 
 268 
policy perspective, it has implications for the internal military policies as well as the 
future of joint operations.  
     
Other Limitations and Possibilities for Future Research  
 The small number of women that have served and the lack of historical data-
consistency presents challenges in researching women in the military. Indeed, due to the 
small numbers of women that have historically served, many countries have not 
quantified their contributions outside of war-time participation (Steder, forthcoming). 
Historical accounts are thus reliant on narratives from women that served or those that 
served with women. Most often such accounts come from more senior women or 
exceptional cases. While their stories and perspectives are important for understanding 
women in the military, their experiences may not be generalizable. Military structure 
preferences seniority, and junior members may not either feel comfortable speaking out 
or have the mechanisms through which to honestly share their experiences. Similarly, the 
writings and statements from women’s movements often have an elite-bias.  The 
“feminist consciousness” has primarily been recorded by women that have had the access 
to formal channels of power, or the means to self-publish and promote (Katzenstein, 
1987). Additionally, they are also centered on the concerns of more upper class women, 
often leading to divisions and fissures among women in a particular country (Banaszak, 
Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003). For this reason, the writings used to inform the claims about 
women’s role in public life may not be reflective of the broader beliefs held by all women 
in society.  
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 The shifting culture to the all-volunteer force may exacerbate the elite bias in 
future research. For Western countries in particular, the all-volunteer force is creating a 
widening cultural and socioeconomic gap between officer and enlisted classes (Griffith & 
Bryan, 2016). As this gap widens, intersectional forces such as poverty, race, the urban-
rural divide, familial affinity for military service, and educational attainment may 
overshadow gender in their stickiness with regards to the ability of certain groups to 
impact the military as an institution.     
 However, this dissertation also creates much opportunity for future and follow on 
research. First, with the standardization of data collection by NATO, there is an 
opportunity to more quantitatively track integration, and expand the work done. 
Especially for countries that have newly opened positions to women, tracking future 
changes will help to more robustly test the relationship between political culture and 
women’s integration.  
 Additionally, there is work to be done in testing the impact that female leaders 
have on the military. While there is a growing body of literature on the impact of 
women’s role in politics, senior military leaders are largely absent from these studies. 
While there is currently a very small cohort of female senior military leaders, there is an 
opportunity for systematic engagement at this early time to measure impact on military 





Broader Implications of the Dissertation  
Implications for Scholarship  
 From a scholarly perspective, there are two primary areas in which this 
dissertation has important implications. First is the study of women in political and public 
life. Second is the study of militaries and war. While these areas are seemingly 
contradictory, there are important lessons for each to be gleaned from the process of 
integration.  
 
For the Study of Women   
 Viewed as part of the broader studies on women in public life, this dissertation 
contributes in two important ways. First, it highlights the importance of viewing women’s 
movements not as isolated events, but as part of a broader social and political dialogue 
and tradition. Indeed, women’s movements are isolated events, nor do they exclusively 
impact “women’s issues.” In this dissertation, I show how even though not explicitly 
targeted by the women’s movement, the military was impacted by the types of claims 
made and the policies for which women’s movements successfully lobbied. Indeed, 
women’s movements are part of a culturally dependent and broad sociopolitical beliefs. 
 Further, the military is a form of political participation by women that is still 
largely under-studied. As I noted in Chapter 3, most studies of women in the military 
focus on the relationship as being one way, emphasizing how the military impacts 
women. However, as I showed in this dissertation, women can have an impact on the 
military as well. In order to more fully understand the impact of women in public life, it 
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is important to look not just at how women come to participate in traditionally masculine 
institutions, but at how they shape and change them. Further examination of women’s 
choice to join and remain in the military, and the ways in which they can impact military 
life is thus important to more complete understanding of women’s public and political 
participation.  
 Finally, it emphasizes the importance of qualitative studies of women’s roles in 
public life. The surge of quantitative studies in the mid-2000s were an essential step in 
emphasizing that “women matter” to and have a positive impact on public and political 
life (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005; Hudson & Den Boer, 2002). However, despite the 
near-universal rise in women’s participation in public life around the world, there 
remains variation in the degree to which women have been able to impact their societies 
and democratic institutions. A more in-depth examination of the process by which 
women came into public life, and the variations in the culture and institutions is 
necessary to unpack the impact that women in politics and the public arena have had.   
 
For the Study of the Military and War 
 Though charged with the monopoly on the legitimate use of political violence, the 
military is more than just killing people and breaking things. The military serves both a 
domestic and international purpose that is beyond violence. Understanding women’s 
integration in the military helps to further illuminate the role of the military in society, 
and sheds light on the lasting impact that military culture has on the political process. 
Indeed, militaries often take the culture of the environment in which they are fighting into 
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account, however rarely evaluate the role of domestic culture in shaping tactical 
outcomes. The study of women’s integration highlights the role that the culture of those 
fighting is as important as the place where the fighting is being done.  
 As Risa Brooks notes, political culture, social structures and institutions 
contribute to military effectiveness (Brooks, 2007). While she was primarily focused on 
the outputs of the military, and military power, in this dissertation I showed that culture, 
social structure and institutions are also important for the inputs to military activity. This 
highlights the important of studying women in the military outside of war, and 
incorporating women’s integration as part of the broader study of military effectiveness.  
 Understanding the role of domestic civilian culture helps to better understand 
what tactics and strategies are transferrable between militaries. In the era of increased 
joint fighting, there is an increasing push for cross-national military studies (Welle, 2010; 
Rietjens, 2008; Alford & Cuomo, 2009; Larsdotter, 2011).  Women’s participation in the 
military has been no exception to this (McBride & Wibben, 2012; Erwin, 2012). 
However, there is often a lack of cultural context to such studies. In this dissertation, I 
showed that cultural context and institutional history is an important part of 
understanding of not just integration, but the resultant variations in military tactics and 
strategies as well. 
 
Implications for Policy Makers  
 In addition to scholarship, this dissertation contributes to the policy discussions 
around women’s participation in the military. Especially since the passage of UN 
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Resolution 1325, increasing the number of women in militaries has been a priority of 
virtually every country. Indeed, NATO as a whole has made increased gender 
representation a priority of its leadership core. Numerous countries have commissioned 
studies on either how to increase the share of women in their military or the lessons to be 
learned from other countries (Burrelli, 2013; Berkshire Consultancy Ltd, 2010; Cawkill, 
Rogers, Knight, & Spear, 2009). The most common approach to “solving” the problem of 
women in the military or responding to internationally-focused studies has been to create 
new laws that increase opportunities for women, or adopt recruitment policies aimed 
specifically at female recruits.  
 However, as I showed in this dissertation, laws alone do not mean that a military 
is integrated. While important initial conditions, the sociopolitical culture and the military 
history plays an important role in ultimately determining integration. This helps to 
explain why despite a convergence of laws still there has still been a divergence of 
outcomes in integration. Indeed, implementing a law will not be effective if the claims 
needed to support it are not present. The most evident example of this is seen in the 
dropping of restrictions on women in combat roles. Despite the convergence on the 
decision to drop the restrictions on women’s service, women have not joined at similar 
rates. Indeed, several countries146 still do not have any women in combat arms positions. 
Laws and policies must be supported by claims that are compatible with military culture 
if integration is going to be successful.   
 
146 There is no mandatory reporting on the breakdown of occupational specialties. For those that did report, 
United States, Germany, and Denmark reported no women in ground combat arms. It is reasonable to 
assume that there are others as well.  
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 Senior military leaders can also benefit from an increased understanding of the 
troops with which they’re working.  Understanding the nuance of the variations in 
integration will help military leaders to better utilize troops under their command in the 
most effective ways possible. Indeed, militaries could benefit from cultural studies of 
their allies as well as their adversaries.   
 
My Commitment to Women, Peace, and Security 
 I came to this dissertation out of a desire to better understand my personal lived 
and observed experience as part of the United States Military who has taken part in 
several joint-ISAF combat missions. When I began work, I focused almost exclusively on 
military policy, and viewing the military as a unique institution in the WPS framework. 
Through the process, however, I came to better understand the importance of placing the 
military as an institution on equal footing with others, especially when advancing a 
comprehensive WPS research and practice agenda.  
 Especially in Western democracies, WPS is most often viewed as something that 
is required for international work, especially in newly emerging democracies, or post-
conflict societies. However, as shown through the historical-institutional approach to 
gender integration, cultural learnings are essential for ensuring WPS at home. If we are 
going to use international frameworks to encourage culturally-appropriate mechanisms 
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FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
I use a structured focused comparison to evaluate the variations in women’s integration in 
the militaries in France, Norway, and the United States. The below framework is used in 
each chapter.  
 
1. Military Culture  
a. What are the historical beliefs about the role of the military?  
b. How does the military view itself? (internal vs external orientation) 
c. How does the civilian population view the military? (internal vs external 
orientation)  
d. What types of missions is the military typically involved in? (values vs 
combat)  
e. How are individuals promoted and rewarded in the military?  
f. What is the connection between military service and citizenship? 
 
2. Structural Conditions  
a. What are the laws concerning women’s military participation?  
b. What are the policies around child care?  
c. What are the policies around parental leave?  
d. What are the policies around sexual harassment / assault?  
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3. Functional Participation  
a. What role did women play in the military?  
b. What occupational specialties did they hold?  
c. What was their role in overseas operations (training, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance, war)?  
d. What was their role in domestic military life?  
 
4. Durability 
a. How long did women typically stay in the military?  
b. How many women were senior officers? Staff noncommissioned officers?  
c. What leadership roles / command possessions did women hold?   
 
5. Claims about Service 
a. How did women frame their service?  
b. What did they call upon to make claims about service (historical events, 
women in other aspects of public life)?  
c. How did the claims about service coincide or conflict with military 
culture?  
 
6. Outcome  
a. What impact did women have on the military?  
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b. What policies were made to make it easier for women to serve?  
c. What tactics reflected women’s roles in the military?  




CODING SCHEME FOR QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF INTEGRATION  
 
Legal 
Component Description Value  
Barriers to 
Participation 
• Occupational fields closed to women  
• Geographical restrictions on women’s 
service  
• Quotas/limitations on number of women 
able to serve in a given unit 
0 = Women excluded from the 
military  
0.25 = Women Auxiliary / 
Limited ranks  
0.5 = Women allowed in 
gendered roles only  
0.75 = Women allowed in all but 
ground combat  
1 = No restrictions on women’s 
service   
Childcare  • Provisions for childcare during all 
operational hours  
• Provisions for childcare during 
deployment  
• Equality in maternity / paternity leave  
Division of Parental Leave  
0 = No parental leave  
0.25 = Maternity leave only  
0.5 = Maternity + Paternity, but 
paternity optional or negligible  
0.75 = Maternity + Paternity, but 
paternity significantly less  
1 = Equal maternity + paternity 
leave  
 
Child Care  
0 = No formal child care 
policy/private care only   
0.5 = Mixed public/private care  




• Laws on harassment / assault (military 
and national)  
• Number of allegations of harassment or 
assault 
• Nature of investigation and prosecution 
of alleged instances of harassment or 
assault  
Laws 
0 = No formal laws  
0.5 = Military policies that put 
prosecution in the hands of 
commanders  




Functional Participation  
Component Definition Value  
Level of Participation • Women’s Participation as percentage of total 
force 




• Women’s Participation in overseas missions  
• Breakdown of combat vs peacekeeping vs 
training missions 





Component Definition Value 
Staff Noncommissioned 
Officers 
• Percentage of SNCOs that are women  Percentage as 
decimal  








Retention Rate  • Percentage more/less that women reenlisted 






















USA 1 0.159 0.0068 0.1253 0.3466 0.4787 0.18 -0.15 0 0.5 0.5 2.6677 
CAN 1 0.151 0.008 0.082 0.354 0.444 0.117 0.068 0.5 0.75 0.5 3.53 
UKG 1 0.101 0.0008 0.1055 0.205 0.3113  nd nd  0 0.75 0.5 2.6623 
FRA 1 0.152 0.0007 0.0406 0.5147 0.556 0.066 0.066 1 1 1 4.84 
SPA 1 0.126 0 0.0243 0.0853 0.1096 0.069 0.0726 0.5 0.75 0.5 3.1272 
POR 1 0.11 0 0.047 0.2558 0.3028 0.06 -0.03 0.5 0.5 1 3.4428 
BEL 1 0.078 0 0.089 0.3935 0.4825 0.05 0 1 0.75 1 4.3605 
NTH 1 0.095 0.0003 0.1054 0.3761 0.4818 0.071 0.0141 0.5 1 0.5 3.6619 
GMY 1 0.113 0.0001 0.0696 0.548 0.6177 0.056   0.5 1 0 3.2867 
DEN 1 0.064 0 0.039 0.2315 0.2705 0.077 0.0483 0.5 0.25 0.5 2.7098 
NOR 1 0.107 0.0054 0.249 0.2026 0.457 0.077 0.017 0.5 1 0.5 3.658 
ITA 1 0.041 0 0.019 0.127 0.146 0.045 0.108 0.5 1 0.5 3.34 
 
 
 
 
 
